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It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if 
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The landscape of the United States dual banking system2 changed 
dramatically in recent decades.  The extent of this change, and the 
consolidation trend in the financial services industry, challenge the 
assumption that commercial banks provide services which are unique 
and insulated from non-bank competition.3  Today, commercial banks 
face increasing competition from various industries, and much of that 
new competition recognizes no geographic boundaries.  Those charged 
with overseeing this industry in turmoil must move beyond old 
assumptions about banking products, services, and markets, as embodied 
within outdated merger review methodologies.  This Article addresses 
the past, present, and future of banking consolidation with an aim to 
propose modern reforms to the multi-agency approach to banking 
antitrust analysis. 
“The market increasingly is being taken by non-banking entities, 
both on the credit and deposit side,” according to a banking consultant in 
1993.4  Customers are taking their business to non-traditional institutions 
(brokerages, mortgage lenders, and insurers) for their online banking 
services.5  The advent of “pure Internet banks” presents additional 
 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
 2. The U.S. banking system is comprised of the main components, national and 
state banks, the former are chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
(“OCC”) and the latter by a state-level banking authority.  For a detailed discussion of 
this system, including the implications of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act, see CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 19-32.5 (Juris Publ., 4th ed. 2001). 
 3. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (providing Court’s 
discussion of unique and insulated nature of traditional commercial banking). 
 4. Steven Greenhouse, Nonbanks’ Community Role Will Be Target of U.S. Study, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1993, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9F0CE0DE163FF93AA35755C0A965958260&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Or
ganizations/T/Treasury%20Department (quoting Joann Barefoot, banking consultant). 
 5. See Deborah Salus & Mary Weeks, Do Community Banks Gain Competitive 
Advantage with Online Banking? 3 J. BEHAV. & APPLIED MGMT. 263 (Winter 2002), 
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borderless competition with traditional banking institutions, sans the 
“brick and mortar” overhead.6  Moreover, non-traditional banks, though 
not regulated in the same manner as traditional banks,7 have increasingly 
ventured into service areas previously dominated by commercial banks.8  
Yet, the erstwhile separation of commerce and banking has less to do 
with tradition, however, than it is attributable to regulatory restrictions.9  
In short, administrative standards differ for banks and non-bank 
competitors, which in turn inhibits the competitiveness of the banks “in 
areas where the two intersect.”10  According to the Department of Justice 
 
available at http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/articles/vol3/article3_17.htm. 
 6. Id. at 263. 
 7. See Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 364 (1986). 
In 1984, the Board promulgated rules providing that nonbank banks offering the 
functional equivalent of traditional banking services would thereafter be regulated as 
banks.  The Board accomplished this by amending its definition of a bank, found in 
‘Regulation Y,’ in two significant respects.  First, the Board defined ‘demand deposit’ 
to include deposits, like NOW accounts, which are ‘as a matter of practice’ payable on 
demand.  Second, the Board defined the ‘making of a commercial loan’ as ‘any loan 
other than a loan to an individual for personal, family, household, or charitable 
purposes,’ including ‘the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, 
certificates of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, and similar money market instruments.’ 
Id. (citations omitted).  Regulation Y in its complete form can be found at 
http://www.bankersonline.com/regs/225/225.html.  The Federal Reserve is currently 
proposing changes to Regulation Y. See John Poirier, Fed’s Bank Merger Rule Changes 
May Come By Yr-end, REUTERS, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://today.reuters.com/ne 
ws/articleinvesting.aspx?type=etfNews&storyID=2007-10-18T185833Z_01_N1837770 
5_RTRIDST_0_FED-ACQUISITIONS.XML. 
 8. For example, CapitalOne is a hybrid financial holding company, offering a 
wide range of both traditional and non-traditional products and services to a broad 
customer base. See Capital One, About Capital One, Corporate Information, History, 
http://www.capitalone.com/about/corpinfo/history.php?linkid=WWW_Z_Z_Z_ABT1_
C1_01_T_ABT3.  Wells Fargo & Co “is a diversified financial services company 
providing banking, insurance, investments, mortgage and consumer finance through 
almost 6000 stores, the Internet and other distribution channels across North America 
and internationally.” See Wells Fargo, https://www.wellsfargo.com/. 
 9. See Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America, The Mixing of 
Banking and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 97, 100 
(2004), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/article3.pdf. 
 10. Comment Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comments On the Federal Reserve Bank’s Interpretive and 
Compliance Guide to the Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Docket No. R-1159, Nov. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/201459.htm (“[T]he competitive benefit 
offered by banks may be reduced because the banks are not able to competitively 
respond to multi-product bundles and discounts offered by non-banks.  Consumers are 
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(“DOJ”), the repeal of interstate banking prohibitions over the last three 
decades has “erode[ed] banks’ monopoly power in ‘traditional’ 
products.”11  Only a vestige of the traditional regulatory opposition 
remains to what now appears to be an almost inevitable trend12 “toward 
a greater blending of banking and commerce.”13 
Geographic variables must also be prominent on the regulatory 
agenda.  Purveyors of banking products now include numerous non-
traditional entities, and the markets for bank products and services and 
the firms offering them are no longer just locally situated.  Increases in 
the locations and diversity of a market’s participants can influence the 
competitive landscape.  Bank mergers enable companies that do not 
traditionally provide commercial banking services to compete at the 
local level with commercial banks.  For example, consolidations have 
expanded the geographic scope of credit card giants—which have 
expansive reach into almost all communities in the nation.  When these 
credit card giants acquire regional banks, such transactions facilitate a 
broader market for both the targeted bank and the acquirer. 
Consolidation in any industry inevitably leads to a discussion that 
contemplates competitive fairness.  The United States Supreme Court 
took up the issue in 1963.  United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 
the seminal banking antitrust case, is such a result, applying the 
Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 191414 to commercial 
 
harmed when banks cannot respond to competitive tying and bundling of products 
offered by non-banks.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Blair, supra note 9, at 97. 
 13. Id. at 99, 101. 
[D]espite the regulations and prohibitions on certain activities and forms of control, . . 
. certain charter types—including limited purpose consumer banks and ILCs—permit 
a mixing of banking and commerce.  These charter types do not fit the definition of a 
bank under the BHCA and technically are not banks; in certain states, they can be 
owned by commercial firms.  These firms, in turn, are not subject to the BHCA and 
are not required to become bank holding companies. 
Id. at 99 (citations omitted). 
 14. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A 
New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 346 n.1 (2007). 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘every contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); section 2 of the Sherman Act 
makes it illegal for a firm to ‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize’ interstate 
commerce, Id. § 2; and section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any mergers the effect 
of which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’ 
Id. § 18.  Because of the broad wording of these statutes, ‘[p]erhaps uniquely, 
American antitrust law is a creature of judicial, as opposed to legislative, creation.’ 
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banks.  The Philadelphia National Bank Court established a long-
standing common law bank merger competition analysis, and introduced 
to the banking antitrust competitive analysis key analytical concepts 
such as “product or services market” and “relevant geographical 
market,” which became commonplace in the evaluation of probable 
competitive effects of a proposed merger.15  The seminal banking 
antitrust case continues to considerably influence the regulatory review 
paradigm for bank merger analysis. 
The anticompetitive test minted by Philadelphia National Bank was 
designed to determine whether the proposed bank merger might lessen 
competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.16  
The Court defined “line of commerce” as a cluster of products and 
services17 which banks specially provide to customers, also referred to as 
“commercial banking.”18  The Court noted that “[i]ndividuals and 
corporations typically confer the bulk of their patronage on banks in 
their local community; they find it impractical to conduct their banking 
business at a distance.”19  Thus, the analysis created nearly half-century 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 15. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see also United States 
v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); Elijah Brewer III et al., The Price of Bank 
Mergers in the 1990s, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 2000 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chicago, 
Ill.), at 7, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/20 
00/EPARTL1.PDF. 
 16. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 355 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962)). 
 17. See id. at 356 (“[T]he ‘line of commerce’ (relevant product or services market) 
and ‘section of the country’ (relevant geographical market) . . . .”). 
 18. See id.; see also James V. DiSalvo, Federal Reserve Geographic Banking 
Market Definitions, 1 n.1 (1999), available at www.philadelphiafed.org/files/bm/fedmk 
ts.pdf. 
The Court held that banking was a ‘unique line of commerce,’ represented by the 
cluster.  The cluster consists of the following: unsecured personal and business loans, 
loans secured by securities or accounts receivable, automobile and consumer goods 
installment loans, tuition financing, bank credit cards, revolving credit funds, demand 
deposits, time and savings deposits, estate and trust planning, trusteeship services, 
lock boxes, safety deposit boxes, account reconcilement services, correspondent 
services, and investment advice. 
Id. (citing and quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 
(1963)). 
 19. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357-58; see also id. at 358 (“The factor of 
inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as high transportation costs 
in other industries.”). 
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ago construed a section of the country, or relevant geographic market, as 
being the local community of the bank’s customers.20 
Philadelphia National Bank is not without its critics.  Former 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Lee Loevinger, the attorney 
who argued the case for the government in Philadelphia National Bank, 
observed: 
‘[F]rom the viewpoint of economic or antitrust analysis, the [cluster 
approach] has become virtually meaningless.’  Because of state and 
federal regulations on the lending activities of financial institutions, 
it is now necessary to measure possible price discrimination by 
commercial banks by delineating narrow submarkets, which consist 
of available substitutes to consumers who have limited alternatives.21 
Eugene A. Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency,22 criticized 
Philadelphia National Bank for its failure to anticipate the increasing 
nonbank competition that banks would face: “Unlike [thirty-five] years 
ago, there are now [1995] nonbank competitors for nearly all 
commercial bank services.”23  Ludwig questioned whether it was even 
possible for a bank to gain a monopoly over financial services in any 
given market in the face of modern technology, the disappearance of 
interstate banking barriers, and an “explosion” of financial services 
offered by nonbanks.24  Another former Comptroller of the Currency, 
Robert Clarke, observed that “commercial banks no longer perform a 
unique function, which was the critical factor in the Supreme Court’s 
 
 20. See id.; see also id. at 361 (acknowledging that the four-county Philadelphia 
metropolitan area, which was recognized as a “meaningful banking community” in state 
law, best defines the “section of the country” for the purposes of evaluating the merger). 
 21. Michael T. Sheehan, Irving Bank Corp. v. Board of Governors: Recognition of 
the Submarket Approach in Bank Merger, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 677, 702 (1989) 
(quoting and citing Loevinger & Lehr, A New Look at Bank Mergers, 4 BANKING EXP. 
REP. 1, 13 (1985) (citations omitted)).  (brackets in original). 
 22. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, http: 
//www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (“The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks.  It also supervises the 
federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.”). 
 23. See Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the OCC 
Antitrust Conference (Nov. 16, 1995), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/ 
95-127.txt (“[N]onbank competitors . . . enjoyed relatively unrestrained access to the 
market and could develop specialized expertise in one or two areas of the financial 
services universe.”). 
 24. See id. 
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adoption of the cluster approach in Philadelphia National Bank.”25  
Clarke emphasized that “‘[w]hile banking functions continue to be 
essential to our economy, [commercial] banks themselves are not.’”26 
William Baxter, President Reagan’s first nominee to head the 
DOJ’s Antitrust Division, was a vocal proponent of a new antitrust 
enforcement paradigm.27  He believed that a continuing process was 
necessary in order to accurately appraise “how our economy works, 
[and] how enterprises in different kinds of markets interact with one 
another,” and appropriate antitrust policy should be “based on whatever 
it is we know at any particular moment about the economics of industrial 
organization.”28  In practicality, some of the government agencies which 
review bank merger proposals do not conform their antitrust competitive 
banking analysis to the dictates mandated by Philadelphia National 
Bank.  However, adherence to the traditional geographic market and 
product market definitions mandated by that decision has endured.  The 
Federal Trade Commission recognizes that antitrust policy and laws are 
works in progress.29 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has 
acknowledged that since the 1970s many changes have occurred in 
banking technology, market dynamics, regulations and the economy, 
and these changes “have raised questions regarding the traditional 
definition of locally limited commercial banking.”30  The Board has also 
 
 25. Sheehan, supra note 21, at 701 (citing A Clear Message: Expand Banks’ 
Product Line, ABA BANKING J., 52 (Dec. 1987)). 
 26. Id. at 700-01 (quoting A Clear Message: Expand Banks’ Product Line, ABA 
BANKING J., 52 (Dec. 1987)). 
 27. See Thomas B. Leary, FTC, Guidelines for Merger Remedies: Prospects and 
Principles, Remarks at the Joint U.S./E.U. Conference (Jan. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learyuseu.shtm. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Debra A. Valentine, FTC, Assistant Dir. for Int’l Antitrust, The Evolution 
of U.S. Merger Law, Remarks at the INDECOPI Conference (Aug. 13, 1996), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvperumerg.shtm (“At its best, antitrust is a 
pragmatic tool designed to achieve important social and economic goals.  In U.S. 
merger policy, those goals have not always been constant, or consistent with each other, 
and our enforcement tools have not always been perfectly adapted to their tasks.”). 
 30. Supporting Statement for the Survey to Obtain Information on the Relevant 
Market in Individual Merger Cases (FR 2060; OMB No. 7100-0232), at 2, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/formsreview/FR2060_20070530_omb.pdf 
[hereinafter Supporting Statement]. 
Since the [Connecticut National Bank] decision, numerous changes in bank 
regulation, technology, and the economy have raised questions regarding the 
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noted that large firms have access to national and sometimes 
international markets for their financial services, and that some U.S. 
banks compete with foreign banks (and the domestic and foreign capital 
market) for large business customers.31 
The Supreme Court has not “repudiated the pillars of its merger 
jurisprudence of the 1960s.”32  The Court recognized, in a 1986 case, the 
changing dynamics of the domestic banking markets and the 
interrelationship between commerce and banking,33 but has not yet 
exercised jurisdiction over any cases that would permit the Court to 
begin fashioning an updated analytical framework for bank merger 
regulatory review.  The competitive analysis conducted by the federal 
banking agencies and the DOJ should not be based upon the outdated 
localized geographic concept that was mandated by Philadelphia 
National Bank almost a half-century ago, nor should the regulatory 
analysis proceed under the presumption that commercial banks remain 
unique because of their cluster of products and services.  Courts and 
banking regulator should craft a competitive effect analysis that 
accounts for the changing financial environment, considers the realistic 
geographic competition, and considers the range of services and 
 
traditional definition of locally limited commercial banking.  The most notable 
changes are: [ ] thrift institutions are now permitted to offer the majority of banking 
products, including transaction accounts and commercial loans, [ ] nondepository 
institutions offer various financial services, [ ] securitization and loan sales have 
increased, and [ ] electronic technology has increased the potential for very quick 
delivery of financial services to final users, including small businesses and consumers. 
Id. at 2. 
 31. See id. 
 32. William E. Kovacic, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Toward a Domestic 
Competition Network, Address Before the American Enterprise Institute Conference on 
“The New Antitrust Paradox: Policy, Proliferation in the Global Economy” (Apr. 21, 
2003), at 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/040421domesticcomp.pdf. 
 33. See Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1986). 
This case is about so-called ‘nonbank banks’- institutions that offer services similar to 
those of banks but which until recently were not under Board regulation because they 
conducted their business so as to place themselves arguably outside the narrow 
definition of ‘bank’ found in § 2(c) of the Act.  Many nonbank banks, for example, 
offer customers NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts which function like 
conventional checking accounts but because of prior notice provisions do not 
technically give the depositor a ‘legal right to withdraw on demand.’  Others offer 
conventional checking accounts, but avoid classification as ‘banks’ by limiting their 
extension of commercial credit to the purchase of money market instruments such as 
certificates of deposit and commercial paper. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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products offered by competitors in the context of the state of the 
domestic economy at the time of the proposed banking combination. 
The authors contend that the local market analysis established by 
Philadelphia National Bank is no longer an appropriate measure of 
anticompetitive effects of proposed banking combinations.  While it 
remains among the worthy metrics for the evaluation of market 
concentration, its exclusive use is no longer reliable.  Moreover, the 
cluster of services and products once delineated as the “line of 
commerce” do not accurately determine the competitive effects of a 
bank merger in today’s market for financial products and services.  The 
authors believe that U.S. courts and regulatory agencies should consider 
the utilization of a competitive effect analysis which takes into account 
the changing financial environment, realistically contemplates 
geographic competition, and accounts for the growing range of service 
and products offered by competitors, from bank and non-bank entities 
alike. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT BANK CONSOLIDATION AND STATISTICS 
The United States has “more banks per capita . . . than in any other 
developed economy,” and a majority of these banks are community 
banks.34  Between 1980 and 2003, the number of banks was halved, 
from 16,000 to approximately 8000.35  During the 1990s, an average of 
over 500 bank mergers occurred annually, up from roughly 345 per year 
during the 1980s.36  The number of operating banks in the U.S. declined 
by some 30% since 1990 during this consolidation period.37  As of 2006, 
 
 34. Robert DeYoung et al., Whither the Community Bank? Relationship Finance in 
the Information Age, 178 CHI. FED LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chicago, Ill.), 
June 2002, available at www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/2002/cfljune2002_1 
78.pdf.  Community banks are “identifiable by their small size, their limited geographic 
reach, and their traditional array of banking services.” Id.; “[N]ine out of every ten bank 
mergers have eliminated a community bank.” Id. 
 35. Steven J. Pilloff, Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Study 176: Bank Merger Activity in 
the United States, 1994-2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/p 
ubs/staffstudies/2000-present/ss176.pdf. 
 36. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
 37. Id.  For a detailed statistical economic analysis of banking merger data, see 
Bronwyn, Kathleen Richards, The Economics and Law of a Semi-Regulated Industry: 
The Philadelphia National Bank Case (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University) (on file with Authors); see also Samuel Richardson Reid, Legislation, 
Regulation, Antitrust, and Bank Mergers, 92 BANKING L.J. 6 (1975). 
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there were some “7900 separately insured banking entities operating in 
the United States.”38 
Domestic banks remain relatively small compared to their overseas 
competitors.  For example, only one of the twenty largest banking 
companies is located in the United States, with the others dispersed in 
Japan (10), France (4), Germany (2), United Kingdom (1), and 
Switzerland (1).39  However, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, 
Jamie Dimon, “expects the current market turmoil to unleash a wave of 
bank mergers” and that these mergers will be “big.”40  This prediction is 
based upon the necessity for companies to reorganize and the need for 
more capital, long-term financing, and access to goods, which generally 
occurs after a crisis—not during the crisis.41  Among the biggest of these 
mergers proposed in the shadow of the subprime fallout, was Dimon’s 
JPMorgan Chase bidding $2 per share to acquire investment bank and 
broker Bear Stearns & Co. with the support of, and “prodding” by, the 
Federal Reserve, including as much as $30 billion in government 
backing of distressed assets.42 
Fewer banks controlling an increasingly higher concentration of 
domestic banking assets has been the trend in the U.S. for decades.43  In 
 
There were less than 100 bank mergers per year from 1940 through 1951.  From that 
date forward the pace quickened.  During the entire decade of the 1950s, the 
Comptroller of the Currency approved 904 mergers involving national banks and 735 
mergers were approved by the various state regulators.  In the latter half of that decade 
there were 883 approved mergers involving resources amounting to $16.6 billion. 
Id. at 6-7. 
 38. United States Delegation, Working Party No. 2, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Roundtable on Competition and Regulation in 
Retail Banking, at 2, DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2006)60,  available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bc/international/docs/Banking_US.pdf [hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 39. See Terry Calvani et al., Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers: A Survey of 
Recent Developments, n.2 (Dec. 1, 1996), available at http://library.findlaw.com/1996/ 
Dec/1/129882.htm. 
 40. John O’Donnell, JP Morgan Heads Predicts Wave of Bank Mergers, REUTERS, 
Dec. 7, 2007, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/bankingfinancial-SP/idUKL0762 
21020071207?feedType=RSS&feedName=bankingfinancial-SP. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit 
to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/art 
icle/SB120569598608739825.html?mod=hpp_us_inside_today. 
 43. See Daniel J. Mahoney, When Bank Mergers Meet Antitrust Law, There’s No 
Competition. Why Antitrust Law Will Do Little To Prevent Overconsolidation Within 
The Banking Industry, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 303, 302 (1995)  “Total domestic 
banking assets held by the largest 100 banking organizations increased from 50.2% in 
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2006 the DOJ screened 1048 bank mergers, of which 592 required 
competitive analysis.44  By contrast, the DOJ screened 1850 bank 
mergers and required competitive analysis of 1197 (approximately 64%) 
of these bank merger proposals in 1997.  A majority of the nation’s 
banking customers have experienced at least one merger where their 
accounts were switched to another bank.45 
The consolidation trend is not limited to banks themselves, but 
extends to the banking advocacy associations as well.  America’s 
Community Bankers and American Bankers Association merged on 
December 1, 2007.46  The now unified Association, which retained the 
American Bankers Association name,47 represents a majority of the 
banking industry and comprises more than 95% of the domestic banking 
industry’s $12.7 trillion in assets.48  The Association boasts membership 
comprised of “large money-center banks and community banks,” and a 
majority of its constituents are banks with less than $125 million in 
assets.49 
Various theories exist regarding the trend of increased banking 
consolidation via mergers and similar transactions.  According to a 
former FTC commissioner, some of the more notable contributing 
causes to this acquisition trend include “deregulation, competition, the 
desire to improve bank capital ratios, the S&L crisis, [and] a growing 
 
1977 to 61.5% in 1987.” Id. at 303 (citation omitted). 
 44. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Workload Statistics, Fiscal Year 1998-
2007 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm. 
 45. See Bank Mergers Provide Opportunity for Phishing, NETCRAFT.COM, 2007, 
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/06/09/bank_mergers_provide_opportunity_for_
phishing.html. 
 46. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, America’s Community Bankers Merger 
Takes Effect (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://acbankers.org/news_center/aba_america 
s_community_bankers_merger_takes_effect [hereinafter America’s Community 
Bankers Merger Takes Effect]. 
 47. See Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, America’s Community Bankers Board 
Unanimously Approves Merger Plan with ABA (Sept. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.acbankers.org/news_center/americas_community_bankers_board_unanimo
usly_approves_merger_plan_with_aba/. 
ACB and the ABA are the nation’s two leading advocates for banks of all charter 
types and sizes.  When combined, the new organization’s members will represent 95% 
of the assets of the nation’s $11.5 trillion banking industry.  The organization will be 
the premier bank trade association in Washington and the nation. 
Id. 
 48. America’s Community Bankers Merger Takes Effect, supra note 46. 
 49. Id. 
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perception that we have too many banks.”50  A Federal Reserve 
economist remarked that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 mandates that “regulators . . . promptly close 
a depository institution when their capital falls below predetermined 
quantitative standards” and the Act may motivate banking organizations 
to become larger so that the “FDIC will cover 100 [%] of their 
deposits.”51 
A 2004 Federal Reserve study identified “the most important 
factor” facilitating bank consolidation as “the gradual easing of 
geographic restrictions on banks.”52  “Widespread deregulation of 
geographic limits started in the mid-1970s and culminated with the 
Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994[;] 
[t]he easing enabled banking organizations to increase the size and reach 
of their operations by making acquisitions outside of their markets, 
including in other states.”53 
The DOJ attributed the trend of swelling bank mergers in the early 
1990s to “the fragmented way in which the law has required banks to 
operate: confining them to their home states, and in some cases, to their 
home counties or cities.”54  Banks were prevented from expanding 
internally, but were generally able to expand into other geographic 
markets, such as across state lines,55 by acquiring banks in target 
markets.56  The DOJ, in response to the hike in merger activity, assessed 
 
 50. Calvani et al., supra note 39. 
 51. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 2-3. 
 52. Pilloff, supra note 35, at 1. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Robert E. Litan, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Address before the Antitrust Section of the ABA: Antitrust Assessment of Bank 
Mergers (Apr. 6, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/litan.htm  
The reason for the low challenge rate is because: 
In many cases, the banks involved in these mergers have not competed with each 
other and thus have not posed antitrust risks.  In the overwhelming majority of the 
others where the banks have competed against each other, it was clear that the market 
would continue to be competitive even after the merger. 
Id. 
 55. See Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 2 (stating that the Riegle-Neal Act of 
1994 permitted banks to “branch interstate by consolidating existing out-of-state bank 
subsidiaries or by acquiring banks or individual branches through mergers and 
acquisitions”).  In 1995, the Riegle-Neal Act permitted bank holding companies to 
acquire banks in any state, and in 1997, the Riegle-Neal Act enabled banks located in 
different states to merge. Id. 
 56. See Litan, supra note 54; see also David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 
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approximately 2000 bank merger proposals each year in the early 
1990s.57  The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
facilitated new types of banking combinations,58 permitting “banks to 
merge with securities firms and insurance companies within financial 
holding companies.”59 
The vast majority (94% of 3313 bank mergers) effected between 
1994 and 2003 involved combinations in which the target bank operated 
exclusively in a single state.60  Most of the smaller bank mergers of that 
era were “fairly limited,” at least in terms of the geographical market 
scope, which together “tended to account for a relatively small share of 
the assets, deposits, and offices that were purchased.”61 
 
Consolidation in U.S. Banking: Which Banks Engage in Mergers (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, Working Paper Series, Dec. 2002), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2001/2001-003.pdf.  Prior to 1997, when the Reigle-
Neal Act was amended, the ability to acquire a domestic bank and operate it as a branch 
across state lines (“branching”), with few exceptions, was not permitted. See id.  The 
Riegle-Neal Amendment Act of 1997 was enacted in 1997. See Riegle-Neal 
Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-24, 111 Stat. 238 (1997); see also Pa. Ass’n 
of Cmty. Bankers, Bank Geographic Structure, available at 
http://www.pacb.org/banks_and_banking/geography.html (“The Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act allows national banks to operate branches across 
state lines after June 1, 1997.”). 
 57. See Litan, supra note 54. 
 58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999).  The Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999 is also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
 59. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 2; see also Blair, supra note 9, at 97-100 
(“After repeated congressional attempts to address financial modernization, GLB was 
passed in 1999, effectively acknowledging and extending the degree to which banking 
organizations were permitted to engage in nonbank financial activities.”) Id. at 100; see 
also Robert DeYoung et al., The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community 
Banks 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2003-14, 2003), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2003-14.pdf. 
Feeling pressure from a series of rulings by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency that granted increased product powers to national banks, and an announced 
merger between the largest bank in the U.S. and one of the world’s largest insurance 
companies (CitiBank and Travelers), Congress followed nationwide geographic 
deregulation with broad-based deregulation of banking powers.  Specifically, in 1999 
Congress passed the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act which effectively repealed the Glass-
Steagall Act. 
 
These congressional acts ratified the decades-long deregulation movement, and as 
such they marked the culmination of story lines that began in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Id. 
 60. See Pilloff, supra note 35. 
 61. Id. at 21-22. 
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Which banks are typical takeover targets?  The most likely to be 
absorbed have been banks with low capital ratios and those that are cost-
efficient operators.62  Larger national banks also have a greater than 
average likelihood of engaging in mergers.63  The acquiring bank tends 
to be a large bank, often one which has experienced recent rapid growth, 
“lower average capital ratios,” and “higher ratios of total loans to 
assets.”64 
A slim minority of proposed bank mergers are denied according to 
a review of the Board’s Orders on Banking Applications.65  During the 
ten year period from 1997 to 2007, there was apparently only one denial 
of a merger application,66 and this denial did not appear to be based upon 
competitive or public interest factors.67  The Board appears to have 
approved all applications for acquisitions, purchases or mergers brought 
pursuant to the Bank Merger Act during the same period.68  Out of the 
several hundred bank merger and acquisition applications reviewed by 
the Federal Reserve each year, as required by law, fewer than a dozen 
 
 62. See Wheelock & Wilson, supra note 56, at 3 (citing D.C. Wheelock & P.W. 
Wilson, Why Do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and 
Acquisitions, REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 82, 127-38 (2000)); see also id. at 15 (“One 
can reasonably expect that the more concentrated the market in which an acquiring bank 
is located, the less likely it will absorb other banks.”). 
 63. Id. at 15-16. 
 64. Id. at 18; see also Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 6 (noting that where a 
target bank operates in a less competitive market, the price of the acquisition will 
increase). 
 65. For a list of the Board of Governors’ Orders on Banking Applications, visit 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2007/ and click the link for each 
year to view the orders by year (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 66. See Fed. Reserve Sys., 2002 Orders on Banking Applications, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2002/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2008).  The authors reviewed each merger application from the period of 1996 to 2007, 
by visiting http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2007/ and click the 
link for each year to view the orders by year.  There is the possibility, however, that 
banks voluntarily withdraw their merger applications prior to a denial of their proposal, 
and this could skew the statistics. 
 67. See, e.g., Illini Corp., 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 85, 86 (2003), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2002/20021223/attachment.pdf 
(denying the acquisition). 
 68. To see each order for applications filed under the Bank Merger Act during the 
1997-2007 period, visit http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legaldevelopments/or 
dersother/1997.htm, click the link for each year, and view under the heading “Bank 
Merger Act.”  The Bank Merger Act is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (2007). 
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evaluated by the Federal Reserve raise any potentially serious anti-
competitive problems that might jeopardize the application.69 
Statistics and examples of approvals and denials can be misleading, 
however.  It may appear that the current bank merger review process has 
become something of a bureaucratic “rubber stamp” where some 99.5% 
of all bank merger applications were ultimately approved between 1996 
and 2007.70  Yet, banks contemplating a merger or acquisition will often 
remedy any regulatory issues which may bar approval, or withdraw their 
application, which a skewed view of the statistics would not reflect.71 
Although it is not yet clear what will be the end result of the 
subprime lending market’s 2008 collapse, an increased pace of bank 
merger activity is a reasonable expectation, especially combinations 
involving community banks located in hard hit real estate markets.  
According to at least one sector analyst, “you’re going to see companies 
merge to survive.”72  A cottage industry has even developed recently that 
 
 69. See Supporting Statement, supra note 30. 
 70. See Litan, supra note 54 (“For the period 1989 to 1994, the DOJ only 
conducted a full investigation into forty-three (0.5% of all proposed transactions) of the 
roughly 9000 applications filed with the relevant supervisory banking authorities, and 
challenged only four (0.05%) of those forty-three, requiring divestiture of branches.”). 
 71. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 6, 8.  For example, Homestone Mortgage 
Inc., one of Washington State’s largest mortgage brokers, applied to the FDIC for a 
bank charter.  When the FDIC recommended that Homestone Mortgage make changes 
to the bank’s initial business plan (recommending a broadening of some of its lending 
areas), Homestone withdrew its application.  Homestone had hoped to “transition[ ] 
from a mortgage firm to a bank,” thereby expanding its “footprint and help it tap into 
the Puget Sound region’s booming banking business.”  Apparently Washington state 
regulators are familiar with this sort of “transitioning,” because banking rules make it 
fairly easy for a mortgage company to convert itself into a bank. See Justin Matlick, 
Mortgage Firm Withdraws Application to Open Bank, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., May 25, 
2007, available at http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2007/05/28/story11.html 
?f=et143&b=1180324800^1467880&hbx=e_vert; see also William Jason, Sterling 
Savings Bank, North Valley Bank Merger Delayed, NORTH BAY BUS. J., Oct. 26, 2007, 
available at http://www.northbaybusinessjournal.com/article/20071026/BUSINESSJO 
URNAL/71026020/1209.  Sterling Financial Corp. recently submitted a proposal to the 
FDIC seeking to merge with North Valley Bancorp, but the delayed regulatory approval 
process took “longer-than-expected” and the firm sought additional time to comply with 
FDIC requirements. 
 72. See Kevin Duffy, Local Banks Reeling from Housing Downturn, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., Apr. 13, 2008, available at http://www.ajc.com/services/content/business/stori 
es/2008/04/11/bankhangover_0413.html. 
Banks with soaring loan amounts that were at least 30 days past due at year’s end 
include First Georgia Community Bank in Jackson, up 4,061 percent; Neighborhood 
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performs “early triage” on behalf of prospective bank merger 
participants in order to improve the approval chances of related merger 
applications.73  Those who seek to predict the outcome of bank merger 
proposals, and the resultant regulatory scrutiny, would be well served to 
remain mindful of the relevant doctrinal approaches that preceded this 
era. 
III.  ORIGINS OF U.S. BANKING AND ANTITRUST LAW—BRIEF OVERVIEW 
[T]here can be no single, consistent sketch of the developments in 
banking law in the period under review.  Only the perspective that 
comes when time provides the proper spacing will reveal whether the 
storm or the quiet was the theme of the picture, or whether it was all 
just a happening.74 
The Sherman Act, passed on July 2, 1890, “forbids mergers 
effecting an unreasonable restraint of trade.”75  The Clayton Act, enacted 
in 1914, “prohibited the acquisition by one corporation of the stock of 
another corporation when such acquisition would result in a substantial 
lessening of competition between the acquiring and the acquired 
companies, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”76 
In 1950, the Cellar-Kefauver Act amended the Clayton Act.  Cellar-
Kefauver, viewed as the beginning of the “modern era of merger 
control,”77 broadened the reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The 
 
Community Bank in Newnan, up 10,097 percent; and FirstBank Financial Services in 
McDonough, up 3,072 percent. The list goes on. 
 
“You’re going to see companies fail, you’re going to see companies merge to 
survive,” said Christopher Marinac, an analyst at FIG Partners in Atlanta, a bank 
research firm. 
Id. 
 73. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Financial Institutions M&A 2007: 
Continued Rich Diversity in an Active M&A Market an Annual Review of Leading 
Developments, 1638 PLI/CORP 209, 737-78 (2007). 
 74. John J. Brennan, Developments in Banking Law – 1964-1965, 83 BANKING L.J. 
189 (1966). 
 75. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 354-55 (1963) (citations 
omitted). 
 76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-13 (1962). 
 77. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy 
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 433 n.184 (2003) (“Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), a case DOJ initiated in the 1950s, supplied the 
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1950 legislation “eliminated the artificial distinction between 
acquisitions of assets and acquisitions of stock,”78 and removed the 
perception that there was a “rising tide of economic concentration in the 
American economy79 [and] . . . that increased economic concentration 
might threaten other fundamental values of a non-economic nature.”80  
These changes were the impetus for this amendment.81  The objective of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act is to prohibit only those acquisitions that 
may allow the combined entities to exercise market power by raising 
prices and restricting the availability of a product or service to 
customers.”82  “[T]he Supreme Court, echoed by the lower courts, has 
said repeatedly that the economic concept of competition, rather than 
any desire to preserve rivals as such, is the lodestar that shall guide the 
contemporary application of the antitrust laws, not excluding the 
Clayton Act.”83 
Prior to the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956 
(“BHCA”),84 bank holding companies were not subject to existing 
regulatory restrictions that otherwise prevented banks from blending 
banking with commerce.85  Further, non financial companies, such as 
 
Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the 1950 statute.”); see also Cellar-Kefauver Act 
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(1994).  This Act amended the Clayton Act. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311 n.18. 
 78. Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 107 (2002). 
 79. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 260 (2001) (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315). 
 80. Id. (citation and quotation omitted). 
 81. Id.  The Clayton Act was again amended in 1976.  Section 7A of the Act, 
known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, requires the relevant regulatory agency to give 
prior notification of large merger proposals to the U.S. DOJ. See Clayton (Hart-Scott 
Rodino) Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976) (amended 2001). 
 82. FTC v. Foster, No. Civ. 07-352 JBACT, 2007 WL 1793441, at *51 (D. N.M. 
May 29, 2007) (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2006); see also Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. 
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1986) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)) (“Since 1970 the 
statute [Bank Holding Company Act] has provided that a bank is any institution that 
‘(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) 
engages in the business of making commercial loans.’”). 
 85. See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 
VILLANOVA L. REV. 1, 34-86 (1993) [hereinafter Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding 
Company Act]; see also Christian Johnson & George G. Kaufman, A Bank By Any 
Other Name . . . , 4Q/2007 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 
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Ford Motors and Sears, the titans of traditional “commerce,” openly 
operated banks.86  Concerns mounted in the 1950s that combinations 
such as these might eventually result in a disproportionate concentration 
of economic and social power, and served as a catalyst for promulgation 
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and its 1970 amendment.87  
The Bank Holding Company Act prohibits companies which own banks 
from acquiring banks across state lines and disallows these companies 
from partaking in “activities that are not closely related to banking.”88 
The Bank Holding Company Act “vests broad regulatory authority 
in the [Federal Reserve] Board over bank holding companies ‘to restrain 
the undue concentration of commercial banking resources and to prevent 
possible abuses related to the control of commercial credit,’”89 and 
“authorizes the Board to regulate ‘any company which has control over 
 
Chicago, Ill.), at 44, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicpers 
pectives/ep_4qtr2007_part3_johnson_etal.pdf. 
The mixing of banking and commerce in ‘universal’ banks, as exists in many 
countries, has long been controversial in U.S. banking history.  Most state charters for 
banks and the federal charter for national banks limit the activities of banks to 
accepting deposits and making loans, but permit other services viewed as incidental to 
banking.  This was generally interpreted by regulators as prohibiting the banks from 
engaging in some financial activities, such as insurance underwriting and real estate 
brokerage, and all nonfinancial activities.  Until the enactment of the BHCA in 1956, 
these limitations were not generally applied to bank holding companies, so that 
commercial firms could own banks. 
Id. 
 86. See id. 
Ford Motors and Sears, among other large nonfinancial firms, operated banks.  But, as 
discussed earlier, growing fears in the 1950s that such combinations could lead both 
to excessive economic and social power and to potential conflicts of interest favoring 
sellers resulted in the enactment of the BHCA in 1956 and its expansion in 1970.  
Since then, the thrust of legislation, which often is preceded by changes in the 
marketplace, has reversed.  The financial powers of BHCs have been expanded 
significantly, most recently in the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, and the 
nonfinancial powers have been expanded moderately.  However, unlike ILCs, 
commercial banks may still not be owned by commercial firms. 
Id. 
 87. See id.; see also Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 (Pub. L. 
No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ( Pub. L. No. 511; 70 
Stat. 133). 
 88. Carol Conjura, Comment, Independent Bankers Assoc. v. Canover: Nonbank 
Banks Are Not in the Business of Banking, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 429, 430 (1986) (quoting 
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982)). 
 89. Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 365 (1986) (quoting 
S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 24 (1970)). 
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any bank.’”90  The Bank Holding Company Act contains the same 
standards as those contained within section 2 of the Sherman Act91 and 
section 7 of the Clayton Act.92  The Bank Holding Company Act has 
redefined banks and bank holding companies several times.93 
It is evident from this chronology of the evolution of the definition of 
both ‘bank’ and ‘bank holding company’ for regulatory purposes that 
the legal definition at any moment in time reflects the pressing 
public concerns of the time.  As the concerns changed, so frequently 
did the definitions.94 
The definitional evolution of “bank” ensures that prevention of 
excessive economic concentration in banking, one of primary purposes 
of the Bank Holding Company Act, is accomplished.95 
 
 90. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 365 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1)). 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2007). 
 92. Id. § 18; see also Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 368-69. 
[The Bank Holding Company Act] provides that, even if an institution accepts 
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, the institution is 
not a bank unless it ‘engages in the business of making commercial loans.’  Under 
Regulation Y, ‘commercial loan’ means ‘any loan other than a loan to an individual 
for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes,’ including ‘the purchase of 
retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, bankers’ 
acceptances, and similar money market instruments.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 93. See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 85, at 39, table 1 (In 1956 the definition of 
bank was “[a]ny national or state-chartered commercial, savings, or trust bank.”  In 
1966 the definition was narrowed to “any institution that accepts deposits that the 
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand.”  In 1970 it was further narrowed to 
only include “[a]ny institution that both accepts demand deposits and makes business 
loans.”  In 1987 the definition of banking was again changed to “[a]ll banks insured by 
the FDIC except thrifts, credit cards banks, and industrial loan companies and banks.”); 
see also id. at 39, table 2.  In 1970, Congress further narrowed the definition of “bank” 
to include only those domestic institutions “‘which 1) accepts deposits that the 
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and 2) engages in the business of 
making commercial loans.’” Id. at 40 (quoting Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 
(Public Law 91-607) Sect. 2(c), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1760.  In Dimension Fin. Corp., 
the Federal Reserve attempted to change the definition of “banks” within the Bank 
Holding Company Act; however the Supreme Court did not permit the change. See 
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S at 365-69. 
 94. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 85, at 41.  The Federal Reserve Board, in 
1984, amended Regulation Y to clarify the Act’s definition of bank. See Dimension Fin. 
Corp., 474 U.S at 364. 
 95. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 85, at 39. 
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A.  A Tide Not Stemmed 
During the five years from 1955 to 1960, legislation was introduced 
in response to the “apparently accelerating trend toward concentration in 
the commercial banking system in this country, a trend which existing 
laws were evidently ill-suited to control.”96  Both the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 195697 and the Bank Merger Act of 196098 were 
promulgated during this period.  The Bank Merger Act of 1960, while 
augmenting the regulatory agencies’ bank merger review powers,99 did 
little to slow the merger wave.100  Criticism of the “permissive 
approach” by bank regulators, who in the early 1960s approved “a 
substantial majority” of merger proposals, led to Philadelphia National 
Bank, the first court action challenging a proposed and approved 
merger.101  Domestic bank merger analysis was henceforth based on a 
new animating set of principles. 
The Bank Merger Act of 1960 required bank regulators to evaluate 
competitive effects prior to approving a proposed bank merger.102  
 
 96. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 373 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Wemple & Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust 
Laws, 16 BUS. LAW. 994, 995 (1961).  Many of the bills are summarized in Funk, 
Antitrust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 BANKING L.J. 369 (1958). 
 97. 12 U.S.C. § 1841.  The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 empowered 
Federal bank regulators, in part, to restrict anticompetitive mergers. See 12 U.S.C. § 
1841; see also SIFMA Primer on Securities – Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/bank_holding_company_act_of_19.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008). 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was implemented in response to banks 
forming bank holding companies in order to own both banking and non-banking 
businesses.  This Act, among other things, generally prohibited a bank holding 
company from engaging in most non-banking activities or acquiring voting securities 
of certain companies that are not banks. 
Id.; see also Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act, supra note 85. 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2007). 
 99. Id. § 1828(c)(4); see also Ludwig, supra note 23 (“In the banking area, the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the Bank Merger Act of 1960 gave federal 
bank regulatory agencies power to restrict anticompetitive mergers.”). 
 100. Reid, supra note 37, at 11. 
 101. See id. at 8-9. 
 102. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1982); see also Ralph P. DeSanto, Product 
Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision of Section 4(c)(8) of the 
Bank Holding Company Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1127, 1127 n.137 (1985). 
The Bank Merger Act of 1960 requires bank regulators to take into account 
competitive effects in the approval of bank mergers.  The Bank Merger Act of 1966 
required bank regulators to disapprove mergers that violated § 7 of the Clayton Anti-
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Supervisory banking agencies were required by statute to employ a fact-
specific test that contemplated a variety of factors, including: 
[T]he financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, 
the adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the 
general character of its management, the convenience and needs of 
the community to be served, whether the bank’s corporate powers 
are consistent with the purposes of the federal deposit insurance act, 
and the effect of the transaction on competition (including any 
tendency toward monopoly).103 
Upon due consideration of the preceding factors, the relevant 
agency could approve only those proposed mergers which it determined 
were consistent with the “public interest.”104  The examining agency was 
also required to request a report detailing an evaluation of the 
competitive factors from the U.S. Attorney General, as well as similar 
reports from the non-reviewing agencies (Federal Deposit Insurance 
 
Trust Act, unless ‘the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly 
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting 
the convenience and needs of the community to be served.’  Bank regulatory decisions 
applying more stringent standards than § 7 have been reversed. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., A Brief History of the 
Conference on Bank Structure & Competition (2007), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_events/2007_bsc_
history.cfm. 
 103. H.R. REP. No. 86-1416 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995 (S. 1062 
is the bill which became the Bank Merger Act of 1960); see also United States v. Phila. 
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 378 (1963) (The statutory test for the banking regulators is 
whether or not the merger proposal is in “the public interest,” utilizing six banking 
factors and the impact of the merger on competition.). 
 104. H.R. REP. No. 86-1416 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995; see also 
Stanley D. Waxberg & Stanley D. Robinson, Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank 
Mergers, A Need for Legislative Revision, 82 BANKING L.J. 377, 379 (1965). 
Thus, even if all four agencies see eye to eye on the antitrust issue -- let us suppose 
that they are unanimous that the merger will have adverse effects on competition -- 
the supervisory agency may, nevertheless, conclude that the transaction is in the 
public interest because one or more of the banking factors outweighs the antitrust 
consideration.  For example, the agency may decide that the merger will solve an 
acute management succession problem at one of the banks by the infusion of new 
executive blood; or that it will lend financial stability to a bank with an erratic pattern 
of earnings and improve its prospects; or that it will provide important banking 
services in a community which does not presently enjoy them; or that it will enable 
the bank to meet the expanding credit needs of its customers by increasing its lending 
limit; and so on. 
Id. at 380 (citations omitted). 
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Corporation (“FDIC”), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), and the Federal Reserve).105 
Even if a proposed merger had the potential to adversely effect 
competition, the supervisory agency was authorized to find that a 
proposed merger was in the “public interest”—and therefore lawful 
under the 1960 Bank Merger Act—if the factor(s) detailed above 
outweighed antitrust competitive considerations.106  Thus, even if a 
proposed combination might ultimately reduce banking competition, the 
transaction could still be approved if certain market benefits would 
arguably be realized from the proposed merger, because the proposed 
combination would be in the “public interest.”107  For example, a 
planned merger might be approved if the combination would expand 
service to customers by way of increased lending limits;108 or if the 
merger would bring financial stability to a target bank with inconsistent 
earnings;109 or perhaps where a merger would bring needed banking 
services to an underserved community.110 
After the enactment of the Bank Merger Act in 1960, regulatory 
agencies appeared to largely disregard the competitive factors in their 
review of merger applications and, in 1961, one year after the enactment 
of the Bank Merger Act, roughly $6 billion in bank resources were 
involved in the mergers approved by regulators.111  The DOJ entered the 
fray and began a period of judicial action in order to “correct this 
deficiency of regulatory discretion.”112  It is believed by some, however, 
 
 105. See H.R. REP. No. 86-1416 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995, at 
2005-06; see also Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 378-79 (citing H.R. REP. 
No. 1416 (1960); S. REP. No. 196 (1959)) (The Bank Merger Act of 1960 authorized 
three banking agencies (FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve) to approve bank mergers.). 
 106. See Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 379. 
 107. Id. at 380. 
 108. See id. (citing 1963 FDIC Rep. Cas. No. 19; 1963 Fed. Reserve Rep. Cas. No. 
29; 1963 Compt. Curr. Rep. at 216-17). 
 109. See id. (citing 1963 FDIC Rep. Cas. No. 1; 1963 Fed. Reserve Rep. Cas. No. 
24; 1963 Compt. Curr. Rep. at 135). 
 110. See id. (citing 1963 FDIC Rep. Cas. No. 23; 1963 Fed. Reserve Rep. Cas. No. 
30; 1963 Compt. Curr. Rep. at 129-30). 
 111. See Reid, supra note 37, at 8. 
The opinions of the agencies appeared to concede little relevance to the oligopoly 
theory in these matters; rather, the focus was on the traditional concern of bank 
solvency and the assumed efficiency and other benefits of large banking institutions.  
The result was that the 1960 Act had little effect in curbing mergers. 
Id. 
 112. Id. (citations omitted). 
618 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
and apparently by the regulatory agencies prior to Philadelphia National 
Bank, that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 (with inferences drawn from 
legislative history) authorized regulatory agencies to approve bank 
mergers if “resulting benefits to the banking system more than offset any 
concomitant lessening of competition.”113  One thing is clear: “the 1960 
Act had little effect in curbing mergers.”114  Consequently, a new era in 
banking antitrust analysis emerged, as the Philadelphia National Bank 
analysis became law. 
There were few impediments to bank mergers in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Antitrust challenges brought by the Department of Justice, and 
the adverse DOJ opinions in merger reviews, did not slow the merger 
trend.115  There were 190 approved mergers one year after Philadelphia 
National Bank.116  Statistical review of early 1960s bank merger activity 
also suggests that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was not entirely 
effective at reigning in anticompetitive mergers.  During the five-year 
period between May 13, 1960 and May 12, 1965, the bank merger 
approval rate was 97%, with 859 mergers approved by the banking 
supervisory agencies, and a mere 28 merger proposals denied,117 
although aggregate average annual mergers fell from 175 to roughly 
 
The agencies approved a substantial majority of the merger applications which came 
before them; more significantly, they continued to approve horizontal mergers 
between large banks in major metropolitan areas such as Philadelphia, Chicago, and 
New York in the early 1960s.  The result of this permissive approach by the bank 
regulatory agencies was the initiation of the first court action challenging a proposal 
and approved merger involving the Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard Trust 
Corn Exchange Bank during 1961. 
Id. 
 113. Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 380.  The approval of a bank merger 
by the supervising regulatory agency deemed in the public interest and whose benefits 
offset the reduction in competition, was: 
[S]pecifically contemplated by the Congress that enacted the Bank Merger Act of 
1960.  The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency cited a number of examples 
‘where the public interest would clearly require that the proposed merger should be 
approved even though a definite and substantial lessening of competition could be 
expected’ which is why ‘the committee concluded that the strict rule of the 1950 
amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was inappropriate to the field of banking.’  
And the House Committee was ‘convinced the Senate’s approach is basically sound.’ 
Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted). 
 114. Reid, supra note 37, at 8. (citation omitted). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 11. 
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150.118  The substantial difference in banking antitrust policy between 
the DOJ and  bank regulatory agencies was evident during this period.  
The DOJ found adverse anticompetitive effects in 494 (58%) of the 859 
mergers approved by the regulatory agencies.119  In contrast to the 
statutory public interest standard employed by bank regulators, the 
Justice Department’s market competition scrutiny involved a “more 
doctrinaire approach to the problem of competition than the agencies.”120  
Less than 1% of these approved mergers, however, were ever actually 
challenged in court.121 
The DOJ invariably denied bank merger proposals where the effect 
on competition was something greater than insignificant, employing a 
“more penetrating” antitrust inquiry than the banking regulatory 
agencies.122  The DOJ  typically opposed a bank merger application if 
the proposed transaction enabled two (or more) local banks to better 
compete in a larger market area with larger rivals, because the merger 
effectively eliminated significant competition between these two smaller 
local banks.123  In 1963, while using its “more penetrating” scrutiny, the 
 
 118. See Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., The 1966 Amendment to the Bank 
Merger Act, 83 BANKING L.J. 753, 764 (1966) (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, an appreciable decline is evidenced in the merger activity of the largest 
banks.  While the banking agencies displayed a high rate of approvals, it is possible 
that many merger schemes never developed because of apprehension of administrative 
scrutiny by the banking agencies or the increasingly active Justice Department.  
Moreover, market concentration in the banking industry has apparently lessened since 
enactment of the Act.  An appreciable increase in the number of new banks chartered 
has raised the net number of commercial banks from 13,486 in 1959 to 13,775 in 
1964.  In addition, there has been a significant increase averaging 1,000 per year in 
the number of additional branches. 
Id. at 764 (citations omitted). 
 119. Reid, supra note 37, at 11. 
 120. Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 381. 
 121. Reid, supra note 37, at 11. 
 122. Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 381 (citation omitted). 
Going beyond the question of what quantum of competition will be lost as a result of 
the merger, they [DOJ] also focus on the vigor of remaining competition–the variety 
of alternative sources for bank services and credit–in an effort to forecast the effect of 
the transaction in the market as a whole. 
Id. 
 123. See id. at 382 (citing United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 
(1963)).  The DOJ position was apparently that a “gain to competition in one market 
cannot erase a loss in another,” and if a bank merger would increase competition in one 
area where competition was already vigorous, the DOJ would oppose even slight 
increases in market concentration, because the concentrated status “bespeaks a lack of 
effective competition.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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DOJ objected to roughly two-thirds of all proposed mergers that were 
otherwise approved by the relevant banking regulator.124  For example, 
the OCC approved ninety-one bank mergers in 1963, and the DOJ took 
issue with sixty-four of these proposals under its anticompetitive effect 
policy.125  The DOJ rejected proposed mergers approved by the Board 
by a similar margin, approving thirty-one merger proposals and finding 
injury to competition in twenty-two merger proposals.  The DOJ 
similarly rejected a number of the FDIC’s merger approvals—of thirty-
one approved mergers, the DOJ voiced disapproval with seventeen 
mergers.126  The DOJ may have been the lone government entity to not 
perceive the 1960 Bank Merger Act as overtly permissive policy.  The 
differing antitrust methodologies between the DOJ and bank regulators, 
and the divergent results of the disparate analysis, was conspicuous. 
B.  Philadelphia National Bank and its Progeny 
Incongruent approaches between supervisory banking agencies and 
the Justice Department led to a seachange in the review of proposed 
bank mergers.127  One such interpretive difference, coupled with the 
“permissive approach” of bank regulators, sparked litigation that 
questioned the regulatory oversight of a proposed merger between 
Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange 
Bank.128  Soon after the passage of the 1960 Bank Merger Act, the 
Comptroller of the Currency approved the merger of the Philadelphia 
National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank.129  The U.S. 
 
 124. See id. (Where a potential bank combination could conceivably result in the 
“elimination of substantial competition between two banks,” the Justice Department 
would typically reject the merger proposal). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. (citation omitted). 
 127. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 373 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
During this period, [1955 to 1960] the Department of Justice and the federal banking 
agencies advocated divergent methods of dealing with the competitive aspects of bank 
mergers, the former urging the extension of [§] 7 of the Clayton Act to cover such 
mergers and the latter supporting a regulatory scheme under which the effect of a 
bank merger on competition would be only one of the factors to be considered in 
determining whether the merger would be in the public interest. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 128. See Reid, supra note 37, at 9. 
 129. See Walter E. May, Redefining the Product Market: Commercial Bank Mergers 
in the New Competitive Era, 103 BANKING L.J. 124, 128 (1986). 
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Attorney General objected to the proposed merger, citing antitrust 
grounds, and sought to block the consummation of the combination, 
arguing that it violated both section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.130  A District Court approved the merger in 1962, but 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision “squarely—and solely—
on an application of section 7 of the Clayton Act.”131  United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank132 started a trend of local bank branch 
divestitures in order to obtain approval for proposed mergers, and 
ushered in the application of section 7 of the Clayton Act133 and section 
1 of the Sherman Act134 to proposed bank mergers.  Soon thereafter, in 
1964, the Supreme Court in United States v. First National Bank & 
Trust Company of Lexington135 “removed any doubt that the Sherman 
Act applied to bank mergers,” finding the “competitive impact” of the 
merger as the overriding factor.136 
During the period from 1964 to 1966, the Justice Department filed a 
host of lawsuits attacking bank mergers already approved by the relevant 
supervisory agency.137  These lawsuits often resulted in court orders that 
 
 130. See id.; see also United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 
1962), rev’d, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 131. May, supra note 129, at 129 (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321). 
Philadelphia National Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Lexington decision establish 
that antitrust challenges to bank mergers are to be viewed in terms of the effects of 
those mergers on the product market known as commercial banking.  In essence, the 
only competitors of commercial banks that those decisions recognize are other 
commercial banks.  Savings and loan associations, credit unions, commercial finance 
companies, money market funds, and a host of other participants in the financial 
markets also occupied by commercial banks are to be ignored when the competitive 
impact of a bank merger is considered. 
Id. 
 132. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321. 
 133. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
 134. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000). 
 135. United States v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 
(1964); see also C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas 
and the Curse of the Curse of Bigness, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art 
icle=1000&context=c_paul_rogers.  In Lexington, Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, held that “one relevant market” was commercial banking, but “[b]ecause he 
determined that the merger was illegal with the market so defined, he avoided deciding 
whether trust department services constituted another relevant market.” Id. at 72. 
 136. Reid, supra note 37, at 9 (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321; First Nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665). 
 137. See First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665; Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321; United States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 263 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Mo. 
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appeared to detrimentally affect banks and the public; creeping 
uncertainty grew regarding the bank merger approval process.  Banks 
subject to the court orders were required to “unscramble their affairs as a 
result of antitrust litigation subsequent to agency approvals of 
mergers.”138  Intended to foster stability and predictability, antitrust laws 
as applied to banking only yielded borderline chaos for those seeking to 
perform mergers and acquisitions among banks. 
Three years after promulgation of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, the 
Philadelphia National Bank Court held that “contrary to the prevailing 
conventional wisdom,” bank mergers were indeed subject to section 7 of 
the Clayton Act.139  The United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co.140 decision also “carried antitrust doctrines into the banking field in 
an unprecedented way.”141  Prior to this case, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that antitrust laws were violated 
when the combined “market” percentages were substantially lower than 
the benchmarks in the Philadelphia National Bank and Lexington 
cases.142  The court also required prophylactic divestitures because the 
 
1966), rev’d 389 U.S. 27 (1967); United States v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. 
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Brennan, supra note 74;. see also Hearing on S. 1968 
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 89th Cong. 3-4 (1965) (statement of William McChesney Martin, Jr., 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/wmm65/download/30999/martin65_0519.pdf, 
at 5 [hereinafter statement of William McChesney Martin]. 
My study of the situation makes it crystal clear to me that the test for the validity of 
bank mergers today is not what the Congress thought it was to be at the time it 
enacted the Bank Merger Act. . . . This litigation [Philadelphia National Bank] --as 
well as other pending antitrust court cases to overturn bank mergers--makes it 
unmistakably clear that banks and their customers now face the uncertainty that, even 
though merger proposals receive the advance approval of the appropriate Federal 
banking agency, the transactions are subject to veto in the courts on the basis of 
competitive factors alone. 
Id. at 6. 
 138. Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137, at 5. 
The problems that have followed in the wake of these court cases are well known.  A 
high degree of public confidence is peculiarly essential to a sound and vigorous 
banking structure.  Indeed, the uncertainty regarding agency approvals and protracted 
antitrust litigation to unscramble mergers risk detrimental effects on the banks 
involved and the public. 
Id. at 6. 
 139. Ludwig, supra note 23. 
 140. See Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867. 
 141. Brennan, supra note 74. 
 142. See id. (citing Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867). But see United 
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proposed merger “‘accelerat[ed] a trend toward oligopoly’” and caused a 
“‘permanent elimination of significant competition between major 
competitors,’” which violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts.143 
Incidentally, the Federal Reserve had approved the merger of the 
Manufacturers Trust Company and The Hanover Bank in September, 
1961.144 
 
States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 377 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I cannot concur in the simplistic way in which the Court applies the numbers test here. 
 
Philadelphia Bank did not hold that all bank mergers resulting in an ‘undue 
percentage share of the relevant market’ and ‘in a significant increase in the 
concentration of firms in that market’ necessarily violated [§] 7 of the Clayton Act.  
Instead that case established a rule by which the percentage figures alone do no more 
than ‘raise an inference’ that the merger will significantly lessen competition.  
Philadelphia Bank left room, however, for the merging companies to show that the 
‘merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects.’  In short, under the 
Philadelphia Bank test, the percentage figures create a rebuttable presumption of 
illegality. 
 
In this case there are two aspects of market structure, each largely ignored by 
the Court, that I think might well rebut the presumption raised by the 
percentage figures that the merger will have a significant effect on 
competition.  Consequently, I think the appellees should on remand be given 
an opportunity to show by ‘clear evidence’ that despite the percentage 
figures, the anticompetitive effects of this merger are not significant. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 143. Brennan, supra note 74 (quoting Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867).  
Some criticize the DOJ’s divestiture as an apparent solution to an anticompetitive 
merger. See Rep. Kucinich Sends Letter to Federal Reserve Bank Requesting A Public 
Hearing in Cleveland, U.S. FED NEWS, Mar. 23, 2007, available at 
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentPrint.aspx?DocumentID=61247.  
Representative Kucinich publicly commented on the proposed acquisition by 
Huntington Bancshares of Sky Financial, and stated the following: 
Despite efforts by Huntington Bank to comply with the Community Reinvestment 
Act, depository banks are shutting down throughout my district. Cropping up like 
weeds in their place are payday lenders and check-cashing institutions with usurious 
interest rates and fees.  This trend, while pandemic in the inner city, is notable 
throughout my district. 
Id. 
 144. See Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137, at 7. 
The merger of Manufacturers Trust Company and The Hanover Bank, which the 
Board approved under the Bank Merger Act in September 1961, was held to violate 
the Federal antitrust laws last March by the Federal District Court in New York.  That 
merger is the only one approved by the Board under the Bank Merger Act that has 
been the subject of antitrust litigation. 
Id. 
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Decided in 1963, Philadelphia National Bank held definitively that 
bank mergers are subject to application of both the Sherman Act145 and 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, and that “regardless of economic benefit, a 
bank merger could still be a legal violation of the Clayton Antitrust 
Act.”146  Prior to Philadelphia National Bank and its progeny, the 
legislative history of the Bank Merger Act of 1960 specifically 
contemplated Clayton Act scrutiny of bank mergers, and expressly 
rejected its application as excessively “rigid,” and argued that “it would 
be unwise to attempt to anticipate all possible situations where a merger 
would benefit the public.”147 
In applying the antitrust statutes to bank mergers, the Court 
established the test for determining the competitive effects of a proposed 
bank merger and “whether the effect of the merger [ ] may be 
substantially to lessen competition [ ] in any line of commerce in any 
section of the country.’”148  The majority defined “line of commerce” as 
the “relevant product or services”149 offered by a commercial bank, 
concluding that banks were “unique and insulated” from competition 
because of the distinctive conglomeration or cluster of products and 
services offered by these banks.150  The Court also defined “section of 
the country” as the “relevant geographical market,”151 and this market is 
the area where the “effect of the merger on competition will be direct 
and immediate.”152 
 
 145. See United States v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 
666 n.1 (1964). 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide in pertinent part: 
 
SEC. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. * * * 
 
SEC 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor * * *. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 146. How Not to Get Married, TIME, Feb. 18, 1966, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,899042,00.html? (citation omitted). 
 147. H.R. REP. No. 86-1416 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995, 2003. 
 148. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 355. 
 149. Id. at 356. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 358 (“In banking, as in most service industries, convenience of location is 
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In 1964, United States v. First National Bank & Trust Company 
determined that “merging companies are major competitive factors in a 
relevant market, [and that] the elimination of significant competition 
between them constitutes a violation of [section 1] of the Sherman 
Act.”153  United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust,154 
decided in 1970, held that: 
[F]or the purposes of analyzing a proposed merger under the Clayton 
Act, regulators should consider both the level of concentration and 
the change in concentration of firms in the appropriate geographical 
market, and a merger application may be accepted if it can be shown 
that the transaction provides substantial public benefits even though 
it may violate antitrust guidelines.155 
C.  The Aftermath of Philadelphia National Bank 
Philadelphia National Bank spawned “one of the more significant 
developments for banking in the 1965 Congressional session – the 
failure to amend the Bank Merger Act.”156  Frustrated federal regulators 
sponsored legislation to combat the recent court decisions, with stalwart 
support from the American Bankers Association and other influential 
lobbyists.157  In a 1965 statement to Congress, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Martin noted: 
 
essential to effective competition.  Individuals and corporations typically confer the 
bulk of their patronage on banks in their local community; they find it impractical to 
conduct their banking business at a distance.”). 
 153. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. at 673. 
 154. 399 U.S. 350 (1970). 
 155. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 7 box 1 (citing United States vs. Phillipsburg 
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970)). 
 156. Brennan, supra note 74; see also S. 1698, 89th Cong. (1965); see also Reid, 
supra note 37, at 9-10 (citing Benjamin J. Klebaner, The Bank Merger Act: Background 
of the 1966 Version, 34 S. ECON. J. 250, 250 (1967)). 
Stirred into action by a series of Antitrust Division victories, the American 
Bankers Association sponsored legislation introduced by Senator Robertson 
within a month after the Manufacturers Hanover decision was announced.  
Bankers (other than those sponsoring the Independent Bankers Association) 
were convinced that under the 1960 law, competition was not intended to be 
the controlling factor in bank merger cases, and the Attorney General was 
assigned only an advisory role, but the courts had decided otherwise. 
Id. 
 157. See Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., supra note 118, at 769 (stating that the 
American Bankers Association “had expressed no concern over the relationship 
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In a very real sense, S. 1698 would merely restore to the bank 
merger situation the rules that were generally understood to apply at 
the time of enactment of the Bank Merger Act in 1960 and until the 
decision in June 1963 of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Philadelphia National Bank case that section 7 of the Clayton Act 
applied to bank mergers, even though approved under the 1960 
statute. . . . The best evidence of this is in the legislative history of 
the Bank Merger Act.158 
Senate Bill S. 1698 would have conferred “exclusive and plenary” 
authority to the OCC, FDIC and the Reserve Board, to disapprove or 
approve proposed mergers within the ambit of the Bank Merger Act.159  
In 1964, only one month after the Manufacturers Hanover litigation was 
resolved,160 President Lyndon B. Johnson, under the impression that 
federal agencies responsible for banking regulation lacked coordination 
regarding procedures and actions, “ventured into the morass of banking 
regulation in an effort to bring some order out of chaos.”161  President 
Johnson ordered the Treasury Secretary “to establish procedures which 
will insure that every effort is made by these agencies to act in concert 
and compose their differences.”162  The bill, which would have 
exempted bank mergers from the federal antitrust laws,163 survived a 
 
between bank mergers and the antitrust laws prior to the Manufacturers Hanover 
decision”). 
 158. Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137, at 3. 
 159. See id. at 2. 
 160. See generally Settling an Account, TIME, Mar. 19, 1965, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,833593,00.html. 
By a short 30 minutes, the Justice Department failed in 1961 in its bid to block a 
merger between New York’s Manufacturers Trust Co. and the Hanover Bank.  Aware 
that Justice viewed the merger as a violation of the antitrust laws, the banks speeded 
up their negotiations, legally joined to form the nation’s fourth largest bank half an 
hour before the trustbusters filed suit to stop the action.  Faced with a fait accompli, a 
federal judge refused to consider the Justice Department’s bid for a restraining order.  
Furious over the maneuver, particularly since the two banks had not discussed their 
plans with it, Justice immediately filed another suit. 
 
Last week the trustbusters had their revenge.  In Manhattan, Federal Judge Lloyd 
MacMahon ruled that the Manufacturers Hanover union had indeed conflicted with 
antitrust laws, and declared it illegal.  It was the first bank merger to be declared 
illegal by any federal court below the Supreme Court, and it made the bank the largest 
firm ever to lose a merger case in the courts. 
Id. 
 161. Waxberg & Robinson, supra note 104, at 377. 
 162. Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. See Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137. 
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Senate vote, but later “disintegrated” in the House Banking 
Committee.164 
Congress succeeded in amending the Bank Merger Act in 1966,165 
which effectively “adopted the Supreme Court’s approach and brought 
banking directly under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,”166 and directed 
bank regulators to deny a merger application if it violated the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts.  It provided more defined guidelines for dealing with 
the antitrust aspects of proposed bank mergers and “establish[ed] a 
procedure for the review of proposed bank mergers so as to eliminate the 
necessity for the dissolution of merged banks.”167  The 1966 Amendment 
also added a definition of “antitrust laws” which included the Sherman 
 
 164. Brennan, supra note 74; see also How Not to Get Married, supra note 146. 
Congress moved to reframe the law, but unfortunately the task fell to the House 
banking committee, which is run as a fief by Chairman Wright Patman.  Patman, a 
moonfaced country lawyer from Patman’s Switch (pop. 25), Texas, dislikes big banks, 
tight money and Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin in about 
equal degree.  Sympathetic to the Supreme Court, Patman stalled the revised bill for 
25 weeks.  When Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach wrote Patman that he 
favored a liberalized bank-merger law, Patman just tucked the letter into his pocket.  
That was too much for committee members who wanted a clarifying bill.  One 
morning when Patman was away, a rump majority secretly met and defiantly 
approved a bill strengthening the 1960 act. 
 
Caught between an outraged chairman and an angry majority, House Speaker John 
McCormack worked out a compromise.  The bill could be reported out, he ordered, 
but only in proper style and session, and with the chairman’s name on it.  
‘Sometimes,’ grumped Wright Patman as he went through the motions, ‘we have to 
take something that is considered bad in order to keep from taking something worse.’ 
 
Waiting for President Johnson to sign the bill last week, some Congressmen were 
afraid that something worse might still be ahead.  The bill bars monopolies, re-
establishes the principle of community benefit, allows the Justice Department 30 days 
to object to mergers it dislikes.  But the wording is so vague that it will almost 
certainly end up in the courts again for definition. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 165. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000).  Several factors led to 
the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1966: 
[A] continued high level of merger activity among banks, an outraged banking 
community, and an unparalleled antagonism between the Justice Department and 
Federal bank regulatory agencies, all combined to pressure Congress into once again 
tackling the knotty problem of bank mergers.  The result was the Bank Merger Act of 
1966, a confusing compromise at best. 
Reid, supra note 37, at 13 (quoting Mitchell, Getting the Most Out of the Banking 
System in the ‘70s, THE ECON. & BUS. BULL., Winter 1969, p 2). 
 166. Reid, supra note 37. 
 167. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (quoting the Act’s preamble). 
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and Clayton Acts, “and any other Acts in pari materia.”168  The 
Amendment divided the authority to approve (or disapprove) 
prospective bank mergers among the banking agencies and the Justice 
Department,169 and required the relevant banking agency to request 
competitive factor reports from the other federal banking agencies and 
the DOJ.170 
Among the key differences between bank mergers and other types 
of business combinations, at least in terms of the regulatory review 
process, was that under the 1966 Bank Merger Act bank regulators could 
approve a proposed merger even if the combination might ultimately 
have an anticompetitive residue.171  Regulators were vested with the 
exclusive authority to determine whether a proposed merger was 
“clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the 
transaction in meeting the ‘convenience and needs’ of the community 
served.”172 
The amended bank merger law provided relief to consummated 
bank merger participants,173 countering the transactional uncertainty 
caused by Philadelphia National Bank.174  Bank mergers consummated 
prior to the 1966 Amendment, but not yet challenged in court, were 
 
 168. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(8). 
 169. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4); see also Rose Marie Kushmeider, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring 
Federal Bank Regulation, FDIC BANKING REV., available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/banking/2006jan/article1/index.html. 
 170. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4); see also Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 332 
(“[U]nder the Bank Merger Act of 1960 . . . the Comptroller may not give his approval 
until he has received reports from the other two banking agencies and the Attorney 
General respecting the probable effects of the proposed transaction on competition”). 
 171. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B). 
(5) The responsible agency shall not approve 
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the country 
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which 
in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the 
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the 
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience 
and needs of the community to be served. 
Id. 
 172. Id.; see also DeSanto, supra note 102, at n.137 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 
1828(c)(5)(B) (1982)). 
 173. See 12 U.S.C § 1828(c)(2)(A),(B); see also Reid, supra note 37, at 13 (“[T]he 
new law immunized all mergers unchallenged before February 21, 1966, from 
subsequent litigation.”). 
 174. See Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., supra note 118 (citations omitted). 
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exempted from future antitrust challenges.175  Even combinations that 
violated antitrust laws, or which were the subject of pending court 
challenges, were exempted if consummated prior the Philadelphia 
National Bank decision.176  As a result, the previously nullified 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and First National Bank & Trust Co. 
of Lexington transactions were among those that could be lawfully 
consummated. 
D.  Regulation in the 1990s Produced the Highest Ever 
Run on Bank Mergers 
Perhaps the banking deregulation “zenith” occurred in the 1990s, 
when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
(“Riegle-Neal Act”) was passed in 1994.177  Prior to the passage of 
Riegle-Neal, state laws permitted out-of-state bank holding companies 
to enter a state’s market primarily by way of the acquisition of a state 
chartered bank.178  The Riegle-Neal Act created the “highest-ever five-
year run of bank mergers in U.S. history, in terms of both the number 
and the value of the banks acquired.”179  A majority of the acquired 
banks were community banks, and a majority of combinations during 
the period involved two (or more) community banks.180  The 1997 
 
 175. See id. 
However, an apparent distinction is made between mergers consummated 
before and after the decision in Philadelphia: a merger consummated before 
the decision is ‘conclusively presumed’ not to constitute a violation, while a 
post-Philadelphia merger can not ‘alone and of itself’ constitute a violation.  
The significance of this distinction, however, is not readily apparent, for both 
types of mergers appear immune from antitrust attack.  The difference in 
phraseology may be designed to restrict the use of the earlier mergers as 
evidence in later cases so as to allow banks with pre-Philadelphia merger 
histories to stand on equal footing with other banking institutions. 
Id. 
 176. Id.; see also Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137, at 2-3 
(“Any bank merger or similar transaction consummated prior to the date of enactment 
of the Bank Merger Act (May 13, 1960) following approval of the transaction by the 
appropriate State or Federal bank supervisory authority, also would be exempted from 
the Federal antitrust laws by the bill.”). 
 177. Robert DeYoung et al., The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community 
Banks 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2003-14, 2003), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2003-14.pdf. 
 178. See id. at 2. 
 179. Id. (citation omitted). 
 180. See id. (citation omitted). 
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amendments to the Riegle-Neal Act (the 1997 Riegle-Neal Amendments 
Act)181 permitted commercial banks to operate “with complete freedom 
across state lines.”182 
Riegle-Neal supporters opined that decreased federal regulation on 
interstate banking would almost certainly increase competition, which 
in-turn would “generally improve the quality and availability of all types 
of financial services.”183  Proponents also speculated that market 
concentration would be less of an issue, because “with greater 
geographic mobility, the potential for entry [would] be a stronger 
deterrent.”184  Prior to Riegle-Neal’s passage, the DOJ expressed 
concern that “two contradictory trends [would] be unleashed,”185 and 
removal of interstate branching restrictions from previously constrained 
regional and national banks might prompt some to expand their 
geographic market coverage.186  This sort of market expansion was 
generally not the source of significant antitrust concern.187  Interstate 
branching was considered a likely stimulus for the mergers of a 
substantial number of smaller banks which previously competed within 
the same market, perhaps because the combinations of these smaller 
banks would be equipped to compete effectively with the national and 
regional mega banks with newfound economies of scale.188  This latter 
variety of “within-market mergers” typically raises greater antitrust 
concerns than do “market-extension mergers.”189 
 
 181. Riegle-Neal Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 105–24, 111 Stat. 238 (1997). 
 182. Robert DeYoung et al., Out-of-State Entry and the Cost Efficiency of Local 
Commercial Banks (OCC Economics Working Paper No. 97-7, 1997), available at 
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp97-7.pdf. 
 183. Id. at 1-2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Litan, supra note 54. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id.; see also Leo King, RBS in Talks Over Job Cuts as ABN Integration 
Progresses, COMPUTERWORLD UK, May 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/it-business/it-organisation/news/index. 
cfm?newsid=8895 (according to Chris Skinner, chief executive at think-tank Balatro, 
“The whole point of any bank merger is you’re going to get efficiencies, . . . .”). 
 189. Id. 
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IV.  U.S. BANKS ARE NO LONGER “UNIQUE” NOR “INSULATED” 
The test articulated in Philadelphia National Bank is no longer 
reflective of the current financial environment.  The majority concluded 
that commercial banks offered services that were “unique” and 
“insulated,”190 and “it [was] [ ]clear that commercial banking is a market 
‘sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities.’”191  
Today, commercial banks are not the only financial institutions offering 
financial products and services, and banks cannot be set apart as 
“unique” providers of a “clustering of financial products and services,”  
The distinctive characteristic of “commercial banking,” unquestionably 
valid in 1963, now appears antiquated.192  Other institutions now provide 
 
 190. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321.  The Court found that commercial banks were 
unique because of: 
The unique powers of commercial banks to accept demand deposits, provide checking 
account services, and lend against fractional reserves permit the banking system as a 
whole to create a supply of ‘money,’ a function which is indispensable to the 
maintenance of the structure of our national economy.  And the amount of the funds 
held by commercial banks is very large indeed; demand deposits alone represent 
approximately three-fourths of the money supply in the United States.  Since a bank’s 
assets must be sufficiently liquid to accommodate demand withdrawals, short-term 
commercial and industrial loans are the major element in bank portfolios, thus making 
commercial banks the principal source of short-term business credit.  Many other 
services are also provided by banks, but in these more or less collateral areas they 
receive more active competition from other financial institutions. 
Id. at 326 (citations omitted); The Court also found that banks were “insulated” 
because: 
Some commercial banking products or services are so distinctive that they are entirely 
free of effective competition from products or services of other financial institutions; 
the checking account is in this category.  Others enjoy such cost advantages as to be 
insulated within a broad range from substitutes furnished by other institutions.  For 
example, commercial banks compete with small-loan companies in the personal-loan 
market; but the small-loan companies’ rates are invariably much higher than the 
banks’, in part, it seems, because the companies’ working capital consists in 
substantial part of bank loans.  Finally, there are banking facilities which, although in 
terms of cost and price they are freely competitive with the facilities provided by other 
financial institutions, nevertheless enjoy a settled consumer preference, insulating 
them, to a marked degree, from competition; this seems to be the case with savings 
deposits. 
Id. at 356-57. 
 191. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357 (quoting Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 
296 F.2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961)). 
 192. See B. Frank King et al., Is Commercial Banking a Distinct Line of 
Commerce?, ECON. REV., Oct. 1, 2000, available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ 
1G1-71764057.html. 
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even greater clusters of services, meaning that the cluster concept might 
not even be a valid means of analysis in the present financial 
environment.193  Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve has continued to 
employ the Philadelphia National Bank “cluster” approach to define the 
relevant product market for banking services.194  The consequence of 
adhering to the 1963 judicial mandate has resulted in a sometimes rigid 
competitive analysis that seems unwilling to consider the nation as a 
legitimate geographic market, and appears unable to bury the “cluster of 
products and services” concept despite significant and ongoing evolution 
of the financial market. 
It would have been accurate, during the Philadelphia National Bank 
era, to state that commercial banks in the 1960s and 1970s were the only 
institutions that provided the cluster of products and services “denoted 
by the term ‘commercial banking.’”195  As the domestic financial 
services sector experienced industry-wide consolidation, with banks, 
brokers, and lenders of all sorts operated in forms often 
 
 193. See id. 
 194. See, e.g., First Hawaiian, Inc., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 966, 967 (1993). 
The Board has long held that the product market for evaluating bank mergers 
and acquisitions is the cluster of products and services offered by banking 
institutions.  The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is this cluster of 
products and services that, as a matter of trade reality, makes banking a 
distinct line of commerce.  According to the Court, this clustering facilitates 
the convenient access to these products and services, and vests the cluster 
with economic significance beyond the individual products and services that 
constitute the cluster.  The courts have continued to follow this position.  In 
addition, a recent study conducted by Board staff supports the conclusion that 
customers still seek to obtain this cluster of services. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Cent. Pac. Fin. Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 93 (2004), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/winter04_legal.pdf 
(approving the acquisition). 
According to the Supreme Court, the clustering of banking products and services 
facilitates convenient access to these products and services, and vests the cluster with 
economic significance beyond the individual products and services that constitute the 
cluster.  Several studies support the conclusion that both businesses and households 
continue to seek this cluster of services.  Consistent with these precedents and studies, 
and on the basis of the facts of record in this case, the Board concludes that the cluster 
of banking products and services represents the appropriate product market for 
analyzing the competitive effects of this proposal. 
Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted); see also The Chase Manhattan Corp., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 
76, 77-79 (2001); Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 85 Fed. Res. Bull. 747, 750-51, 751 n.19 
(1999) (“The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the cluster of products and 
services that, as a matter of trade reality, makes banking a distinct line of commerce”). 
 195. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356. 
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indistinguishable from their rivals, the reality of five decades began to 
fade into the background.  The Philadelphia National Bank Court 
observed that the consumer checking account was a hallmark 
commercial banking product or service “so distinctive that [it is] entirely 
free of effective competition.”196  Today a wide range of companies exist 
that are not traditional “commercial banks,” including auto 
manufacturers, traditionally considered a classic example of commerce, 
which provide checking account services and a range of banking 
services.197 
Mergers have created an environment that has altered banking to 
such an extent that the traditionally “insulated” services, once “unique” 
to commercial banks, are now offered by firms such as Volkswagen.  
Car makers entered the banking market and now compete directly with 
commercial banks.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Toyota Motor 
Corp. began in 2004 to “develop[ ] a host of banking products, including 
money-market accounts, CDs and savings.”198  Volkswagen Bank 
USA199 offers internet banking services and products, including savings 
accounts, CDs, home-equity lines of credit, auto financing, credit cards, 
and checking accounts.200  Specialty lenders are able to offer personal or 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Jennifer Saranow, Now Open: The Bank of VW, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2004, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109943562479362790.html?mod=today 
s_us_personal_journal; see also Pallavi Gogoi, What’s Next—the Bank of Burger 
King?, BUSINESSWEEK, June 18, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/01_25/b3737104.htm. 
Why are upscale carmakers and retailers surging into the business?  BMW, for one, 
figures that having an actual bank, rather than just the credit unit it had before, gives it 
a cheaper way to raise capital for its credit business than the debt markets.  It has 
access to depositor funds and can borrow from other banks at low federal funds rates, 
says John M. Christman, head of BMW financial services for the Americas.  Since 
July, 2000, when the bank opened, Christman has signed up 25,000 customers with $1 
billion in assets, and the bank is now operating profitably.  Retailers hope to run 
credit-card operations without having to split profits with outsiders.  And a federal 
bank charter would let such outfits as General Motors Acceptance Corp. override state 
usury laws and charge higher uniform interest rates nationwide. 
Id. 
 198. Saranow, supra note 197. 
 199. Volkswagen Bank USA was established as an Industrial Loan Company.  Its 
parent is Volkswagen AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (VW AG). See Volkswagen Bank 
USA, Application for Federal Deposit Insurance, FDIC (Dec. 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/DepIns/VolkswagenBank.html 
(approving the application). 
 200. See Saranow, supra note 197 (“Both General Motors Corp. and BMW AG 
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small loans at very competitive rates, often lower than commercial 
banks.  The Philadelphia National Bank premise that banks are 
“insulated” from competition because they could offer loans at much 
lower rates,201 has been revealed as an anachronism.202 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the U.S. 
payment system203 is being reshaped by “banking consolidation and 
conglomeration, thriving community banks, nonbanks providing 
payment services, and technological advances,” and increasingly, 
consumers are choosing to utilize nonbank electronic payment 
services.204  For example, “[a]lmost daily [consumers] [ ] are bombarded 
by announcements from existing technology firms and ‘new economy 
start-ups’ of innovative products designed to meet e-commerce 
requirements [that] [ ] cross over into traditional business lines of 
banks.”205 
 
already have U.S. banks offering personal banking products.”). 
 201. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356. 
 202. See King et al., supra note 192. 
 203. See FFIEC Glossary, http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/Wholesale/1 
8.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  According to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, the definition of “Payment Systems” is “[t]he mechanism, the 
rules, institutions, people, markets, and agreements that make the exchange of payments 
possible.” Id. 
 204. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Financial Services Strategic Plan, FIN. UPDATE, 
Oct.-Dec. 2000, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=5AC8E90 
1-B0FE-11D5-898400508BB89A83&method=display. 
 205. See Jamie B. Stewart, Jr., First Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of New York, Remarks before the SIBOS 2000 Conference: The 
Implications of Advancing Technology for Bankers and Central Bankers (Sept. 11, 
2000), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2000/js000911.html 
(“Banks are . . . moving into business areas that bear little resemblance to traditional 
banking--a development that regulators are clearly monitoring.”); see also Press 
Release, Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch Announces Beyond Banking: The Power of 
Advice for Smarter Cash Management - New Offering Marks Key Component of ‘Total 
Merrill’, A Broad Financial Management Platform For Clients (Jan. 8, 2003), available 
at http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149_8688_8591_7705 (offering 
Merrill Lynch customers both traditional and non-traditional services in a 
comprehensive package). 
Beyond Banking®, a new comprehensive cash management service that offers all the 
typical features of a checking and savings account, including ATM access, web bill 
payment and a variety of short-term investment products.  Clients also have access to 
innovative mortgage, credit and lending products together with the advice and 
guidance of a skilled Merrill Lynch financial advisor. 
Id. 
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From retailers to manufacturers, non-traditional banking companies 
now offer consumer banking services, and have expanded into more 
traditional banking areas such as CDs and checking accounts.206  
Department Store Nordstrom offers a wide range of banking services 
through its Nordstrom Federal Savings Bank.207  At the deep discount 
end of the retail spectrum, Walmart has been an aggressive provider of a 
host of consumer financial products and services.208  Even universities 
offer banking services today; for example, Drexel University offers 
banking services through AJDrexelBank.com.209 
Many small business owners still consider a traditional commercial 
bank to be a critical multi-purpose “financial channel,” where banking 
and other financial services are provided.210  Competition has eroded 
relationships that banks have traditionally enjoyed with small business 
customers.211  For example, many of the small business-centered 
services traditionally offered by banks, such as loans, are now 
aggressively offered by nonbanks, such as “American Express Small 
 
 206. See Saranow, supra note 197. 
 207. See Nordstrom Credit Card and Banking Services, http://about.nordstrom.com/ 
aboutus/credit/credit.asp?origin=bankurl1. 
Nordstrom Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nordstrom, Inc. and is a federally 
chartered savings bank.  Our goal is to enhance your Nordstrom shopping experience 
by providing convenient banking and credit products, such as the Nordstrom Visa 
Signature® Card, Nordstrom Platinum Visa® card, Nordstrom credit card, Nordstrom 
MOD® card, interest-bearing checking accounts with the Nordstrom Visa® check 
card and nationally competitive certificates of deposit. 
Id.; see also About Nordstrom Bank, http://about.nordstrom.com/aboutus/credit/about.a 
sp; Saranow, supra note 197 (“Nordstrom Federal Savings Bank has offered a checking 
account, among other banking products, since 2001.”). 
 208. See Kris Hudson, Wal-Mart Pushes Financial Services Menu, WALL ST. J., 
June 6, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118108758438025751.html? 
mod=home_whats_news_us. 
 209. See AJDrexelBank.com, https://secure.ajdrexelbank.com/frameset.asp (last 
visited May 8, 2008). 
 210. Maggie Scarborough, Must Banks Give Away Their Small Business Franchise?, 
92 ABA BANKING J. 51, (2000), 2000 WLNR 6884287. 
 211. See Penny Crosman et al., 2008 IT Budgets Up More than 10% for Financial 
Services Firms, WALL ST. & TECH., Nov. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=204204039; see also 
Scarborough, supra note 210 (“There is a statistical correlation between the number of 
financial services used by a customer and account retention.  The odds of retention are 
increased exponentially with each additional service.  Therefore, selling additional 
services to small business customers is not only desirable but also essential to continued 
growth and profitability.”). 
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Business Services.”212  The New York Times reported that three of the 
five most popular small business bankers were not banks at all, but 
instead credit card issuers (Mountain West Financial, American Express, 
and Advanta Corporation).213  These three card issuers accounted for 
roughly one-third of all corporate lending in loan amounts up to 
$100,000 in 1997.214 
Studies also demonstrate that consumers no longer tend to use just 
one bank for all of their banking needs.215  Customers who traditionally 
utilized commercial banking for their financial products and services, 
such as savings deposit accounts, can turn to nonbank alternatives such 
as “thrifts, credit unions, annuities, mutual funds, and other securities 
and insurance products.”216  This market reality challenges the 
contemporary relevance of the Philadelphia Court’s finding that 
commercial banking “enjoy[ed] a settled consumer preference” which 
insulated banks from competition217  Moreover, the market reality also 
challenges the Court’s “repeatedly held” position that “it is the unique 
cluster of services provided by commercial banks that sets them apart 
for purposes of § 7.”218 
 
 212. Crosman et al., supra note 211. 
 213. Joseph Kahn, Banking on the Unbanks; Tellerless Wonders Are Reinventing 
Small-Business Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE6D61138F937A35751C0A96F9
58260. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Daniel J. Mahoney, supra note 43, at 315 (citing Peter Bronsteen, Product 
Market Definition in Commercial Bank Merger Cases, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 687 
n.29 (1985)); see also id. 
[I]ncreased competition that banks now face from nonbank financial 
institutions has opened up myriad alternatives for customers, sometimes 
making it more prudent and less costly to select services from a variety of 
sources.  As a result, the rationale that the Supreme Court provided for its 
cluster approach in Phillipsburg National Bank deteriorates as fewer and 
fewer consumers engage in ‘full-service’ banking. 
Id. 
 216. King, supra note 192. 
 217. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963). 
 218. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. at 664 [citations omitted]; see also Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U. S. 321. 
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V.  HAS THE COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS EVOLVED SINCE PHILADELPHIA 
NATIONAL BANK?  WHAT’S IN YOUR WALLET? 
Differing merger review methodologies resulted in some efforts by 
banking regulators and the DOJ to coordinate and clarify merger 
approval processes.  Despite those efforts, and despite recognition that 
what is considered to be “banking” has indeed evolved, regulators 
nonetheless continue their use of local geographic market and cluster of 
banking services analyses.  Perhaps the lone exception to this entrenched 
posture has been the DOJ. 
Congress was cognizant of the “special needs and characteristics of 
banking” when it defined the scope of bank regulators’ supervisory 
authority.”219  However, it was the Supreme Court in Philadelphia 
National Bank which “confirmed” the Department of Justice’s 
jurisdiction to review bank mergers.220  Further complicating the issue, 
the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act (and the 
related amendments) provided statutory authority for the applicable 
supervisory agency and the DOJ to conduct concurrent independent 
reviews of proposed bank merger combinations.221  Moreover, beginning 
in the mid-1980s, the state attorneys general became yet another 
“second[ary] public institution for antitrust merger control.”222  The 
varying methodologies of the regulatory agencies, the DOJ, and the 
 
 219. Statement of William McChesney Martin, supra note 137, at 3-4. 
The special needs and characteristics of banking, however, is the central theme 
running throughout the legislative history.  It was emphasized that banking is a 
licensed, strictly regulated, and closely supervised industry that offers problems 
acutely different from other types of business, whether regulated or not.  Because of 
this, [ ] Congress in enacting the Bank Merger Act deliberately chose to place the 
authority to pass on bank mergers in the Federal bank supervisory agencies. 
Id. at 3-4. 
 220. Stuart M. Chemtob, Special Counsel for Int’l Trade, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, The Role of Competition Agencies in Regulated Sectors, Address at the 5th 
International Symposium on Competition Policy and Law, Institute of Law (May 11-12, 
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225219.htm (citing Phila. 
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321). 
 221. See id. 
Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the bank regulator is required to seek a report on 
competitive factors involved in the merger from the Department of Justice.  The bank 
regulator must take this report into consideration in its decision-making on the 
competitive effects of the transaction, but may not be required to follow the Justice 
Department’s advice, depending on other factors. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 222. See Kovacic, supra note 32, at 3. 
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states’ involvement created an uncertain environment whereby banks 
confronted inconsistent approaches to bank mergers.  The almost chaotic 
regulation by committee mirrors that of the subprime mortgage market 
and may have been among the motivating factors behind Treasury 
Secretary Henry (“Hank”) Paulson’s recent proposal to substantially 
consolidate power over financial services regulation with the Federal 
Reserve as an “umbrella regulatory agency.”223 
The Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the DOJ, in an effort to 
streamline the regulatory process, published bank merger guidelines in 
1995, titled “Bank Merger Competitive Review Screening 
Guidelines.”224  This joint guideline screening resource was established 
to ensure that the DOJ and the supervisory regulatory agencies applied 
similar regulatory standards to evaluate the competitive effects of a 
merger proposal.225  However, the regulatory agencies and the DOJ have 
 
 223. See Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Democrats Seek Stronger 
Regulator for Wall Street, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/23/business/23credit.php; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
(2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/regulatory-
blueprint/; Symposium: The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown and the Global Financial 
Crisis, 14 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. __ (forthcoming 2008) (transcript on file with the 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law) (remarks of Mr. Giovanni P. Prezioso, 
Esq.). 
But I think one of the things we have is, if you think about where we are now in terms 
of [regulatory] accountability, a system that has grown up with a history at the state 
level, a history at the federal level, a division between regulation of banks and thrifts 
and broker-dealers and so forth, that isn’t very well suited to the kind of marketplace 
that we have today, the kinds of international institutions that we have. 
Id. 
 224. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW—INTRODUCTION 
AND OVERVIEW (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.p 
df [hereinafter BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW]; see also Calvani et al., supra 
note 39 (“[The] ‘Bank Merger Competitive Review’ was first issued in March 1995, 
and has been commonly referred to as the ‘Bank Merger Screening Guidelines.”).  The 
DOJ has also produced its own merger guidelines in conjunction with the FTC. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm.  The FDIC elected 
not to join with the DOJ and other banking regulators, instead issuing its own statement 
of policy. See FDIC Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-1200.html. 
 225. See Chemtob, supra note 220 (citing BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, 
supra note 224); see also Roundtable, supra note 38 (“The purpose of this screening is 
to identify quickly proposed mergers that clearly do not have significant adverse effects 
on competition and allow them to proceed.”). 
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not used consistent standards in bank merger regulatory analysis.226  
According to a former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, 
“unfortunately” the states have also promulgated their own merger 
guidelines, “which are different from those employed by either the DOJ 
or the bank regulators,” and results in further confusion and produces 
different results.227 
Banking regulators and the Justice Department, to some extent, 
seem to recognize the changing banking market and the need for 
reforming antitrust banking analysis.  To that end, the DOJ has not used 
the Philadelphia National Bank antitrust analysis and will instead define 
product and geographic markets on the basis of the specific services 
offered and the location in which these services are offered.228  The 
 
 226. See David S. Neill, Geographic Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis of 
Bank Mergers, 123 BANKING L.J. 291, 298-300 (2006) (“[The DOJ’s] formulation does 
not appear to conform with the ‘chain reaction’ theory of market definition underlying 
the Federal Reserve methodology.”); see also Chemtob, supra note 220. 
[T]he screening guidelines make clear that the regulatory agencies and the 
Department of Justice, in practice, do not necessarily use the same product market or 
geographic market definitions.  For example, the Department of Justice examines the 
competitive effects of the transaction in disaggregated product markets (including 
retail, small business and middle-market lending) while the banking agencies look at 
the cluster of banking services.  Remedies recommended by the Justice Department 
and the bank regulators may also differ, with Justice Department remedies more likely 
to be focused on ensuring that market competition is protected, rather than simply on 
restoring the pre-merger structural characteristics of the market. 
Id. 
 227. Calvani et al., supra note 39 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys General, NAAG 
1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 256 (Supplement) 
(Mar. 30, 1993)).  The differences between the states competitive review approach and 
the Feds is “real:” 
For example, in the BankAmerica/Security Pacific transaction, California and Arizona 
disagreed with the conclusions reached by the federal antitrust authority, and 
demanded additional divestitures.  States have also caused modifications to bank 
acquisitions even before the federal government has had an opportunity to review the 
transaction.  In Fleet Bank’s planned acquisition of 32 Chemical Bank branch offices, 
New York forced Fleet to divest a branch office by threatening to file an objection 
with the Fed.  The differences are real. 
Id. at n.32 (citations omitted). 
 228. See Litan, supra note 54. 
Whereas the Fed looks at deposit data as an adequate proxy for the ‘cluster’ of 
services that banks often provide (loans, deposits, and various fee-based services), we 
at DOJ have long treated banks as multi-product firms and, accordingly, have assessed 
the competitive impact of mergers in each relevant product or service (deposits, 
various types of loans, and so on). 
. . . . 
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Board, however, still employs the Philadelphia National Bank 
traditional antitrust analysis,229 despite its admitted “diminishing faith in 
the cluster approach.”230  While the Board has also stated that its banking 
merger analysis could involve a review of competitors spanning the “the 
entire country,”231 the authors, have thus far not located a single bank 
merger approval order which utilized an analysis of competitors in the 
entire country, or even in a region of the country.  The Board has 
continued, for almost a half century, to define the relevant geographic 
 
Although we will endeavor to use the Fed’s market definitions, in some cases those 
definitions may not accurately reflect the nature of competition for a particular 
service.  This is especially likely to be true where the Fed’s markets are drawn quite 
broadly, but the particular services the parties offer actually are bought by purchasers 
in a smaller region -- for example, the inner city rather than a wider metropolitan area.  
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that we may define different geographic 
markets for each of the different product markets.  Our touchstone is where customers 
for specific services are willing to turn, not some arbitrary geographic area that may 
be developed for some other purpose. 
Id. 
 229. See, e.g., First Bancorp., 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 696, 2000 WL 1185522, *2 (2000) 
(“Board and the courts repeatedly have held that the geographic market for the cluster 
of banking products and services is local in nature.”). 
 230. Sheehan, supra note 21, at 699. 
In United Bank Corp. of New York, the Fed stated that although it continued to view 
commercial banking as the relevant line of commerce in determining the competitive 
effects of a proposal, it might be appropriate in particular cases to take into 
consideration direct competition from financial institutions other than commercial 
banks. 
Id. (citing United Bank Corp. of New York, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 358, 359 (1981)); see 
also id. (quoting Letter from Michael Bradfield, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., to 
Barry Grossman, Chief, Comm’ns & Fin. Section, Antitrust Div. (Jan. 10, 1986), in 
Reply Brief of Appellant at app., United States v. Cent. State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 
(W.D. Mich. 1985), aff’d, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987). 
The Board has not read the Philadelphia . . . case as prohibiting the Board 
from a reevaluation of the appropriateness of the product market in 
commercial bank mergers as described in that case to reflect changing 
conditions in the financial services marketplace that directly impact 
commercial banking services. 
Id. 
 231. See Supporting Statement, supra note 30, at 1. 
Applying the theoretical concept to specific situations requires the determination of 
the geographic area that includes all direct competitors (this area could be a town, a 
county, a state, a region of the country, or the entire country) and the relevant product 
market (this requires identifying the firms within the relevant geographic area that 
compete with one another). 
Id. 
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market for bank merger proposals as local in nature,232 irrespective of 
whether or not such an analysis ignores the modern market dynamics. 
For example, in its 2004 approval of Bank of America’s acquisition 
of FleetBoston Financial, the Board determined “that the cluster of 
banking products and services represents the appropriate product market 
for analyzing the competitive effects of this proposal.”233  The Federal 
Reserve determined that the appropriate cluster of products and services 
was the local market, finding that the “geographic markets for 
considering the competitive effects of this proposal are the four local 
banking markets in which the subsidiary banks of Bank of America and 
FleetBoston compete directly.”234  The competitive effects of the 
proposed merger were considered in a manner consistent with Supreme 
Court “precedent,”235 with the Board’s previous market studies,236 and 
with the fact-finding of record.237 
 
 232. See, e.g., First Union Corp., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 489, 491-92 (1988) (citing 
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 359 (1963)) (“In defining the relevant 
geographic market in the case of bank acquisitions, the Board and the courts 
consistently have held that the geographic market for the cluster of banking services is 
local in nature.” (citation omitted)); see also First Bancorp., 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 696, 
2000 WL 1185522 (2000). 
First Bancorp has suggested that the relevant geographic market includes not only 
Moore County, but also all the counties that are contiguous to Moore County. 
 
In defining the relevant geographic market, the Board consistently has sought to 
identify the area in which the cluster of banking products and services is provided by 
competing institutions and in which purchasers of the products and services seek to 
obtain these products and services.  In applying these standards to bank acquisition 
proposals, the Board and the courts repeatedly have held that the geographic market 
for the cluster of banking products and services is local in nature. 
Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
 233. See Bank of Am. Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217 (2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/spring04_legal.pdf (approving the 
merger); see also id. at 221 n.18 (“The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the 
cluster of products and services that, as a matter of trade reality, makes banking a 
distinct line of commerce.” (citations omitted)). 
 234. Id. at 221. 
 235. Id. at 221 n.18 (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357); accord United States 
v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 
U.S. 350 (1969). 
 236. See id. at 221 (“Several studies support the conclusion that businesses and 
households continue to seek this cluster of services.” (citations omitted)). 
 237. Id. at 221 (“In defining the relevant geographic market, the Board and the 
courts have consistently held that the geographic market for the cluster of banking 
products and services is local in nature.”). 
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Credit card issuers have found mergers to be an effective method to 
enter banking markets, and to establish synergistic “brick and mortar” 
branches.  Capital One Financial Corp., among the world’s “largest 
providers of MasterCard and Visa credit cards,”238 and a provider of a 
host of online banking services,239 acquired the Louisiana-based regional 
bank Hibernia in 2005240 and now boasts of “over 700 Capital One Bank 
branches and over 1100 ATMs in Connecticut, Louisiana, New Jersey, 
New York and Texas.”241 
Capital One’s Hibernia acquisition typifies the holding company’s 
expansion strategy to branch into “other forms of consumer and 
commercial banking.”242  The Federal Reserve approved Capital One’s 
Hibernia acquisition243 with minimal apparent scrutiny of the product or 
geographic markets, or line of commerce or cluster of service analyses, 
as mandated by Philadelphia National Bank.244 
The Federal Reserve determined that the Capital One-Hibernia 
combination did not directly encroach onto any relevant banking market, 
and viewed the merger as having “no significant adverse effect on 
competition or on the concentration of banking resources in any relevant 
banking market and that competitive factors are consistent with 
approval.”245  The Board also determined that the combination would 
enable the combined entity “to offer a broader variety of products to its 
 
 238. Capital One Seen Buying Hibernia, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2005/03/07/capital_one_seen_buying_hibernia/. 
 239. See Capital One, https://onlinebanking.capitalone.com/capitalone/.  For a list of 
CapitalOne products, see https://onlinebanking.capitalone.com/capitalone/ (Credit 
Cards, Auto finance, Direct banking, Personal Loans, Healthcare Finance, Home 
Improvement Loans, Business Credit Cards, Business Line of Credit, Business Loans, 
etc.). 
 240. Capital One Financial Corp., 91 Fed. Res. Bull. 513 (2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20050816/attachment.pdf. 
 241. See Capital One, Find ATM and Branch Locations, http://maps.capitalone.com/ 
locator/; see also Capital One, About the Capital One and Hibernia Merger, 
http://www.capitalone.com/welcome/mergerfaq.php#branch_and_atm (“Capital One 
does not currently have other branches or ATMs beyond the Hibernia network.  We will 
be expanding our network of bank and ATM locations over time.”). 
 242. Terence O’Hara, Hibernia Helped Capital One Profit Grow, WASH. POST, Jan. 
20, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/ 
19/AR2006011903154.html. 
 243. Capital One Financial Corp., supra note 240. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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customers,”246 and for the acquired Hibernia to “broaden its geographic 
reach” and “enhance [its] ability to service its customers,” due to Capital 
One’s managerial and financial resources and its “national presence.”247 
Capital One was the “26th largest depository”248 when it applied for 
merger approval, and Hibernia was also among the top fifty depository 
institutions, with the resulting combined entity joining the top twenty-
five largest U.S. depository entities.249  The phrase “geographic market” 
or “product market” or “line of commerce” were conspicuously absent 
from the Fed’s merger approval.250  Shortly after obtaining the Fed’s 
regulatory imprimatur, Capital One applied to the OCC for permission 
to open seven new commercial bank branches in the New Jersey, New 
York, and Dallas metropolitan markets.251  As this Article reached the 
cusp of publication, Capital One was marketing its new “brick and 
mortar” branches, a number of which are located in Manhattan, in an 
aggressive televised advertising campaign.252 
Some commentators contend that the Federal Reserve does employ 
a more expansive geographic area than the local one dictated by 
Philadelphia National Bank.253  In fact, sources point toward a period in 
the 1980s when the Federal Reserve “indicated that it would look at 
entire metropolitan areas” in its competitive review process.254  The 
Board has also recognized that “issuing credit cards is an activity that is 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Capital One Seeks OK for 7 Branches, YAHOO FIN., Aug. 16, 2007, available 
at http://ca.us.biz.yahoo.com/ap/070816/capital_one_branches.html?.v=1. 
 252. Press Release, Capital One, Capital One Bank Celebrates Grand Opening of 
Third Harlem Branch (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal 
/site/google/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20080417005788&newsLang=en. 
 253. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Financial Institutions M&A 2007: Continued 
Rich Diversity in an Active M&A Market—An Annual Review of Leading 
Developments, 1638 PLI/CORP 209, 712-13 (2007). 
It should be noted that, as localized as the Federal Reserve Banks’ predefined markets 
are, in some sense they are larger than would be suggested by the formulation 
expressed in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.  In particular, the markets 
are not so narrow that an individual customer at one end of a market would need to 
consider banks at the opposite end of the market to be practical alternatives.  Rather, it 
is assumed that the economic integration of the market will transmit banking 
competition via a ‘chain reaction’ effect. 
Id. 
 254. See Doug Bandow, The Merger Barriers Fall, 78 ABA BANKING J. 46 (1986). 
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conducted on a national or global scale, with relatively low barriers to 
entry and with numerous other large financial organizations providing 
these services.”255  The definition of a product market or geographic 
market often determines whether a proposed merger is lawful, and it is 
therefore critical to the antitrust merger analysis that an evolving and 
pragmatic paradigm exists to ensure effective antitrust policy, especially 
in a fast-changing and increasingly borderless market for many financial 
services.  Yet, General Counsel of the Fed’s Board of Governors, Scott 
G. Alvarez, conceded in 2005 that “the Federal Reserve ha[s] not found 
persuasive evidence to alter the general framework for analyzing bank 
mergers and acquisitions.”256 
The environment within which the DOJ has operated in the bank 
merger context is worth noting.  Prior to the passage of the Bank Merger 
Act of 1966,257 the DOJ lacked statutory authority to prevent a bank 
merger.  Philadelphia National Bank, however, brought bank mergers 
within section 7 of the Clayton Act258 and consequently placed bank 
merger applications within the auspices of the DOJ.259  The passage of 
the 1966 Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act 
empowered the DOJ to independently review bank merger proposals, 
along with concurrent review by other bank regulators.260  The Bank 
Merger Act also required the relevant regulatory agencies to “request 
reports on the competitive factors . . . from the Attorney General and the 
other two banking agencies.”261  During the last decade the DOJ 
 
 255. Federal Reserve System, Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holding 
Companies, Bank of America Corporation, Dec. 15, 2005, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2005/20051215/attachment.pdf. 
 256. Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Statement before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, at 9 (Dec. 5, 2005), 
available at http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/Alvarez_Statement.pdf; see 
also id. at 8-9 (“[T]he courts have consistently held that arguments for changing these 
long-standing product and geographic market definitions must be based on persuasive 
economic evidence and, to date, have found such persuasive evidence to be lacking.”). 
 257. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000). 
 258. The Bank Merger Act of 1966 terms “antitrust laws” to include the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, “and any other 
Acts in pari material.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(8). 
 259. See Chemtob, supra note 220 (citing United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 
U.S. 321, 321 (1963)). 
 260. See id. 
 261. Pub. L. No. 89-356 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4)); see also 
Chemtob, supra note 220 (“[T]he bank regulator must take this report into consideration 
in its decision-making on the competitive effects of the transaction, but may not be 
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Antitrust Division reviewed roughly 1000 bank merger applications 
annually,262 of which ten percent were subjected to an in-depth 
competitive analysis in 1998.263  By contrast, from 1989 to 1994, the 
DOJ investigated forty-three (0.5%) of the roughly 9000 proposed bank 
mergers that received approval from the relevant supervisory banking 
authority, and challenged only four (0.05%) of those.264  Branch 
divestitures resulted in compromised approval for the four challenged 
deals.265 
Although federal bank supervisors and the DOJ conduct 
independent competitive reviews, the DOJ will inform the agencies of 
its conclusions and any divestiture requirements.266  For example, the 
DOJ recently required divestiture of five branch offices to resolve 
perceived antitrust concerns created by the proposed merger of First 
Busey Corporation and Main Street Trust Inc.267  Rather than test its 
 
required to follow the Justice Department’s advice, depending on other factors.”). 
 262. Roundtable, supra note 38, at 5.  The DOJ expects to receive a similar number 
of bank merger proposals in 2008. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, 
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION FY 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 23 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008justification/pdf/21_atr.pdf. 
 263. Mergers in the Financial Services Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/1787.htm [hereinafter Nannes]. 
 264. Litan, supra note 54. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See Roundtable, supra note 38, at 5.  For example, the DOJ required the 
divestiture of bank branches in the following merger proposal: 
Among the most notable surprises was the DOJ’s enforcement position in the merger 
of Society Corporation and Ameritrust Corporation in 1992.  That transaction would 
have raised few if any market concentration concerns in the Federal Reserve’s pre-
defined Cleveland market.  The DOJ, however, split the market into two segments, 
one of which was very concentrated.  The DOJ then required a curative divestiture of 
branches holding approximately $1 billion in deposits.  The lack of transparency in 
the DOJ’s policies prompted significant criticism from antitrust practitioners in the 
early 1990s. 
Id. 
Neill, supra note 226, at 291 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 267. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches 
Agreement Requiring Divestitures in Merger of First Busey Corporation and Main 
Street Trust Inc. (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_rel 
eases/2007/223869.htm.  The Federal Reserve approved the merger on June 14, 2007. 
See First Busey Corp., 2007 WL 2506471, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/orders/orders20070614b1.pdf. 
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market definition and concentration measures, the DOJ will instead 
require divestiture as the “main event of bank merger review.”268 
As required by federal statute, bank regulators must forward a copy 
of a merger application to the DOJ for its review,269 and the DOJ may 
then formally submit, to the applicable regulatory agency, a report 
addressing the competitive factors of the proposed combination.  The 
DOJ can also attempt to block a prospective deal by filing suit under 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, not more than thirty days after the relevant 
regulatory agency has approved a proposed merger.270  The DOJ 
contends that its antitrust analysis has the flexibility to “readily account 
for any change in market dynamics.”271  The DOJ has consistently 
adopted the most enlightened analytical model, one which is attuned to 
contemporary market variables, instead of a monolithic adherence to 
half-century old doctrine. 
VI.  RELEVANT MARKETS 
Federal statutes governing mergers do not provide a specific 
framework for defining geographical and product markets, nor a means 
to measure the competitive effects of a consummated merger.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Philadelphia National Bank decision was the first to 
subject commercial banking, like other prospective business 
combinations, to Sherman and Clayton Act scrutiny.272  The regulatory 
 
 268. Calvani et al., supra note 39. 
 269. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4). 
 270. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (2006); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6) (In non-
emergency cases “the transaction may not be consummated before the thirtieth calendar 
day after the date of approval by the agency.”). 
 271. Roundtable, supra note 38, at 2.  The DOJ-analysis is detailed in its Antitrust 
Division Manual, and includes statutory provisions and enforcement guidelines, which 
supplements the 1995 Merger Guidelines. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST 
DIVISION MANUAL ch. II, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch 
2.htm (providing statutory provisions and guidelines of the Antitrust Division); see also 
BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, supra note 224. 
 272. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 359, 324 n.1 (1963). 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger 
Act, provides in pertinent part: ‘No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire 
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, 
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
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mechanism for analyzing competitive effects was refined by case law, 
most notably by three seminal high court decisions: (1) Philadelphia 
National Bank; (2) Phillipsburg National Bank;273 and (3) Connecticut 
National Bank.274  This trio established the primary method by which 
regulators determine whether the market effects of a proposed bank 
merger are anticompetitive.275  Before a regulator can even begin to 
perform a competitive analysis of a proposed bank merger, the agency 
must first define the “‘line of commerce’ (relevant product or services 
market) and the ‘section of the country’ (relevant geographic 
market).”276  A “necessary predicate” to determine whether a bank 
merger is likely to violate the Clayton Act is to evaluate the scope of the 
relevant product and geographic markets.277  This trio of decisions did 
not provide specific standards for qualifying what constitutes a local 
geographic market, and each supervisory agency was left to its own 
devices to develop a working geographic market definition.278  A lack of 
clarity and predictability resulted with respect to the boundaries of bank 
merger scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court has not revisited the competitive antitrust issue 
in the banking context since the 1970s, and while some of the circuit 
courts have decided such cases, they have not deviated from the local 
geographic market and cluster of product and services approaches first 
articulated in Philadelphia National Bank.279  The Federal Reserve 
reinforces these outdated concepts, insisting that the law governing bank 
 
monopoly.’ 
Id. 
 273. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1969). 
 274. United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); see also United States 
v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 275. See Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 7, Box 1.  The key determinants of the 
degree of competition as set forth in the holdings of the three seminal cases are: “(1) the 
cluster of bank products is the relevant product line for competitive analysis; (2) this 
cluster is typically viewed as being consumed in geographically local banking markets; 
and (3) market structure.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 276. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356; see also DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1. 
 277. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted). 
 278. DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1. 
 279. Alvarez, supra note 256, at 8; see also United States v. Cent. State Bank, 817 
F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987); Wyo. Bancorp. v. Bd. of Governors, 729 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 
1984); Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(using cluster and local banking market to analyze competitive effects of bank 
acquisition while recognizing inherent limitations in traditional market share analysis); 
Mid-Neb. Bancshares, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 627 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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merger activity remains unchanged.280  The Fed’s general counsel 
explained recently that courts have shown a willingness to consider that 
commercial banking services can command an expanded product market 
due to a changing financial sector, and that competition reaches beyond 
local markets.281  In spite of such speculation, continued judicial 
reluctance leaves the “long-standing product and geographic market 
definitions” carefully intact, unless presented with “persuasive economic 
evidence” that compels the charting of a new course for scrutinizing 
bank mergers.282 
The Justice Department has adopted a different analytical approach 
from bank regulators.  According to the Federal Reserve, the DOJ 
usually employs the Board’s traditional local banking market 
definition.283  The DOJ, however, has noted that its screening guidelines 
[Bank Merger Competitive Review]284 indicate that the supervisory 
regulatory agencies and the DOJ “do not necessarily use the same 
product market or geographic market definitions.”285  It is correct that 
 
 280. DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1 n.1 (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321). 
 281. See Alvarez, supra note 256, at 8-9. 
 282. Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 
 283. Alvarez, supra note 256, at 15.  According to the Fed, some differences exist in 
their [DOJ and Federal Reserve] respective approaches to competitive analysis, 
specifically regarding where bank merger proposals might have the potential for 
significant adverse competitive effects. 
The DOJ places substantial weight on the potential effect of a merger on lending to 
small businesses, while the Board considers all lending in the context of the more 
general analysis of the cluster of banking products and services.  The DOJ also has 
discretion to pay less attention to certain mergers or acquisitions, such as mergers 
involving small or medium-sized banks in rural and small urban banking markets, 
while the Board is mandated to review the competitive effects of these and all other 
proposed bank mergers or acquisitions within its jurisdiction.  Because of these 
differences, the Board and the DOJ may reach different conclusions regarding the 
competitive effects of a proposed merger or acquisition.  However, that is rare and 
always known in advance. 
Id. 
 284. BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, supra note 224. 
 285. Chemtob, supra note 220. 
[T]he Department of Justice examines the competitive effects of the transaction in 
disaggregated product markets (including retail, small business and middle-market 
lending) while the banking agencies look at the cluster of banking services.  Remedies 
recommended by the Justice Department and the bank regulators may also differ, with 
Justice Department remedies more likely to be focused on ensuring that market 
competition is protected, rather than simply on restoring the pre-merger structural 
characteristics of the market . . . . Unlike the laws applicable to mergers in the 
telecommunications or energy areas, however, the bank regulators are authorized to 
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the DOJ does employ something that resembles the Philadelphia 
National Bank analysis in its HHI Index-driven review.286  However, the 
DOJ excludes some of the variables evaluated by bank regulators while 
adding others, and considers the pedigree local market factor but one of 
multiple data points for consideration, and may include the effect of 
nonbank rivals, including those operating within national or even global 
markets, as relevant competitors when determining whether a proposed 
combination would ultimately result in anticompetitive market effects.287 
Nonetheless, neither the Federal Reserve’s traditional local market 
approach, nor the DOJ’s modified metrics, take into meaningful account 
a host of other variables in the manner advocated by the authors.  Many 
economic factors, both macro and micro, are worthy of evaluation 
during a proposed merger’s scrutiny.  Examples of such relevant 
variables that a reviewer should consider include at what point in an 
economic cycle a merger was proposed and the underlying reasons for 
that prospective combination (e.g., business synergies versus “going 
concern” survival), as well as the general health of the domestic 
financial services sector and broader economy.288  These and numerous 
other endogenous and exogenous factors warrant due consideration 
because they offer the prospect of improved efficacy of the review, by 
way of an enhanced insight into the proposed transaction.  Accordingly, 
these are points that should be plotted on a reviewer’s data curve in 
order to more accurately evaluate the competitive impact of a given 
transaction, and ultimately, to discern whether the public interest is 
served by a transaction’s approval. 
 
approve an anticompetitive merger if they find that the anticompetitive effects are 
‘clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effects of the transaction in 
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 286. For example, the “DOJ distinguishes banking from other industries . . . by 
allowing it more latitude for increases in HHI,” but typically does not include, for 
example, thrift deposits into its analysis, whereas the Federal Reserve factors in the 
market effects of thrifts, but only assesses them with a half-weighted value in their 
antitrust analysis. See Gilbert & Zaretsky, Banking Antitrust: Are the Assumptions Still 
Valid?, FED. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (2003), at 30-31, available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/11/gilbert.pdf. 
 287. See Litan, supra note 54; see also id. (“[B]anks face competition in virtually all 
of their services from non-banks . . . “); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 
224; see generally Gilbert & Zaretsky, supra note 286. 
 288. Ben Bernanke et al., The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 
REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 1, 1-15 (1996). 
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A.  The Federal Reserve’s Competitive Analysis 
As a starting point for the Federal Reserve’s competitive effects 
analysis of a bank merger application, the Board typically “defines the 
scope of the local geographic banking markets that are likely to be 
affected by a proposed acquisition or merger.”289  The Board next 
examines the competitive effects of a proposed combination in each of 
the local banking markets where an acquirer and prospective target 
compete.  The Fed will typically factor into its review: 
[T]he number of competitors that would remain in the market, the 
relative market shares of total deposits in depository institutions in 
the market (‘market deposits’), the concentration level of market 
deposits in the market and the projected increase in this level as 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI’) under the 
DOJ Merger Guidelines, and other characteristics of the market.290 
If a merger “results in a HHI change of 200 points or more to a 
post-merger HHI level of 1800 or more, or a post-merger market share 
of 35 [%] or more,” the Board will conduct a more detailed review to 
assess whatever anticompetitive effects might exist, and determine 
whether there are mitigating factors (in each respective local banking 
market) that might offset any potential anticompetitive effects.291  Some 
of the mitigating factors considered by the Board are a makeup of the 
local banking market, including the “number and relative market share 
of the remaining competitors,”292 and the attractiveness of entry into that 
 
 289. Alvarez, supra note 256, at 10. 
Under the Board’s procedures, these geographic banking markets are defined by staff 
at the Federal Reserve Bank in whose District the acquiring banking organization and 
the target depository institution directly compete, with oversight by Board staff in 
Washington.  The Federal Reserve System’s specialized expertise, data, and market 
knowledge provide critical resources for competitive analysis, including in defining 
local geographic banking markets.  In delineating local banking market boundaries 
within their Districts, the Federal Reserve Banks consider a number of factors, 
including population density, worker commuting patterns, advertising patterns of 
financial institutions and additional banking data, and other indicia of economic 
integration and the transmission of competitive forces among banks. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 290. Alvarez, supra note 256, at 10 (citations omitted). 
 291. See id. at 12. 
 292. Id. at 13. 
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market, as determined by “recent entry and favorable economic 
conditions.”293 
The Federal Reserve’s “active economic research program” reviews 
the local banking market and cluster approach used in the merger 
analysis,294 and has “not found persuasive evidence to alter the general 
framework for analyzing bank mergers and acquisitions.”295  It is unclear 
what the Fed might consider to be “persuasive,” but these reviews do 
confirm, at least for the Fed, that the “cluster of commercial banking 
products and services and the local area continue to provide reliable 
guidance for defining the appropriate product and geographic markets in 
banking for the vast majority of households and small businesses.”296  A 
large body of research conducted in the past few years by the Federal 
Reserve Board revealed conflicting data regarding geographic 
markets.297  Some Federal Reserve research has supported the traditional 
localized geographic market approach, whereas other research suggests 
“considerably larger markets.”298  For banking mergers, the Fed 
 
 293. Id. Other factors include: 
The competitive significance of the target institution also can be a relevant factor in 
some cases.  For example, if the bank to be acquired is in a failing condition or 
otherwise is not a reasonably active competitor in the market due to its financial 
condition or other circumstances, the loss of competition would not be considered to 
be as severe as otherwise indicated by the HHI measurement.  Adverse competitive 
effects also may be offset somewhat if the bank to be acquired is located in a 
fundamentally declining market such that it cannot sustain the existing banking 
organizations.  In addition, the Board might consider other evidence on the nature and 
degree of competition in a particular market, including information on actual pricing 
behavior and the quality of services provided, in assessing the effects of a particular 
transaction. 
Id. at 13-14. 
 294. See id. at 9. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
For example, the Board’s 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances indicates that 
small businesses tend to obtain multiple financial services from their primary financial 
institution and from depository institutions in general, most of which are commercial 
banks.  In contrast, this Survey suggests that small businesses typically obtain only 
one financial service from non-depository suppliers.  With respect to geographic 
markets, the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances indicates that the majority of 
small businesses obtain most of their financing from local financial institutions, 
primarily commercial banks.  In addition, the Board’s 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances indicates that households still, to a substantial degree, obtain many financial 
services at local depository institutions. 
Id. 
 297. Neill, supra note 226, 302 n.11. 
 298. Id. (citations omitted). 
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continues to use a two-decade old geographic market and product 
market framework,299 with the FDIC and the OCC following suit.300  The 
Treasury Department has recently sought to advance a “blueprint” for 
the Fed to become an “umbrella” agency for the financial 
services/banking sector.301 
B.  The Department of Justice’s Competitive Analysis 
The DOJ utilizes the same antitrust competitive analysis for 
banking industry as it does for all other industries.302  The standards used 
by the DOJ to assess the competitive effects of all mergers are found in 
the DOJ’s Merger Guidelines303  According to a former Federal Reserve 
Commissioner, “[w]hile the bank regulatory agencies have not officially 
endorsed DOJ’s segmented ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines Approach’ to 
market definition, it has captured the day.”304 
In reviewing a bank merger proposal, the pragmatic DOJ approach 
can “refine” its definitions of the relevant product and geographic 
market by evaluating specific services that each merger participant 
 
 299. See id. at 292 (citations omitted). 
 300. See DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1 
 301. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Blueprint for a 
Stronger Regulatory Structure (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/hp896.htm. 
 302. Litan, supra note 54. 
 303. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 224; see also Timothy J. Muris, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks On the Occasion of the Celebration 
of the Twentieth Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines (June 10, 2002), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/1982mergerguidelines.shtm#N_14_. 
The merger guidelines initiative begun in June of 1982 continues to exercise 
considerable intellectual power because the 1982 Merger Guidelines were not frozen 
in time.  The Justice Department issued its first merger guidelines in 1968, revised 
them in 1982, amended them further in 1984, and, joined by the Federal Trade 
Commission, amended them again in 1992 and 1997.  Driving this evolution has been 
an institutional attentiveness to developments in theory and the lessons of practical 
experience.  These Merger Guidelines will retain their vitality only if the federal 
agencies remain open to future adjustments informed by improvements in economic 
and legal learning, and if the agencies make efforts to analyze and learn from the 
results of past implementation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 304. Calvani et al., supra note 39 (“Moreover, by jointly adopting the Bank Merger 
Screening Guidelines, both DOJ and the regulatory agencies have adopted a method of 
approach that minimizes conflict.  The centerpiece is the method of defining the 
relevant product market and measuring concentration.”). 
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offers and the location(s) in which the services are offered.305  If finance 
companies or credit unions compete with merger candidates, the DOJ 
will include those businesses in its relevant product market analysis.306  
The DOJ also employs a “looser” HHI threshold than suggested by its 
own Merger Guidelines,307 because the competition facing banks comes 
from non-banks who offer virtually the same services, and from out-of-
state banks,308  These circumstances, according to the DOJ, “often 
cannot be captured by computing HHI’s based solely on deposits.”309 
The HHI concentration result will be different when markets are 
defined differently.  For example, in the Central Savings and Huntington 
 
 305. See Litan, supra note 54. 
The way we analyze markets should cause no more uncertainty than our procedure in 
all other types of mergers, which often present unique product and geographic 
markets.  Merger analysis is fact-sensitive in banking as elsewhere.  The analytical 
principles and goals are the same, but the answers they produce depend on the facts of 
specific cases. 
Id.; see also Martin Frederic Evans & Kevin P. Lewis, Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Antitrust Considerations and Developments, 608 PLI/CORP 27, 40 (1988) (“[T]he 
Department insists that the ‘[a]ccurate assessment of the competitive effects of a merger 
requires the definition of a unique geographic market for each relevant product 
market.’” (citations omitted)). 
 306. Id.; see also Sheehan, supra note 21, at 703-04. 
In United States v. National Bank and Trust Company of Norwich, the Justice 
Department, in suing to enjoin the merger of two New York banks, stated that ‘[t]he 
relevant product markets in this case are appropriately defined as banking services 
provided to consumers (‘consumer banking’) and banking services provided to 
businesses (‘business banking’).’  Furthermore, the Justice Department stated that 
within the two markets ‘there are a number of component services that can be 
considered separately as distinct product markets.’  Within consumer banking 
markets, the Justice Department included demand deposit accounts, savings deposits, 
time deposits, money market deposit accounts, consumer loans, and residential 
mortgage loans.  As providers of many of these services, commercial banks, thrifts, 
credit unions, and other financial institutions should all be included in the product 
market when in fact their products compete with one another. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 307. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 224. 
 308. See Litan, supra note 54. 
 309. Id.  According to the DOJ: 
[S]ome have questioned why we, in some cases, have not used the Fed’s pre-defined 
markets. . . . [W]e will depart from the Fed’s regions where the market realities 
suggest we should.  Moreover, unlike the Fed, which views banks as providing a 
cluster of services, we view banks as multi-product firms.  As a result, we sometimes 
have to use different geographic market definitions for each of the products we 
examine. 
Id. 
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National merger,310 the Board defined the geographic market as a three-
county area, increasing the post-merger HHI by 934 points for a total 
HHI score of 2856 points, and a 43% combined market share.311  The 
DOJ, however, defined the geographic market for the same proposed 
merger as a “single county market,” with a 70% combined market share 
and a post-merger HHI of 5242, an increase of 2462 points.312  The 
Department of Justice treats banks as “multi-product firms” and assesses 
the competitive impact of a proposed combination for each relevant 
product or service.313  The Department of Justice employs a flexible and 
pragmatic analytical approach to its review of proposed banking 
combinations, examining bank competitors in various markets if those 
entities are meaningful participants in market(s) at issue in a proposed 
bank merger. 
C.  Relevant Product Market 
The Philadelphia National Bank Court concluded that the “relevant 
product market” was comprised of the “cluster of products (various 
kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust 
administration) denoted by the term ‘commercial banking.’”314  The 
Court determined that these clusters of products constitute a distinct line 
of commerce.315  When conducting a Clayton Act analysis of a proposed 
bank merger, the relevant product market generally includes only 
competing commercial banks.316  The Philadelphia National Bank Court 
determined in 1963 that “commercial banking products or services are 
so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition from 
products or services of other financial institutions; the checking account 
is in this category.”317 
The Supreme Court has resisted attempts to expand the definition of 
what constitutes a “product market,” despite the changing banking 
 
 310. Maribeth Petrizzi & Erin Carter Grace, Bank Merger Process Overview – 
Powerpoints, 1467 PLI/CORP 181, 210 (2005).  The merger of Central 
Savings/Huntington National - Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan (1999) was considered a 
small business market merger. Id. 
 311. See id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Calvani et al., supra note 39, at n.36 (citation omitted). 
 314. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
 315. See id. 
 316. See Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 7, Box 1. 
 317. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356. 
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landscape and the expansion of financial services offered by non banks.  
Meanwhile, banking regulators have occasionally expanded the product 
market definition, and the DOJ has utilized an evolving product market 
analysis.  The Federal Reserve Board, however, recently stated that 
based upon “empirical data,” the relevant banking market for most U.S. 
households and small business remains generally limited to small 
geographic areas (e.g., counties), and “there is a tendency [for 
consumers] to purchase a cluster of services from commercial banks.”318 
1.  DOJ’s Relevant Product Market 
Although the DOJ generally attempts to use the Federal Reserve’s 
geographic market definitions, the Fed’s definitions, according to the 
DOJ, do not precisely recognize the attributes of competition for a 
particular service, in some instances.319  The DOJ’s relevant product 
market analysis includes: 
Look[ing] separately at the markets for deposits (commercial and 
retail), various types of loans (mortgages, consumer, and 
commercial), and any other services the parties may offer (trust, cash 
management, correspondent  banking services, etc.).  We tend to 
look especially hard at the type of commercial lending in which the 
parties are engaged.  If, for example, they concentrate their attention 
on small business borrowers (for example, with loans  no more than 
$1 million) or on mid-size borrowers (with larger loan limits) then 
those are the markets we will look at.320 
The DOJ’s product market analysis also “looks at disaggregated 
product markets.”321  This entails an examination of the types of 
products offered by banks to various entities, such as retail, small 
businesses,322 middle market,323 syndicated lending,324 and activities 
 
 318. Supporting Statement, supra note 30, at 2. 
 319. See Litan, supra note 54 (“This is especially likely to be true where the Fed’s 
markets are drawn quite broadly, but the particular services the parties offer actually are 
bought by purchasers in a smaller region–for example, the inner city rather than a wider 
metropolitan area.”). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Petrizzi, supra note 310, at 204. 
 322. Id. (“Small business” means sales less than $10 million and credit less than $1 
million). 
 323. Id. (Middle market means sales of $10 million to $100 million and credit of $1 
million to $10 million). 
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which are generally considered nonbank activities, such as credit cards, 
merchant card processing, ATM networks, and custody services.325  
Although the Federal Reserve uses the cluster of products and services 
analysis set forth in Philadelphia National Bank, the DOJ rejects the 
approach “because banks are not constrained to raise the prices of all the 
services they offer uniformly.”326 
The DOJ challenged the merger of First Hawaiian and First 
Interstate Bank of Hawaii327 after it was approved by the Federal 
Reserve Board.328  The DOJ submitted its report to the Fed, concluding 
that if the transaction was consummated, it would result in substantially 
anticompetitive effects.329 
The [DOJ] Report’s conclusion appears to be based primarily on the 
determination that commercial lending to small-and medium-sized 
businesses—rather than the cluster of banking products and 
services—constitutes the relevant product market, and the State of 
Hawaii in its entirety constitutes the relevant geographic market.330 
 
 324. Id. at 204.  Syndicated lending is “participation in a large loan by more than 
one institution, and is generally for amounts that exceed the level that those institutions 
are comfortable lending on their own . . . which includes investment grade, leveraged 
and highly leveraged loans.” Id. 
 325. Id. at 204. 
 326. Id. at 205 (“For example, banks are not deterred from raising the price of one 
product, such as a small business line of credit, by the possibility that prospective loan 
customers would substitute other products in the cluster.”); see also Neill, supra note 
226, at 297 (citing Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations, Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Address Before the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 
30, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1004.htm). 
Moreover, the DOJ does not adhere to the Federal Reserve Board’s ‘cluster-of-
services’ product market.  Rather, the DOJ disaggregates the product cluster into its 
constituent components and defines a different geographic market for each of the 
component product markets and type of customers using those products.  Thus, the 
DOJ asserts that retail depositors, small businesses, middle-market businesses, and 
large corporations demand different banking products and access those products 
across different geographic distances. 
Id. 
 327. United States v. First Hawaiian, Inc., Civ. No. 90-00904, 1991 WL 126314 (D. 
Haw. May 29, 1991) (The banks were ordered to divest branches). 
 328. First Hawaiian, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 52, 56 (1991), available at 1991 WL 
267202 (approving the acquisition). 
 329. See id. 
 330. Id. (citation omitted). 
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The Federal Reserve noted that the DOJ’s competitive effects 
analysis was premised upon a product market definition that deviated 
from the tradition definition established by the Supreme Court.331  The 
Board also noted that the DOJ’s product market definition “is not 
supported by recent studies of the market behavior of bank customers,” 
and contended the DOJ failed to provide any specific empirical or legal 
justification for its product market definition.332  The Board also 
disagreed with the DOJ’s “statewide geographic market”333 and 
concluded, based upon precedent, “that the geographic market for the 
cluster of services is local in nature.”334  First Hawaiian highlights the 
differences between DOJ bank merger analysis,335 and the Federal 
 
 331. See id. at 56-57. 
[A]fter reviewing the record in this case in light of relevant Board and 
judicial precedents, the Board believes that the appropriate product market in 
this case is the cluster of banking products and services, and the relevant 
geographic markets for analyzing the effects of this expansion proposal are 
the five local markets identified above. 
Id. 
 332. Id. 
The Report indicates that, even if the relevant product market is viewed to be 
a ‘package’ of banking services that includes loans and transaction accounts, 
the market share of a particular institution does not differ significantly when 
measured by reference to the commercial loan market or measured by 
reference to transaction accounts.  Comparable loan data are not readily 
available, and the Board believes that deposits represent the best available 
measure of an institution’s market share.  The Report also states summarily 
that the proposal would be anticompetitive if market share were measured on 
the basis of deposit data.  According to the Report, the HHI would increase 
by 273 points to 3379 on that basis.  This calculation does not account for the 
presence of thrift institutions in the market (with the exception of one thrift 
that is fully included), does not account for any of Applicant’s planned 
divestitures, and assumes a statewide geographic market.  As explained 
above, the Board believes that an analysis of these data, as well as the other 
relevant factors, supports the conclusion that the proposal is not likely to 
lessen competition substantially in any relevant market. 
Id. at 57 n.32. 
 333. Id. at 57 n.32. 
 334. Id. at 54. 
 335. For other examples of the DOJ’s challenges to Board approved mergers, see 
United States v. Society Corp, No. 1:92CV 0525, 1992 WL 191096 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 
1992) (DOJ’s challenge to Society Corp merger); 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 750 (1991) 
(Federal Reserve’s approval of Fleet/Norstar Merger); United States v. Fleet/Norstar 
Fin. Group, Inc., Civ. No. 91-0221-P, 1991 WL 299117 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 1991) (DOJ’s 
challenge to the Federal Reserve Approved merger of Fleet and Norstar Financial 
Group). 
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Reserve Board’s cluster of product and services and local geographic 
market definitions, first enunciated by Philadelphia National Bank.336 
2.  Failed Attempt to Diversify the Product Market 
[T]he Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Philadelphia and 
Phillipsburg on the subject were not intended to be ironclad, hard 
and fast rules which require a court to don blinders to block out the 
true competitive situation existing in every set of circumstances.  
Lower courts have split on the issue.337 
Almost a decade after Philadelphia National Bank, the District 
Court’s product market definition in United States v. Connecticut 
National Bank departed from the Supreme Court’s earlier holdings,338 
when the lower court determined that the “line of commerce” within a 
Clayton Act section 7 analysis “included both commercial banks and 
savings banks.”339  The trial court opined that the edicts of Philadelphia 
National Bank and Phillipsburg National Bank should not prevent an 
analysis of “the true competitive situation,” depending upon the 
circumstances.340 
The United States Supreme Court in Connecticut National Bank 
considered savings banks almost irrelevant in the commercial bank 
merger context and took issue with the lower court’s inclusion of such 
components of a product market analysis.341  The Court agreed with the 
trial court’s assessment that Philadelphia National Bank and 
Phillipsburg National Bank “do not require a court to blind itself to 
economic realities,”342 and stated that it “‘must recognized meaningful 
 
 336. Id. at 532-54. 
 337. United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 280 (D. Conn. 1973). 
 338. See id. at 240. 
 339. United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660 (1974) (citing Conn. 
Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. at 281). 
 340. 418 U.S. at 660-61 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. at 281). 
[C]ountervailing legal and factual arguments persuade this Court that, while other 
financial institutions may not be significant in determining the appropriate line of 
commerce in the instant case, savings banks are in direct and substantial competition 
with commercial banks in providing product-services to the banking consumers in 
Connecticut.  The cold, hard realities of the situation are that savings and commercial 
banks are fierce competitors in this state. 
Id. 
 341. See Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. at 662. 
 342. Id. 
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competition where it is found to exist.’”343  Although the Court 
acknowledged that commercial banks and savings banks in the state 
offer basically equivalent services and, thus, are “‘fierce 
competitors,’”344 it found that the lower court “mistaken[ly]” included 
commercial and savings banks in its product market analysis, despite its 
recognition that each offered customers “identical or essentially fungible 
services.”345  The Court also determined that the District Court 
“overestimated” the degree of overlap in competition between 
commercial and savings banks in the state.346 
Despite substantial similarity in the services offered by savings and 
commercial banks, according to the Court “the overlap is not sufficient 
at this stage in the development of savings banks in Connecticut to treat 
them together with commercial banks in the instant case,” and 
commercial banks provided a cluster of services that savings banks were 
unable to offer, especially to commercial customers.347  Direct 
competition between commercial and savings banks, in “some 
submarkets,” is not the endpoint of an appropriate bank merger market 
 
 343. Id. (quoting United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964)). 
 344. Id. (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. at 280). 
 345. Id. at 662. 
[The District Court also] erred as a matter of law in concluding that the absence of a 
‘line of commerce’ phrase in the Bank Merger Act of 1966 alters traditional standards 
under [§] 7 of the Clayton Act for defining the relevant product market in a bank 
merger case. 
 
The commercial banks in both [Philadelphia National Bank and Phillipsburg National 
Bank] faced significant competition from savings and loan associations and other 
credit institutions.  The [District] Court in both instances nevertheless viewed the 
business of commercial banking as sufficiently distinct from other credit institutions 
to merit treatment as a separate ‘line of commerce’ under [§] 7.  Analogous 
distinctions, although perhaps not as sharply defined, are controlling here. 
Id. at 663-64 (citations omitted). 
 346. See id. at 663. 
To be sure, there is a large measure of similarity between the services marketed by the 
two categories of banks. 
 
In our view, however, the overlap is not sufficient at this stage in the development of 
savings banks in Connecticut to treat them together with commercial banks in the 
instant case.  Despite the strides that savings banks in that State have made toward 
parity with commercial banks, the latter continue to be able to provide a cluster of 
services that the former cannot, particularly with regard to commercial customers, and 
this Court has repeatedly held services that the former cannot, particularly provided 
by commercial banks that sets them apart for purposes of [§] 7. 
Id. at 663-64. 
 347. Id. at 663-64. 
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analysis.348  The District Court noted that “it would be ‘ostrich-like” to 
assume that the two types of banks are not in direct and vigorous 
competition with regard to the services they share or are not viewed by 
many bank customers as more or less fungible for purposes of those 
services.349  Despite such clarity of thought, the Federal Reserve only 
gives a 50% weighting to thrift deposits, and the DOJ often does not 
consider them at all.350 
Aggregation of financial services and products, particular to 
commercial customers, apparently justifies the view that commercial 
banks deserve a specialized method to evaluate proposed mergers.351  
Because commercial banks service business constituencies with clusters 
of products and services that, in the aggregate, are not offered by savings 
banks, “the differences in what commercial banks . . . offer to that 
important category of bank customers are sufficient to establish 
commercial banking as a distinct line of commerce.”352 
The Supreme Court cautioned that nothing in Connecticut National 
Bank, Phillipsburg National Bank, or Philadelphia National Bank 
prevented future analysis as to whether savings banks and commercial 
banks might co-exist within the same line of commerce.  The 
Connecticut National Bank Court also noted specifically that “[a]t some 
stage in the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic to 
distinguish them from commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton 
Act.”353  The Court was apparently not yet persuaded that the lines 
between commercial and savings banks had blurred sufficiently, and so 
it adhered to the Philadelphia National Bank and Phillipsburg National 
Bank tests.354  The District Court was therefore required, despite other 
 
 348. Id. at 664 n.3. 
 349. Id. (citations omitted). 
 350. Gilbert & Zaretsky, supra note 286; see also First Hawaiian, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 52, 55 (1991), available at 1991 WL 267202 (“The Board also believes that thrift 
institutions must be recognized as competitors in the market.  As explained above, the 
Board has previously indicated that thrift institutions have become, or have the potential 
to become, significant competitors of commercial banks.”). 
 351. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. at 664. 
 352. Id. at 664. 
 353. Id. at 666. 
 354. Id. 
We do not say, and Phillipsburg National Bank, . . . and Philadelphia National Bank, . 
. . do not say, that in a case involving a merger of commercial banks a court may 
never consider savings banks and commercial banks as operating in the same line of 
commerce, no matter how similar their services and economic behavior. At some 
stage in the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic to distinguish them 
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decisions that realistically expanded the product market in the 
nonbanking context,355 to proceed on remand with the use of a relevant 
product market that excluded, inter alia, savings bank competitors.356  
However, the Court would soon begin to re-evaluate the role of thrifts 
and other financial institutions as it continued to refine its bank merger 
antitrust analysis. 
3.  Justice Harlan Criticizes Narrow Cluster Approach 
The Court eschews all analysis of the composition of the products 
and services offered by appellee banks, however.  The Court thus 
manages to ignore completely the extent to which competition from 
savings and loan companies, mutual savings banks, and other 
financial institutions that are not commercial banks affects the 
market power of the appellee banks.357 
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. 
Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust, observed that “[c]ommercial 
realities in the banking industry make clear that banks generally have a 
very localized business.”358  The Court viewed the cluster of products 
and services offered by full service banks as sufficient to construe 
 
from commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton Act. 
Id. 
 355. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) 
(recognizing submarkets and interchangeability necessitated the examination of the 
effect of a shoe company merger’s effect on those submarkets which are independently 
subject to antitrust scrutiny); Berlyn Inc. v. The Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 73 Fed. 
Appx. 576, 582 (4th Cir. 2003) (evaluating a media merger where the relevant product 
market was constructed of “products that have reasonable interchangeability for the 
purposes for which they are produced”) (citations omitted). 
 356. See Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. at 666 (“[I]n adherence to the tests set forth in 
our earlier bank merger cases, which we are constrained to follow, we hold that such a 
point has not yet been reached.  Accordingly, on remand the District Court should treat 
commercial banking as the relevant product market.”). 
 357. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 380 
(1970). 
 358. Id. at 362. 
The District Court selected as the relevant geographic market an area approximately 
four times as large as Phillipsburg-Easton, with a 1960 population of 216,000 and 18 
banks.  The area included the city of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  The court explicitly 
rejected the claim of the United States that Phillipsburg-Easton constitutes the 
relevant market.  We hold that the District Court erred. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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commercial banking as a distinct line of commerce,359 noting “that the 
relevant product market is determine[ed] by the nature of the 
commercial entities involved and by the nature of the competition that 
they face.”360  Harlan jabbed sardonically that the Court’s simplistic 
bank merger analysis was “an exercise in ‘antitrust numerology.’”361  
Justice Harlan developed two “aspects of market structure” to rebut the 
inferences that percentage figures are somehow determinative of 
whether or not the merger will have significant anticompetitive 
effects.362  The first aspect of Harlan’s market structure which may 
alleviate the significance of the competition required a determination of 
the “conditions of entry in a particular market.”363  Justice Harlan 
posited that percentage figures alone do not reveal anything meaningful 
about the conditions for market entry.364  Free market conditions and the 
regulatory environment are among the variables that have an effect on 
ease of (or barriers to) entry into a respective market.365 
 
 359. See id. at 360-61. 
 360. Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 456-57 
(1964)). 
 361. Id. at 376-77 (Harlan, J., with Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). But see id. at 376 n.4 (Justice Harlan “accept[ed] the Court’s conclusion that the 
appropriate geographic market here is the Phillipsburg-Easton area, and agree[d] that 
the geographic market designated by the District Court was too broad, given the small 
size of the banks involved in this case.”). 
 362. Id. (“Consequently, I think the appellees should on remand be given an 
opportunity to show by ‘clear evidence’ that despite the percentage figures, the 
anticompetitive effects of this merger are not significant.”). 
 363. Id. (“New entry can, of course, quickly alleviate ‘undue’ concentration.  And 
the possibility of entry can act as a substantial check on the market power of existing 
competitors.”); see also Calvani et al., supra note 39, at n.8 (“The Supreme Court has 
expressly accepted the perceived potential entrant theory in a bank case.”). 
 364. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 U.S. at 377. 
 365. Id. at 377-82. 
Quite apart from entry, there is another aspect of the market structure relevant here 
that affects the significance of the percentage figures cited by the Court.  Relying on 
Philadelphia Bank, the Court concludes that the ‘cluster of products * * * and services 
* * * denoted by the term ‘commercial banking’ * * * composes a distinct line of 
commerce’ for purposes of this case.  The Court eschews all analysis of the 
composition of the products and services offered by appellee banks, however.  The 
Court thus manages to ignore completely the extent to which competition from 
savings and loan companies, mutual savings banks, and other financial institutions 
that are not commercial banks affects the market power of the appellee banks. 
Id. at 379-80. 
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The second prong of Justice Harlan’s “aspects of market structure” 
is an analysis of the cluster of products and services which tends to 
reveal facets of banking market competition and the significance (if any) 
of percentage figures.366  The dissent criticized the majority’s product 
market delineation because it “largely ignores” the “subtleties.”367  
Justice Harlan’s Phillipsburg dissent viewed the proper approach as 
being an evaluation of the competition from other industries, or even 
sub-industries, in addition to commercial banks, because both the target 
and acquirer bank “have more in common with savings and loan 
institutions and mutual savings banks than with the big city commercial 
banks considered in Philadelphia [National] Bank.”368  Harlan’s dissent 
also recognized that “nonbank financial institutions offer close 
substitutes for the products and services that are most important to the 
appellee banks.”369 
According to the minority view, the Court instead “emphasized the 
cluster of services and products which in the Court’s words ‘makes 
commercial banking a distinct line of commerce.’”370  The reform 
advocated by the authors—specifically, an updated model for evaluating 
proposed bank mergers—finds its origins in Harlan’s rebuttal of the 
Phillipsburg majority. 
 
 366. Id. at 378-82. 
 367. Id. at 380-81.  “[T]he Court’s mode of analysis makes too much turn on the all-
or-nothing determination that the relevant product market either includes or does not 
include products and services of savings and loan companies, and other competition.” 
Id. at 382. 
 368. Id. at 380-81. 
 368. Id. at 392. 
 369. Id. at 381. But cf. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 
2003) (In Visa USA, Inc., the Second Circuit agreed “that other forms of payment-such 
as cash, checks, debit cards, and proprietary cards (e.g., the Sears or Macy’s cards)—are 
not considered by most consumers to be reasonable substitutes for general purpose 
credit or charge cards.”); see also id. at 239 (citations omitted) (“A distinct product 
market comprises products that are considered by consumers to be “reasonabl[y] 
interchangeab[le]” with what the defendant sells.). 
 370. Id. 
[E]ven assuming that for purposes of a preliminary analysis one were to use 
commercial banking as the line of commerce for the antitrust analysis—if only for the 
sake of convenience—that does not excuse the majority’s failure to consider the 
competitive realities of the case in appraising the significance of the concentration 
percentages thus calculated. 
Id. at 381-82 (citations omitted). 
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4.  Stare Decisis and Shifting Market Conditions 
The Justice Department challenged the proposed merger between 
the National Bank of Commerce (“NBC”) and Washington Trust Bank 
(“WTB”) on Clayton Act grounds.371  The DOJ opposed the prospective 
merger because it believed the combination might substantially lessen 
competition in a variety of ways.372  The District Court adopted the 
defendant’s proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, including 
the finding that the merger would have “‘no inherent anticompetitive 
effect,’” and would “‘substantially’ increase competition in commercial 
banking in the Spokane metropolitan area.”373  The trial court dismissed 
the DOJ’s complaint,374 having concluded that, even if the proposed 
merger would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, it was otherwise 
lawful under the Bank Merger Act of 1966 because the acquirer (NBC) 
would provide a broad range of banking services to the Spokane area 
market.375  The Supreme Court concurred with the trial court’s findings, 
and determined its view was “in full accord with [its] precedents,”376 
specifically that the relevant product market was “the ‘business of 
 
 371. United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1974) (“NBC is 
a wholly owned subsidiary of a registered bank holding company, Marine 
Bancorporation, Inc. (Marine).”). 
 372. See id. at 614-15. 
The merger ‘may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition’ within the meaning of [§] 7 
in three ways: by eliminating the prospect that NBC, absent acquisition of the market 
share represented by WTB, would enter Spokane de novo or through acquisition of a 
smaller bank and thus would assist in deconcentrating that market over the long run; 
by ending present procompetitive effects allegedly produced in Spokane by NBC’s 
perceived presence on the fringe of the Spokane market; and by terminating the 
alleged probability that WTB as an independent entity would develop through internal 
growth or through mergers with other medium-size banks into a regional or ultimately 
statewide counterweight to the market power of the State’s largest banks.  The 
Government’s first theory—alleged likelihood of de novo or foothold entry by NBC if 
the challenged merger were blocked—was the primary basis upon which this case was 
presented to the District Court. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 373. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 615-16. 
 374. Id. at 618. 
 375. Id.; see also id. at 618 n.15 (NBC was a full-service bank with “increased loan 
limits, different types of loans, international banking services, computer services, 
enhanced trust services, and other benefits,” whereas the target bank (WTB), due to its 
smaller size, could not provide this array of services.). 
 376. Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 359-
62 (1970); United States v. Third Nat’l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 182 n.15 (1968); United 
States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963)). 
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commercial banking (and the cluster of products and services denoted 
thereby).’”377  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that precedent is 
not “sacrosanct,”378 and slavish adherence to prior decisions can be 
eliminated “‘where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been 
established.’”379  In some circles the question continued as to whether 
the financial markets had yet sufficiently shifted away from the 
Philadelphia National Bank Court’s perception that banking was 
“unique” and “insulated,” due to its particular array of traditional 
products and services, as well as a tendency towards predominantly 
local customer constituencies. 
D.  Geographic Market 
The Philadelphia National Bank Court determined that the relevant 
geographical market is not determined by “where the parties to the 
merger do business or even where they compete, but where, within the 
area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will 
be direct and immediate.”380  The Court found that banking was like 
“most service industries” and must have customer-convenient locations 
in order to effectively compete, and that both corporate and retail 
customers “typically” use “banks in their local community” because of 
the impracticality of distant banking.381  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the area where the offices of the acquirer and target 
bank are located is not a perfect benchmark for the “section of the 
country” on which to assess any anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
merger.382  The Court ultimately compromised with the four-county 
 
 377. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 618 (citation omitted). 
 378. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 379. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 
164, 172 (1989)). 
 380. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963) (citation omitted). 
 381. Id. at 358 (citation omitted). 
 382. Id. at 360-61. 
Large borrowers and large depositors, the record shows, may find it practical to do a 
large part of their banking business outside their home community; very small 
borrowers and depositors may, as a practical matter, be confined to bank offices in 
their immediate neighborhood; and customers of intermediate size, it would appear, 
deal with banks within an area intermediate between these extremes. . . . [S]ome 
banking services are evidently more local in nature than others. 
Id. 
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Philadelphia metropolitan area and avoided extreme delineations of the 
relevant market boundaries.383 
Impracticality of banking at a distance is a non-issue in most 
instances today.  Modern banking markets call for a pragmatic analytical 
framework that recognizes the ubiquity of technology and services that 
affordably transcend physical space and make the existing standard 
obsolete.  Today’s era is one where mortgages can be originated over 
toll-free telephone numbers and applications can be made via the 
Internet,384 credit card issuers provide customers with “convenience 
checks,” kiosks frequently replace bank branches, and retail shopping 
outlets often offer ATMs and other financial services.385 
The Connecticut National Bank dissent argued that potential 
competition from adjacent markets should also be incorporated into an 
appropriate competitive effect analysis, and that as a result, the analysis 
may necessarily include more than one relevant geographic market.386  
However, there still remains an almost luddite resistance to an alteration 
 
 383. Id. 
 384. See, e.g., Capital One’s Home Online Loan/Mortgage Application, 
http://www.capitalonehomeloans.com/newhome/?ref=bank&linkid=WWW_Z_Z_Z_B
MRT_C1_01_T_Z (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 385. See, e.g., Karen Epper Hoffman, A 2nd Act for ATMs; ATMs and Financial 
Kiosks Are Back in Vogue as Banks Look to Strengthen Self-service Options in the 
Branch, BANKING STRATEGIES, May/June 2007, available at http://www.bai.org/bank 
ingstrategies/2007-may-june/ASecondAct/print.asp. 
7-Eleven Inc.’s Vcom terminals . . . boasts more than 1,000 such machines, which 
enable users to cash checks, get cash, pay bills and buy money orders.  Exxon Mobil 
installed 130 of its own bill-paying terminals in its convenience stores in 2006, and 
announced plans to roll out nearly 1,000 more by yearend 2007.  Banks recognize the 
need to compete with such retailers and other would-be rivals on the self-service front, 
and one counter-attack strategy is to offer new ATMs with greater functionality. 
Id.; see also Kris Hudson, Wal-Mart Pushes Financial Services Menu, WALL ST. J., 
June 6, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118108758438025751.html? 
mod=home_whats_news_us. 
 386. See United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 673-75 (1974). 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act speaks to lessening competition ‘in any section of the 
country’ . . . and as the majority acknowledges in Marine Bancorporation, the Court 
‘held that the Government had established three relevant markets in which the 
acquired firm actually marketed its products—a single State, a multi-state area, and 
the Nation as a whole.’  To be sure, the selection of any relevant geographic market in 
a banking case must be chosen in terms of the needs of the customers and the area in 
which sellers operate, but this may result in several possible markets, especially in a 
potential . . . competition case where a merger might affect the economic behavior of 
existing firms in various markets. 
Id. at 674 (citations omitted). 
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of the review methods to accurately reflect the present state of the 
financial services market.  At least one Federal Reserve Bank has 
recognized that the changing banking landscape has led to a shift in 
geographic boundaries,387 but it remains convinced that its local market 
definition remains reasonably reflective of the current state of the 
financial services sector.388 
Innovations such as advanced-function ATMs have added to the 
ease of delivering financial services and products,389 and expand a 
bank’s potential offerings to the extent that the West Coast bank Wells 
Fargo “view[s] the ATM as an extension of the bank, not just a glorified 
point-of-sale device, . . . We see it as a place to do banking.”390  
Technology advances have afforded even greater convenience, allowing 
customers to receive financial services via terrestrial fiber optic lines or 
wi-fi signals, whether from a hotel or living room, or while at a golf 
course or an airport concourse.  More than a decade ago, the CEO of 
Chemical Bank even remarked that “[n]ot having branches could be an 
 
 387. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Elements of Antitrust Analysis, available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/struct/antitrst.htm [hereinafter FRB Elements of 
Antitrust Analysis]. 
Recently, the geographic boundaries of the banking markets have been affected by 
technological changes, such as the growth of automated teller machine networks and 
remote banking services, and by financial innovations, such as money market funds 
and deposit brokerage.  Such technological and financial changes could create 
difficulty in establishing geographic boundaries that accurately separate groups of 
banking competitors into distinct geographic markets. 
Id. 
 388. See id. 
In a 2001 paper, Amel and Starr-McCluer study the Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 
Survey of Consumer Finances and conclude that although financial institutions face 
increasing competition from distant and/or non-depository institutions, consumers still 
rely predominantly on local depository institutions for many key banking products. 
Consequently, they argue, current market definitions still accurately reflect 
competitive conditions for these products. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 389. See, e.g., the ‘Unmanned Bank Branch ATM,’ available at 
http://www.kioskmarketplace.com/products_411.php; see also Bill Yackey, Advanced-
function ATMs Register on College Campuses, ATM MARKETPLACE.COM, Aug. 29, 
2007, http://www.atmmarketplace.com/article.php?na=1&id=9187 (Wilmington 
Savings Fund Society Financial Corp.’s moved to unmanned banking at the University 
of Delaware, and “replace[d] its existing on-campus branch ATMs with NCR Corp.’s 
line of Personas M Series 86 no-envelope ATMs.  The ATMs, in addition to cash 
dispensing, offer intelligent-deposit features.”). 
 390. See Hoffman, supra note 385. 
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advantage as we leapfrog the physical delivery system.”391  The nature 
of the contemporary financial services market has unquestionably 
advanced to such an extent that the analytical modalities for bank 
merger evaluation should also necessarily evolve.  While the physical 
“brick and mortar” branch is not yet decidedly anachronistic, an 
increasing number of customers, retail and commercial alike, have 
already elected to fulfill many of their banking needs online, and some 
even bank with an institution that has no physical branch locations at 
all.392 
1.  Federal Reserve Continues to Utilize a Localized 
Geographic Market 
In the context of the banking merger analysis, the Federal Reserve 
continues to define the relevant geographic market as one that is 
predominantly local by nature.393  In setting the geographic market, “the 
Board and the courts have consistently found that the relevant 
geographic market for analyzing the competitive effects of a proposal 
must reflect commercial and banking realities and should consist of the 
 
 391. Saul Hansell, 500,000 Clients, No Branches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE5DB1F39F930A357 
5AC0A963958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1. 
 392. See Carolyn Bigda, Break the Bank: Go Online, CNN MONEY.COM, Aug. 3, 
2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/02/pf/online_banks.moneymag/?post 
version=2007080308. 
The first virtual banks were generally limited to high-yield savings accounts, but 
today’s ‘pure play’ Web banks such as E-Trade and EverBank offer free ATMs and 
check writing. 
 
There are no branches, but you probably use those less frequently anyway: 41 million 
households now do some form of banking online, a number that’s expected to nearly 
double by 2011, according to Forrester Research.  (Even some old-style banks are 
trying to get into the game by setting up Web-only divisions.) 
Id. 
 393. Bank of Am. Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C5, C7-C8 (2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/legal06-508.pdf; see also J.P Morgan 
Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_legal.pdf; Bank of Am. Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217, 
221 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/spring04_le 
gal.pdf; Cent. Pac. Fin. Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 93, 95 (2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/winter04_legal.pdf (“[T]he Board 
and the courts repeatedly have held that the geographic market for the cluster of 
banking products and services is local in nature.”); Fin. Group, Inc., 85 Fed. Res. Bull. 
747, 750 & n.19 (1999); NationsBank Corp., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 858, 860 n.15 (1998). 
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local area where customers can practicably turn for alternatives.”394  
Each Federal Reserve Bank is responsible for defining its own 
geographic market, some of which are closer to a contemporary view 
than others.395  The varying methodologies can be attributed to “the 
decentralized organization of the Federal Reserve System, but it is more 
a result of the diverse geography and demography of the United 
States.”396  For example, the Boston Federal Reserve Bank utilizes the 
following relevant geographic market analysis: 
[C]onsiders a local, economically integrated area to be a banking 
market. It assumes that the boundaries of these markets coincide 
with the boundaries of mutually exclusive predefined economically 
integrated regions.  A banking organization in a region is assumed to 
compete directly with all of the other banking organizations within 
that region, but not with banking organizations outside the region.397 
Given that the Federal Reserve Banks play a “critical role in 
defining the proper scope of local banking markets throughout the 
United States,”398 the bank merger analysis employed by the twelve 
regional banks has wide-ranging implications. 
 
 394. Cmty. Bankshares, Inc., 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C59, C60 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007/legalq107.pdf (citations omitted).  
“In defining a geographic market, the Board and the courts have consistently found that 
the relevant geographic market for analyzing the competitive effects of a proposal must 
reflect commercial and banking realities and should consist of the local area where 
customers can practicably turn for alternatives.” Id. at C60 n.7. 
 395. See DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1. 
There is fairly diverse opinion as to how banking markets should be defined.  Some 
Reserve Banks define markets according to a fixed methodology applied uniformly 
across the entire District.  Federal Reserve Banks taking this approach generally 
update their markets at regular intervals, usually coinciding with the publication of the 
United States Census.  The second approach is to define markets on a case-by-case 
basis, using whatever information is available for a particular area.  There are 
advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. 
Id. at 1-2; see also Neill, supra note 226, at 293-94 (2006). 
It has been suggested that the Federal Reserve Bank’s pre-defined markets are larger 
than the local market delineation set forth by the Court in Philadelphia National Bank 
because the Banks’ markets are not so narrow that an individual customer at one end 
of a market would need to consider banks at the opposite end of the market to be 
practical alternatives.  Rather, it is assumed that the economic integration of the 
market will transmit banking competition via a ‘chain reaction’ effect. 
Id. 
 396. DiSalvo, supra note 18, at 1.  
 397. FRB Elements of Antitrust Analysis, supra note 387. 
 398. Alvarez, supra note 256, n.28; see also Supporting Statement, supra note 30. 
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2.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Comptroller 
of the Currency 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation defines the relevant 
geographic market as inclusive of the area where: a target bank’s offices 
are located; the area from which those offices derive a majority of their 
business, such as loans, deposits, etc.; and “the areas where existing and 
potential customers impacted by the proposed merger may practically 
turn for alternative sources of banking services.”399  The FDIC rejected 
the joint Bank Merger Competitive Review,400 and has set forth its own 
test for competitive review in a Statement of Policy on Bank Merger 
Transactions and its Interagency Bank Merger Act Application.401  The 
FDIC, in 1989, stated that the cluster approach is no longer relevant in 
the current environment,402 and proposed a redefining and expansion of 
product market to include “functional equivalent” services offered by 
non-banks, such as securities firms, finance companies, and depository 
institutions.403  This approach, the FDIC believed, would reflect a more 
realistic competitive approach.  “[T]his product market analysis further 
undermine[d] the cluster approach because it [was] based on financial 
competition, rather than on competition solely within the commercial 
 
 399. See FDIC Statements of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions, 63 Fed. Reg. 
44,763 (Aug. 20, 1998) (“In delineating the relevant geographic market, the FDIC will 
also consider the location of the acquiring institution’s offices in relation to the offices 
to be acquired.”); see also Evans & Lewis, supra note 305, at 39-40. 
The 1980 FDIC Statement of Policy (hereinafter ‘FDIC Policy Statement’) makes no 
reference to the determination of a particular product market, or, therefore, to the 
standards the Agency uses to determine the market.  In a subsequently withdrawn 
policy proposal, the FDIC proposed to determine the relevant product market by 
delineating ‘those individual products or services which are material to the 
proponent’s overall business. . . .’  The policy proposal also expressly recognized that 
thrifts and ‘similar financial service firms’ should consistently be included in the 
relevant line of commerce.  While the proposal was never adopted by the FDIC, the 
Agency regularly considers the presence of thrift institutions in the relevant 
geographic market. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 400. BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, supra note 224. 
 401. See Neill, supra note 226, at 296 (“The FDIC’s supplemental application 
instructions call for merger applicants to provide detailed deposit account information 
based on the locations of the depositors.  It also invites the parties to propose broader 
markets based on where customers could turn for alternative sources of banking 
services.”). 
 402. See Sheehan, supra note 21, at 701. 
 403. See id. (citing and quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 39,803-04 (1988)). 
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banking industry.”404  The FDIC framework’s inclusion of nonbank 
competitors is pragmatic, especially as such market participants continue 
to innovate and offer new financial products and services that 
increasingly press traditional banks for market share, while consumers 
demand greater options, service and convenience. 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency often defines a 
relevant geographic market as inclusive of an area which surrounds the 
branches of the target bank,405 but generally uses the Federal Reserve 
Bank’s market definition to delineate the relevant geographic market.406  
Officially, the OCC follows the Fed’s pre-defined geographic 
markets,407 but has demonstrated a willingness to employ a submarket 
approach when it reviews bank mergers, stating in a 1980 decision: 
The reality of the marketplace, as well as the state of the law, 
indicates that it is no longer satisfactory to rely solely on the 
traditional cluster of services known as ‘commercial banking’ to 
determine whether a particular merger will result in a substantial 
lessening of competition.  The competitive overlap of services 
provided by commercial banks and thrift institutions has increased, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, such that thrift institutions are 
 
 404. Id. at 701 (citing FDIC Proposes Policy on Bank Mergers, Delays Policy on 
Foreign Exchange Exposure Limits, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 606 (Oct. 10, 1989). 
 405. See Cameron Savings & Loan Ass’n, 20-2 O.C.C. Q.J. 84 (2001), 2001 WL 
1002346 (approving the application to merge Cameron Savings & Loan Association 
into Bank Midwest), available at www.occ.treas.gov/interp/feb01/cd01-02.doc (“The 
Bank Merger Act requires the OCC to consider ‘the financial and managerial resources 
and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and 
needs of the community to be served.’”); see also Interagency Bank Merger Act 
Application, http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/bma-fnl.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2008). But see Evans & Lewis, supra note 305, at 40-41 (“The Comptroller includes 
within the cluster of banking services ‘thrift institutions, nonbank financial institutions 
and financial institutions based outside of the delineated geographic market . . . when 
such institutions exert significant competitive pressure in the geographic market for 
banking services.’”) (citations omitted). 
 406. See Old Nat’l Bank, 19-4 O.C.C. Q.J. 72 (2000), 2000 WL 33173092, at *2 n.3, 
available at www.occ.treas.gov/interp/jul00/ca406.pdf (“In defining the geographic 
markets, the OCC considered the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ market 
delineation, as well as evidence of the areas from which the involved banks derive the 
bulk of their deposits.”); see also Wheeling Nat’l Bank, 1999 WL 1426078, available at 
www.occ.treas.gov/interp/jan00/cd99-48.pdf (approving the application by Wheeling 
National Bank in St. Clairsville, Ohio, to purchase certain assets and to assume certain 
liabilities of the Barnesville Branch of Sky Bank, Salineville, Ohio). 
 407. Neill, supra note 226, at 296. 
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now direct competitors or potential direct competitors of commercial 
banks for almost all consumer financial services and an ever-
increasing number of commercial services.408 
While the OCC reviews the “impact of the proposed transaction on 
competition for the cluster of products and services traditionally offered 
by banks,”409 it now recognizes that the Philadelphia National Bank 
approach to treating commercial banks as unique is obsolete.410  
However, the OCC apparently does not yet embrace the idea that 
nonbanks are important competitors and worthy of consideration when 
conducting a market competition analysis. 
3.  DOJ’s Relevant Geographic Market 
The Justice Department’s approach allows for a host of different 
geographic market definitions for the relevant product markets in a 
proposed bank merger, and considers various factors such as barriers to 
entry and nonbank competitors.411  A basic underlying assumption of the 
 
 408. Sheehan, supra note 21, at 700. 
 409. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 1997 WL 580870, *1 n.1, available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/sep97/cd97-82.pdf (approving the application of Zions 
First National Bank in Salt Lake City, Utah, to purchase certain assets and to assume 
certain liabilities of the Logan, North Logan, Cedar City and St. George branch offices 
(all in Utah), of Wells Fargo Bank) 
Separately analyzing the products and services banks offer, without considering the 
impact on competition for the cluster of products and services, however, was 
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, in [Phillipsburg National Bank].  In that 
case, the Court stated that ‘submarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a broader 
line of commerce that has economic significance.’  Thus, even though ‘submarket’ 
analysis would show little impact on competition as a result of the proposed 
transaction because of Wells Fargo’s retention of assets and the presence of non-bank 
suppliers of traditional bank products and services, the analysis in this decision will 
focus on the impact of the proposed transaction on competition for the cluster of 
products and services traditionally offered by banks. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 410. See Sheehan, supra note 21, at 701 (“Robert Clarke, the Comptroller of the 
Currency, in comparing the banking industry to other financial industries . . . 
emphasized that commercial banks no longer perform a unique function, which was the 
critical factor in the Supreme Court’s adoption of the cluster approach in 
Philadelphia.”) (citation omitted). 
 411. See Litan, supra note 54 (“Our touchstone is where customers for specific 
services are willing to turn, not some arbitrary geographic area that may be developed 
for some other purpose.”); see also id. 
[W]e will assess the strength of all non-bank competition, including individual thrifts 
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DOJ geographic market formulation is that each category of banking, 
such as large corporate customers, retail depositors, middle-market 
business,412 small business,413 and even subprime borrowing,414 has a 
clientele with different needs and expectations, requiring different 
banking products and access to products spanning different geographic 
distances using a variety of delivery technologies.415  For proposed 
mergers of large corporations, the DOJ has employed a national 
geographic market due to the following rationale: 
Most corporations demanding these types of services are public 
companies required to disclose financial statements in public filings 
with the Securities & Exchange Commission, and are also likely to 
conduct operations on broader geographic scales that make them less 
dependent on local economic conditions.  Accordingly, the costs 
associated with gathering information about corporations of this size 
are not dependent on geographic proximity, as compared with small 
businesses and non-public middle-market firms.416 
The DOJ distinguishes each product offered by a prospective bank 
merger participant, undertakes a separate analysis for each particular 
product,417 and uses a different geographic market for different product 
 
and such non-banks  as finance companies.  Finally, if we receive customer 
complaints in a market we will probe more deeply to ensure that the merger won’t  
result in competitive harm. 
Id. 
 412. See Neill, supra note 226, at 300-01. 
 413. Small business customers have the smallest geographic market, according to 
the DOJ. See Neill, supra note 226, at 298 (citation omitted). 
 414. See Petrizzi, supra note 310, at 216. 
 415. Neill, supra note 226, at 297. 
 416. Id. at 302. 
 417. See Calvani et al., supra note 39, at n.25.  Some of the ways the DOJ evaluates 
bank merger proposals includes the following: 
DOJ analyzed the bank merger by considering competition in the retail banking 
products market, the business banking market and the medium-size business banking 
market, and found that the merger had no significant adverse effect.  The Federal 
Reserve Board characterized DOJ’s analysis as an ‘alternative analysis’ but reached 
the same conclusion as DOJ. 
 
During the early 1990s when this transition was first taking place, DOJ staff suggested 
even more narrowly defined markets.  Specific type of small business loan (e.g., an 
agricultural loan) might constitute a separate relevant product market.  Thus a merger 
that is otherwise unobjectionable might pose problems simply because the merging 
banks have a high market share of loans to the commercial fishing industry.  Indeed, it 
was suggested that a specific type of cash management service (e.g., lock boxes) may 
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markets.418  For example, if the product market is small business loans, 
the DOJ will likely define the geographic market as “[w]ithin 3-5 miles 
of the business location,”419 and if the product market is a retail bank, the 
DOJ might define the geographic area as the area “[w]here customers 
live and work.”420 
As part of its review process, Justice Department officials often 
interview local bankers who assist the government in determining the 
scope of the geographic market, the extent of competition from “in-
market” and “out-of-market” participants, and other relevant local 
market conditions.421  Additionally, if a bank does not yet operate a local 
branch, but does make loans in that particular area, from the DOJ’s 
perspective, that implies a larger geographic market.422  Critics suggest 
 
be an antitrust market. 
Id. at n.26 (citations omitted). 
 418. See Petrizzi, supra note 310, at 208 (“In the CoreStates/First Union 
investigation, DOJ analyzed a different geographic market for each product market at 
issue.  For small business lending, the geographic market was essentially Philadelphia 
alone, roughly a two-county market compared to the eight county [Federal Reserve 
Bank] market definition (which spanned two states).”). 
 419. Id. at 206. 
 420. Id. (If the product market is the “middle market” the geographic area will 
“likely [be] a larger area than the market for small business.”)  Some have criticized the 
DOJ’s narrow geographic scope in the small business merger context. See Neill, supra 
note 226, at 298-300. 
Some practitioners have argued that the DOJ’s view regarding the narrow geographic 
scope of small business lending does not account for advances in information 
technology.  In particular, the application of credit scoring software to small business 
lending has reduced the information costs associated with such lending and has 
reduced or eliminated the relationship between distance and information costs posited 
by the DOJ’s methodologies.  While monitoring these developments, the DOJ has 
thus far not given them much weight.  In the Central Savings Bank Letter, for 
instance, the DOJ stated that it had ‘excluded limited purpose banks and certain out-
of-market banks in its calculation [of loan market shares] because those institutions 
typically offer credit card loans or nationally-marketed small business loans that tend 
to have a limited credit line.  These loan products are often distinguishable from 
business loans offered by local commercial banks in terms of fees, rates, terms and 
conditions, and often serve as a secondary source of credit to small business owners.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 421. Petrizzi, supra note 310, at 209.  The “DOJ will also use [Community 
Reinvestment Act small business loan] data to support geographic market definition.” 
Id. 
 422. Id.  For example in the DOJ’s review of the Central Savings/Huntington 
National merger in 1999: 
DOJ found, through interviews with local banks, and credit unions: 
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that the DOJ’s divergence from the pre-defined geographic market of the 
Federal Reserve banks can create substantial uncertainty in the bank 
merger application process.423  The 99.5%424 degree of certainty of a 
proposed merger application being approved during 1996-2007, 
however, is likely overlooking more than a few anti-competitive bank 
combinations. 
4.  Rejection of the “State as a Whole” Geographic Market 
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation425 and United States v. 
Connecticut National Bank,426 the DOJ argued “that the State as a whole, 
although not a banking market, is nonetheless a ‘section of the country’ 
within the meaning of [section] 7 of the Clayton Act.”427  The 
government maintained in Connecticut National Bank that the statewide 
geographic market approach should apply because the merger “would 
eliminate one of eight banks in Connecticut with the potential for 
statewide operation,” thereby causing a statewide effect because it 
would “impact . . . every local market in the state where that bank does 
not currently operate but which it might otherwise enter.’”428  The 
Connecticut Nat’l Bank Court rejected the statewide argument asserted 
by the DOJ, and viewed the relevant geographic market not as that of the 
acquirer bank, nor that of the combined market footprint of the acquirer 
and proposed target, but instead placed its analytical emphasis only on 
 
Local banks tend to have better information about local economic conditions and can 
better evaluate the credit worthiness of small businesses. As a result, local banks are 
more willing to make loans to small businesses and offer better terms than more 
distant banks; [and] 
 
Small business customers have a preference for local banks because it minimizes 
transaction costs by dealing with one bank and is more convenient (reconciling 
accounts, making daily cash deposits, acquiring cash/coins for the business, cashing 
payroll checks). 
Id. at 212. 
 423. Neill, supra note 226, at 299. 
 424. See Litan, supra note 54.  During the period 1989 to 1994, the DOJ only 
conducted a full investigation of [forty-three] of the roughly 9000 applications filed 
with the relevant supervisory banking authorities (0.5% of all proposed transactions), 
and challenged only four (0.05%) of those [forty-three], requiring divestiture of those 
branches that created competitive issues. 
 425. United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1974). 
 426. United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 672 (1974). 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. (citation omitted). 
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the localized area of the target in which it competed directly with other 
banks, and justified the position because anything else was “foreclosed 
by the precedents.”429 
The Marine Bancorp. Court, decided on the same day as 
Connecticut Nat’l Bank, considered the relevant geographic market to be 
the greater metropolitan area of Spokane, Washington.430  The DOJ had 
stipulated to greater Spokane as the relevant geographic market, but 
contended that the “entire state” was a “section of the county” that 
should be considered as part of the analysis.431  The Court rejected the 
DOJ’s attempt to expand the “section of the country,” because the 
relevant geographic market is where the “acquired firm is an actual, 
direct competitor.”432  The Court sent a clear signal with the companion 
cases that it had unambiguously discarded the DOJ’s “state-as-a-whole” 
relevant geographic market theory.433 
The Court did embrace the district court’s finding that “common 
sense” dictates the relevant market, for a bank is where that bank has 
existing branch offices.434  Of course, the “common sense” employed in 
these twin decisions preceded the Internet (and electronic banking) by 
decades.  The Marine Bancorp. Court also did not factor into its analysis 
the nonbank entities who were providers of competing financial 
services, and criticized the trial court’s geographic market conclusion 
 
 429. Id. (citing Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 620-22). 
 430. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 619. 
 431. Id. at 619-20. 
It is conceded that the State is not a banking market.  But the Government asserts that 
the State is an economically differentiated region, because its boundaries delineate an 
area within which Washington banks are insulated from most forms of competition by 
out-of-state banking organizations.  The Government further argues that this merger, 
and others it allegedly will trigger, may lead eventually to the domination of all 
banking in the State by a few large banks, facing each other in a network of local, 
oligopolistic banking markets.  This assumed eventual statewide linkage of local 
markets, it is argued, will enhance statewide the possibility of parallel, standardized, 
anticompetitive behavior.  This concern for the possible statewide consequences of 
geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks appears to be an 
important reason for the Government’s recent efforts to block such mergers through 
an application of the potential-competition doctrine under [section] 7. 
Id. at 620. 
 432. Id. at 621-22. 
 433. See generally Marine Bancorp, 418 U.S. 602; see also Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 
U.S. at 672-73 (rejecting the government’s “State as a whole” geographic market 
argument). 
 434. Id. 
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because it, too, conflicted with Philadelphia National Bank.435  The 
relevant geographic market of a target bank remained the “localized area 
in which that bank is in significant, direct competition with other banks, 
albeit not the acquiring bank.”436 
An additional impact of the Marine Bancorp. and Connecticut Nat’l 
Bank decisions was the rejection of the government’s expansive 
treatment of the Clayton Act’s “any section of the country,” which was 
found to be “at variance with this Court’s [section] 7 cases.”437  There 
are no section 7 Clayton Act cases in which the Court had analyzed a 
bank merger by measuring effects on areas where the target bank did not 
directly compete.438  The Court did allow for the existence of more than 
one relevant geographic market where a target marketed financial 
services and/or products to local, regional and national markets.439  
Nonetheless, the Court has still not  acknowledged that various financial 
services feature a national market, and many of those services and 
products fall squarely within the ambit of what is widely considered to 
be “banking.” 
The banking market experienced substantial changes by the 1980s, 
including the advent of NOW accounts and the ATM, the latter of which 
was, incidentally, first utilized by Philadelphia National Bank,440 and 
which represents one of the many devices and services offered 
nationally by both traditional banks and nonbanks.  Nonbank 
competitors argued that the relevant geographic market was the entire 
world for certain computer software in the 2002 Tenth Circuit case, 
 
 435. See Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. at 667. 
 436. Id. (citing Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 
U.S. at 667. 
Although the two banks presumably market a small percentage of their loans to large 
customers on a statewide or broader basis, it is undoubtedly true that almost all of 
their business originates locally.  For example, ‘about 88% of CNB’s total deposit 
business derive(s) from the towns in which CNB had offices.’  As the District Court 
noted in a finding that is inconsistent with its conclusion on the appropriate section of 
the country, ‘[common] sense . . . would indicate that the relevant market areas of 
CNB and FNH generally coincide with where each has established branch offices.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 437. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 620. 
 438. Id. at 621. 
 439. See id. at 621 & n.20 (collecting cases that have acknowledged more than one 
relevant geographic market existed). 
 440. James J. McAndrews, The Evolution of Shared ATM Networks, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV., May-June 1991, at 3. 
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Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc.441  The trial and appellate courts both rejected 
this expansive market application because “‘[t]he geographic market 
consists of the area of effective competition,’”442 and it is “the narrowest 
market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas 
cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the 
market.”443  The conceivable area of effective competition could 
eventually encompass the entire universe (e.g., satellite transmission of 
content and data of all sorts). 
In Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises444 (a nonbanking 
merger case), the Fifth Circuit exhibited a willingness to accept multiple 
geographic market determinations if the facts warranted it.  Apani 
manufactured and marketed purified bottled water “in and around the 
Lubbock, Texas area.”445  The Apani court held that “although the 
geographic market in some instances may encompass the entire [n]ation, 
under other circumstances it may be as small as a single metropolitan 
area.”446  The court analyzed “[t]he area of effective competition in the 
known line of commerce . . . [with a] careful selection of the market area 
in which the seller operates and to which buyers can practicably turn for 
supplies.”447  The court reasoned that “[t]he geographic market must 
correspond to the ‘commercial realities’ of the industry and ‘be 
economically significant.’”448 
 
 441. 306 F.3d 1003, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 442. Id. at 1026 (quoting Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 
893 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 443. Id. at 1026-27 (citations omitted). 
The size of the relevant geographic market depends on a number of factors, including 
‘[p]rice data and such corroborative factors as transportation costs, delivery 
limitations, customer convenience and preference, and the location and facilities of 
other producers and distributors.’ 
. . . . 
‘[T]he geographic market is not comprised of the region in which the seller attempts 
to sell its product, but rather is comprised of the area where his customers would look 
to buy such a product.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 444. Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., 300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 445. Id. at 623. 
 446. Id. at 626 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 
(1962)). 
 447. Id. (citation omitted). 
 448. Id. at 626 (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336-37). 
When determining whether a geographic market corresponds to commercial realities, 
courts have taken into account practical considerations such as the size, 
cumbersomeness, and other characteristics of the relevant product.  In addition, 
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Apani trial court decision,449 which 
was thorough in its geographic area considerations of the bottled water 
industry.450  The Apani court found, at a minimum, that the relevant 
geographic market should include the city of Lubbock because there was 
no geographical limit on the sales market, and there were no regulatory 
restrictions or shopping limitations affecting bottle water distribution.451  
After defining the relevant geographic market, the trial court weighed 
“whether the restraint on the alleged geographic market was 
economically significant,”452 and whether the geographic area included a 
large enough segment453 of the product market.454 
5.  A More Expansive Geographic Market 
The Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General correctly predicted 
that mergers “of an entirely new type,” between large banks and large 
 
determinants that affect the behavior of market participants may also be considered 
such as regulatory constraints impeding the free flow of competing goods into the 
area, perishability of products, and transportation barriers. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 627. 
[I]t is not required that an area encompass a large percentage of all business activity in 
the relevant product market to be considered economically significant.  An area 
containing only a small percentage of business activity may qualify as being 
economically significant if the relevant competition in that specific area is insulated 
from equivalent competition elsewhere. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 449. See id. 
 450. See id. at 628-29. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Apani Southwest, 300 F.3d at 629. 
 453. See id. (“Whether a segment is appreciable depends on whether the segment 
includes either an appreciable proportion of the product market as a whole, or a 
proportion of the product market largely segregated from, independent of, or not 
affected by, competition elsewhere.”) (citation omitted). 
 454. See id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 626. 
In ascertaining the relevant product market, courts consider the extent to which the 
seller’s product is ‘interchangeable in use’ and the degree of ‘cross-elasticity of 
demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.’  Within the product market, 
there may exist submarkets which, in themselves, represent product markets for 
antitrust purposes.  ‘The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by 
examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as 
a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique 
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, 
and specialized vendors.’  The district court properly determined, and neither of the 
parties contest, that the relevant product market is bottled water. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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financial services companies, would soon become prevalent, during 
testimony before the House of Representatives in 1998.455  That same 
year, the Federal Reserve approved Travelers Group, Inc.’s application 
to become a bank holding company through an acquisition of Citicorp, 
as well as its bank and nonbanking subsidiaries.456  The Board analyzed 
the competitive effect in nonbanking services, including a number of 
Citicorp’s nonbank subsidiaries which competed with Travelers 
companies in numerous geographic and product markets,457 and 
determined that the relevant geographic market was regional or national 
for almost all those markets.458  Travelers Group requested approval 
under the Bank Holding Act459 to become a bank holding company 
through acquisition of all Citicorp shares, and those of its subsidiary 
banks.460  The combined entity, to be called Citigroup Inc.,461 would 
represent the largest commercial banking organization not just in the 
United States, but worldwide, with total assets of approximately $751 
 
 455. See Nannes, supra note 263, at 1. 
 456. Travelers Group, Inc. 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 985 (1998), 1998 WL 801352 
(approving the formation of a bank holding company, and providing notice to engage in 
non-banking activities).  Travelers Group, is “a holding company for securities, 
insurance and other financial services.” Id. 
 457. See Travelers Group, Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1009, 1012 & n.114 (discussing 
the concentration of resources and related effects of the proposal). 
 458. See id. at 1009; see also Bradley K. Sabel, The Citicorp/Travelers Merger and 
the Bank Holding Company Act, 1091 PLI/CORP 71, 117 (1998) (“Travelers and 
Citicorp offer complementary products with few significant overlaps in competition.  In 
any product market in which one party to this merger has a significant presence, the 
other party has a relatively small market share.”); see also id. (The Board concluded 
that there would result in only a “de minimis effect on competition in any relevant 
market,” because many competitors provide the same services and products, and the 
market for those services and products are not concentrated.). 
 459. The Bank Holding Company Act is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1841.  Under the 
Bank Holding Company Act, the Fed uses the following factors when reviewing 
acquisitions of banks or mergers of bank holding companies: 
[1] the competitive effects of the proposal in the relevant geographic markets; [2] the 
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the companies and banks 
involved in the transaction; [3] the convenience and needs of the communities to be 
served, including the records of performance under the Community Reinvestment Act 
(12 U.S.C. §2901 et seq.) (‘‘CRA’’) of the insured depository institutions involved in 
the transaction; [4] and the availability of information needed to determine and 
enforce compliance with the BHC Act. 
Bank of Am. Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 212, 218 (2004). 
 460. Travelers Group, Inc. 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985 (1998). 
 461. Id. at 985-86. 
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billion.462  The new company would engage in wide-ranging banking 
and nonbanking activities,463 including insurance (Travelers), and 
securities (Salomon Smith Barney) businesses, a combination formerly 
considered a Glass-Steagall Act third rail.464  The Board approved the 
merger and, interestingly, made no mention of Philadelphia National 
Bank or its progeny, nor did the Board discuss the antitrust test 
mandated by that case, as the mega-merger glided without significant 
resistance to its consummation.465  Less than a decade after what was 
then the largest banking combination in history, deal architect John Reed 
now considers the merger to be a “mistake.”466 
The DOJ opposed what it asserted was the anticompetitive 
organizational structure of Visa and MasterCard467 who, at that time, 
comprised roughly half of the “four major network systems in the 
payment card industry,” and were both owned by many various banking 
institutions who were also members of a network.468  The circuit court 
affirmed and held that “exclusivity rules violated [the] Sherman Act . . . 
and imposed permanent injunctive relief.”469  Although there was no 
discussion of the relevant geographic market in the Visa decision, the 
 
 462. Id. 
 463. See id. at 1003. 
 464. See Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (also known as the Banking Act of 1933); Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see also Symposium: Panel I: 
Strategic Planning For Financial Institutions In A New Legal And Economic 
Environment, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 23, 45 (2001) (citing H. Rodgin 
Cohen, Landmark Legislation Passes; Examining Impact on Financial Services Global 
Consolidation, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at S3) (stating that the “[Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act] . . . removes restrictions now imposed on banks under the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) . . . . The BHCA 
restrictions generally apply to foreign banks that conduct U.S. operations through a 
branch or agency.”); William Safire, On Language: Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/magazine/18wwlnsafire.t.html. 
 465. See Comment of Inner City Press, available at http://www.innercitypress.org/ 
samprot.html (Comment filed with the Federal Reserve Board Opposing the Citicorp – 
Travelers Merger, 1998). 
 466. Francesco Guerrera, Citi Merger Architect Calls Deal ‘Mistake,’ FIN. TIMES, 
April 4 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/adb7e4a6-019d-11dd-a323-
000077b07658.html. 
 467. United States v. Visa, Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 468. Id.; see also id. at 234-35. 
 469. Id. at syllabus. 
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lower court determined that the United States was the relevant 
geographic market “for the general purpose card product market and the 
general purpose card core system services market.”470  The attorneys 
general of twenty-seven states, and for the District of Columbia, argued 
for the government in a joint amicus brief that asserted “[w]hen a 
defendant is a participant in geographic markets outside the one under 
scrutiny, as Visa and MasterCard [are] in this case, courts may look at 
[its] activity in those markets.”471 
Paycom Billing Services, an internet credit card transaction 
processor, sued MasterCard International ( a national bank card 
association), for alleged Sherman Antitrust Act violations and claimed 
that MasterCard conspired with member banks to restrain trade.472  
Paycom cited United States. v. Visa as support and claimed that the 
relevant geographic market was the United States as a whole because 
there were six distinct types of markets.473  The Paycom court agreed 
and defined the geographic market as the entire country, in large part, 
because MasterCard did not challenge Paycom’s market definition, but 
 
 470. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 471. Brief for Connecticut, Ohio, Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee, United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-
6074(L)), 2002 WL 32828496, *13 (2d Cir. July 3, 2002) (citing Aspen Ski Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985)). 
 472. Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int’l, Inc., No. CIVA03CV6150DGT 
RLM, 2005 WL 711658, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005), aff’d 467 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 
2006) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 473. Id. at *2; see also id. at *2-*3 (citations omitted) (“A ‘brick and mortar’ 
merchant sells goods and/or services in person, not over the internet.”). Id. at *3 n.3 
(citation omitted). 
The broadest market is the ‘general purpose card network services’ market.  The next 
three markets are the ‘general purpose credit card services to merchants,’ the ‘general 
purpose credit and T & E card services to merchants’ and the ‘general purpose debit 
card services to merchants.’  For these purposes, defendant does not challenge 
plaintiff’s market definitions, and precedent supports their adequacy at this stage of 
the proceedings. 
 
In addition, plaintiff claims two distinct ‘payment card processing services’ markets.  
The first is broader and includes the processing of all payment card transactions, 
regardless of whether performed over the internet or through a ‘brick and mortar’ 
merchant.  The second is a submarket of the first and includes only those transactions 
made over the internet.  Defendant also does not challenge the definition of these two 
markets for purposes of this motion. 
Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
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also because precedent supported an expanded geographic delineation.474  
Signs of a shifting paradigm were beginning to surface. 
Federal regulators have had success in expanding the relevant 
geographic market in nonbanking mergers.  The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) also argued, for Clayton Act section 7 purposes, 
that the relevant geographic market was the United States as a whole, 
twenty-five years before the Paycom decision.475  The Ninth Circuit 
accepted the nationwide geographic market determination,476 and 
allowed two lead smelting firms, RSR Corporation and Quemetco, to 
continue combined operations.477  The FTC contended that the 
companies were in competition to a significant degree in more than just 
the Midwest market, and the court concurred.478  The FTC had filed an 
administrative complaint alleging that RSR (a lead company) violated 
section 7 of the Clayton Act when it acquired the stock of two 
competitors.479  Similar to the banking market, the lead smelting market 
in the United States is also highly concentrated.480  Although the FTC 
argued that the relevant geographic market for a section 7 analysis was 
the entire United States,481 RSR countered that the companies were not 
 
 474. See Paycom, 2005 WL 711658 at *2 (citations omitted). 
 475. See RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Both sides appealed to the full FTC, which adopted the ALJ’s decision with some 
modifications.  The FTC agreed that the secondary lead market was the proper 
submarket, that secondary lead was the relevant product market, that the United States 
as a whole was the appropriate geographic market, and that the RSR/Quemetco 
merger could substantially lessen competition in the national secondary lead market. 
Id. 
 476. See id. at 1322-23.  “Here these considerations indicate nationwide competition 
in the secondary lead market.  Thus, the relevant geographic market is, as found by the 
FTC, the entire United States.” Id. at 1324.  The Court held that the FTC’s plan 
requiring “divestiture by petitioner of all premerger assets, except for one plant, was 
proper remedy.” Id. at 1325-26. 
 477. See generally RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317. 
 478. See id. at 1322-23. 
Evidence on the pre-merger competition between RSR and Quemetco, coupled with 
evidence of pricing interdependence nationwide and evidence of the ability of 
secondary producers to ship lead into states in which most secondary lead is 
consumed, is substantial.  That evidence is sufficient to support the FTC’s factual 
findings on the relevant geographic market issue. 
Id. at 1323. 
 479. In re RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976), 1976 WL 180019, *3. 
 480. See id. at *18. 
 481. RSR Corp., 602 F.2d at 1322; see also In re RSR Corp. at *33 (“The relevant 
geographic market for the purposes of this proceeding is the United States as a 
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in direct competition with one another anywhere in the country.482  The 
administrative law judge not only found that the companies directly 
competed in the Midwest, but also that the entire country was the 
relevant geographic market483 “because the merger lessened competition 
in the nationwide secondary lead market.”484 
The Ninth Circuit turned to Brown Shoe Co. v. United States485 for 
guidance regarding the delineation of the geographic market boundaries 
and found the criteria sufficiently similar to that used to determine the 
relevant product market.486  RSR, however, attempted to advance the 
view that Connecticut National Bank and Marine Bancorporation 
should apply, and that therefore, the relevant geographic market should 
be “the area in which the acquired firm is in direct competition with 
other firms in the industry or in which it is marketing a significant 
degree of goods or services.”487  The Ninth Circuit disagreed with RSR’s 
position that the geographic market should be defined by the banking 
antitrust cases, precisely because those decisions concerned “the 
heavily-regulated banking industry,” in which the relevant geographic 
market was historically limited to only those areas where regulatory 
agencies had permitted the banks to provide services.488  Thus, the 
Philadelphia National Bank legacy, at least according to the Ninth 
Circuit, was distinguishable, not because banks are “unique” and 
 
whole.”). 
 482. Id.  The parties did agree, however, that the relevant geographic market for the 
overall U.S. lead market (not the secondary lead market) was the nation as a whole. See 
In re RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976),1976 WL 180019, at *78. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962). 
 486. RSR Corp., 602 F.2d at 1323 (citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336-37). 
The geographic market selected must, therefore, both ‘correspond to the commercial 
realities’ of the industry and be economically significant. . . . The fact that two 
merging firms have competed directly on the horizontal level in but a fraction of the 
geographic markets in which either has operated, does not, in itself, place their merger 
outside the scope of [§] 7.  That section speaks of ‘any . . . section of the country,’ and 
if anticompetitive effects of a merger are probable in ‘any’ significant market, the 
merger at least to that extent is proscribed. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 1323 (“To decide that the merger violated Section 
7, the FTC was not required to find that Quemetco and RSR competed on a nationwide 
basis.”). 
 487. Id. at 1323. 
 488. Id. at 1323-24 (citing United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 641 
(1974). 
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“insulated,” but rather because they are highly regulated.  The fact that 
the secondary lead market in which RSR competed was not nearly as 
regulated as banking, in turn aided the court in determining the relevant 
competitive region.489 
6.  Conspicuous Absence of Relevant Geographic Market Analysis in 
Recent Bank Mergers 
Wachovia Corp. consummated a merger with Golden West 
Financial Corp.490 on October 2, 2006491  In the Federal Reserve 
approval order, the phrase “relevant geographic market” was altogether 
absent.  The Board’s analysis of the competitive effects of the proposed 
acquisition in terms of nonbanking subsidiaries, however, noted that 
both banks engage in various services, including “credit extension, trust 
company, investment advisory, and securities brokerage activities [,] 
[t]he markets for these activities are regional or national in scope and 
unconcentrated [sic], and there are numerous providers of these 
services.”492  Accordingly, Wachovia’s acquisition of Golden West’s 
nonbanking subsidiaries would ostensibly not have any substantial 
anticompetitive effect upon any relevant market,493 at least from the 
Fed’s perspective. 
The Federal Reserve approved Wachovia’s application to acquire 
Golden West,494 and also permitted Wachovia “to acquire two of Golden 
West’s savings associations, World Savings Bank FSB of Oakland, 
Calif., and World Savings Bank FSB of Houston, along with Golden 
West’s non-banking subsidiaries.”495  The Federal Reserve considered a 
variety of factors in its merger approval analysis, such as the number of 
remaining competitors in the market, market deposits controlled by both 
banks,496 the increase in market deposit concentration levels as measured 
 
 489. See RSR Corp., 602 F.2d at 1324. 
 490. See Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C183, C183 (2006). 
 491. Press Release, Wachovia Corp., Wachovia Completes Golden West Merger 
(Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/0,,134_307%5E1403,00.html. 
 492. Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. at C186. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C183. 
 495. See Federal Reserve Gives Nod to Wachovia’s Acquisition of Golden West, 
BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., Sept. 29, 2006, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/birmingh 
am/stories/2006/09/25/daily24.html. 
 496. See Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. at C184 (Market deposits are “the 
relative shares of total deposits in depository institutions in each market.”). 
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by the HHI,497 and various other market competition measures.498  The 
word “geographic” only appeared once in the Fed’s approval order, but 
not in the context of a relevant geographic market.499  The Board did 
acknowledge in its order that, as part of its public interest evaluation, it 
reviewed “the effect of the proposal on competition in the relevant 
markets.”500  There was also no mention of the now antiquated 
Philadelphia National Bank antitrust test, nor did there appear to be any 
evaluation of the cluster of products and services.501 
Although the following merger was approved without apparent 
adherence to Philadelphia National Bank’s local geographic market 
analysis, the Fed’s merger analysis appears to be evolving.  Citizens 
Bank completed its acquisition of Republic Bank in late 2006.502  The 
combined entity, dubbed Citizens Republic Bancorp,503 became the 
country’s 45th largest bank.504  Before the combination, Republic was 
Michigan’s second largest bank holding company, and its merger into 
Citizens created the state’s third-largest bank holding company.505  The 
 
 497. The HHI is set forth in the DOJ’s Merger Guidelines. HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 224; see also Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. at C184 n.16 
(The DOJ Guidelines consider a market “highly concentrated if the post-merger HHI 
exceeds 1800,” and “moderately concentrated if the post-merger HHI is between 1000 
and 1800.”). 
 498. See Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. at C184.  Wachovia and the target 
bank, Golden West, competed directly in 26 banking markets. Id.  Of the 24 banking 
markets listed in Appendix B of the Order, 20 banking markets had a resulting 
moderately concentrated HHI, three banking markets had a unconcentrated HHI (under 
1000), and one banking market had a resulting HHI above 1800 indicating a highly 
concentrated market post merger, id. at C192, “without an increase in market 
concentration as measured by the HHI.” Id. at C184. 
 499. See id. at C188-89. 
 500. Id. at C183. 
 501. Subsequent to the merger, the Comptroller of the Currency agreed to hold 
public hearings regarding the closing of branches in Philadelphia.  See Federal Agency 
to Discuss Wachovia Branch Closings, PHILA. BUS. J., Dec. 14, 2006, available at 
http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2006/12/11/daily37.html. 
 502. Citizens Banking Corp., 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C9 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007/pdf/legalq406.pdf. 
 503. See Press Release, Citizens Bank, Citizens Bank Completes Successful Merger 
Integration with Republic Bank (May 7, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/05-07-2007/0004582701&EDATE=. 
 504. Greg Morcroft, Citizens to Buy Republic Bancorp for $1.05 Billion, 
MARKETWATCH, June 27, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx? 
guid={FDD0A7C3-4DC9-4272-9E0D-0BEECD79CE0F}. 
 505. See Mark Brooky, Republic Bank Transforming into Citizens, GRAND HAVEN 
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Fed scrutinized two particular Michigan banking markets where Citizens 
and Republic had competed directly—Flint and Jackson.506  Scrutiny of 
those local markets was warranted because, even with branch 
divestitures, the HHI concentration levels in the two banking markets 
exceeded the DOJ’s Guideline threshold.507  The Board considered 
various mitigating competitive factors favorably and ultimately 
concluded that the merger between the two Michigan banks “would not 
have a significantly adverse impact on competition.”508  The Board also 
found that increased market share concentration, as represented by the 
HHI, was not preclusive and in fact, overstated the potentially adverse 
competitive effects to some degree because: (1) seventeen other 
depository institutions co-existed in the market; (2) competing 
community credit unions509 were vibrant in that market;510 and (3) the 
Flint market was attractive for new entrants.511  The DOJ determined 
that the merger would produce insignificant adverse competitive effects 
 
TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 2007 (“Citizens Republic Bancorp will become the largest 
Michigan-based bank holding company and 43rd largest in the county . . . .”). 
 506. See id. at C10-11. 
 507. See id.  “The DOJ has stated that the higher-than-normal HHI thresholds for 
screening bank mergers and acquisitions for anticompetitive effects implicitly recognize 
the competitive effects of limited-purpose and other nondepository financial entities.” 
Id. at C10 n.9. 
 508. Id. at 5. 
 509. Credit Unions are often a good counter measure to anticompetitive effects. See 
Local Control Lost in Iowa Banks, but not in CUs, Credit Union National Association, 
NEWS NOW, Feb. 9, 2004, available at http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/archive/list.php? 
date=020604#15579.  Credit unions can help to counter to increased concentration of 
national bank power, according to a 2003 study: “Credit unions provide an important 
and necessary check-and-balance to these banking conglomerates, says the report.  
While local control of financial institutions in Iowa is rapidly disappearing, ‘credit 
unions are locally controlled and are countering the trend toward out-of-state banking 
control.’” Id. 
 510. See Citizens Banking Corp., 93 Fed. Res. Bull. at C10-11 (“Eight community 
credit unions control approximately $887.5 million in deposits in the market, which 
represents approximately 9 [%] of market deposits on a 50 [%] weighted basis.”). 
 511. Id. at C11. 
Within the past five years, six de novo bank branches and one credit union have 
opened in the Flint market, and all remain operational.  Other factors indicate that the 
Flint banking market remains attractive for entry.  For example, from 2002 to 2005, 
the market’s average annualized deposit growth exceeded the average annualized 
deposit growth for all metropolitan areas in Michigan. 
Id. 
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and the other governing banking agencies did not object.512  While the 
Fed has begun to look beyond the narrow Philadelphia National Bank 
pedigree analysis, a discussion of geographic market was absent from 
the Fed’s order.513 
VII.  MERGERS CAN STILL BE CONSUMMATED DESPITE 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
The fundamental legislative purpose of the Bank Merger Act of 
1966514 was to allow bank mergers even where a reduction in 
competition might result in the relevant market.515  The rationale is that 
if the public interest is served, despite a consequential dampening of 
competition, the merger should still be approved and consummated.516  
Although mandating Sherman and Clayton Act application, the 1966 Act 
established a new defense once an action is brought to challenge a bank 
merger on anticompetitive grounds.517  An otherwise anticompetitive 
combination can still be consummated if the prospective merger 
participants can demonstrate “‘that the anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
 
 512. See id. 
 513. Citizens Banking Corp., 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C9. 
 514. Pub. L. No. 89-356 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)). 
 515. United States v. Third Nat’l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 192 (1968); see also 
Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C183 (2006) (Under the BHC [Section 4(j)(2)(A) 
of the BHC Act] the Fed is required to determine whether or not the benefits to the 
public outweigh adverse effects such as decreased competition and undue 
concentration.). 
 516. Third Nat’l Bank, 390 U.S. at 192. 
 517. See id. at 178 (citing United States v. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 386 
U.S. 361 (1967)). 
Last Term, in United States v. First City National Bank of Houston this court 
interpreted the procedural provisions of the 1966 Act, holding that the Bank Merger 
Act provided for continued scrutiny of bank mergers under the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act, but had created a new defense, with the merging banks having the 
burden of proving that defense.  The task of the district courts was to inquire de novo 
into the validity of a bank merger approved by the relevant bank regulatory agency to 
determine, first, whether the merger offended the antitrust laws and, second, if it did, 
whether the banks had established that the merger was nonetheless justified by ‘the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served.’  Houston Bank reserved ‘all 
questions’ concerning the substantive meaning of the ‘convenience and needs’ 
defense. 
Id. at 178 (citations omitted). 
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probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs 
of the community to be served.’”518 
The Federal Reserve has relied on the public interest factor519 to 
approve a proposed merger where the public interest factor outweighed 
any likely adverse competitive effect.520  The Fed widened the scope of 
its review for public interest benefits, and found a host of public interest 
factors.521  Mitigating public interest factors can be “weighted against 
the increase in concentration,” and offset anticompetitive effects.522  The 
DOJ Merger Guidelines523 explain that the effect of the merger on 
market concentration, as measured by HHI,524 is the “logical economic 
‘starting point’ for merger analysis,” and if the proposed combination 
does not significantly increase concentration, no further analysis is 
required.525  But even where a proposed transaction’s HHI suggests that 
substantially lessened competition may result, mitigating public interest 
factors can outweigh the HHI and allow the combination to be 
consummated.526 
 
 518. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 
1828(c)(5)(B)). 
An application for approval of the Texas merger was made to the Comptroller of the 
Currency pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B), which provides that he shall not 
approve the merger ‘whose effect in any section of the country may by substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner 
would be in restraint of trade, unless (he) finds that the anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable 
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be 
served.’ 
Id. at 364. 
 519. Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. at C190-91 (In this particular application, 
the public interest factor was cited under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act.). 
 520. Id. 
 521. See id.  These benefits include an array of banking products and services, such 
as various mortgages, an extensive ATM network, access to online banking functions, 
Spanish language capabilities, online functions for deposit and credit accounts, and a 
wide-range of services through non-bank subsidiaries and affiliates, like investment 
banking, securities brokerage, trust services, and asset management services.  An 
increased array of credit instruments and lending opportunities for corporate and retail 
customers might also result. 
 522. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 6. 
 523. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 224. 
 524. See, e.g., FTC v. Foster, No. Civ. 07-352 JBACT, 2007 WL 1793441, at *26 
(D. N.M. May 29, 2007) (citation omitted). 
 525. Id. (citation omitted). 
 526. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 6. 
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If market concentration is significantly increased, mitigating factors 
might outweigh anticompetitive effects, and the merger may still be 
approved.527  An example of mitigating factors might be the lack of 
“competitive viability of the target, [the] presence of active competition 
from thrifts and other financial institutions in the market, competition 
from out-of-market financial institutions, and market attractiveness.”528  
If mitigation will not justify the increased concentration, then divestiture 
of offices and branches529 might be required in order to bring the 
“concentration indicator” to the level that the DOJ guidelines mandate, 
and, for this reason, according to the Federal Reserve, very few bank 
mergers are ever rejected for antitrust reasons.530  While inching towards 
a new analytical framework like the one proposed, the divestiture 
approach, as adopted, tends to ultimately frustrate the spirit of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), especially in low income 
markets where the stability of bank branches is often sacrificed, with 
predatory check cashing operators filling the void.531  The authors’ 
interpretation of “public interest” definitely does not exclude under-
represented constituencies who are precisely the population the CRA 
was designed to protect.532 
 
 527. See, e.g., Foster, 2007 WL 1793441, at *29. 
 528. Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
 529. There are critics of the DOJ’s and Regulators requirement of divestiture.  The 
effect of regulatory divestiture requirements appears to sometimes render a detrimental 
effect on communities. See Rep. Kucinich Sends Letter, supra note 143 (“The 
disappearance of depository bank branches throughout Cuyahoga County has ushered in 
a crisis of foreclosures, predatory mortgage and payday lending.”). 
 530. See Brewer III et al., supra note 15, at 8.  The author points out that the 
statistics may be skewed because bank merger applications which raise antitrust issues 
may be voluntarily withdrawn. See id. 
 531. See Off. of Congressman Anthony D. Weiner, Many More Banks in New York 
(But Only For Some), Dec. 18, 2005, available at http://www.house.gov/weiner/bank_ 
report.pdf.; see also Rep. Kucinich Sends Letter, supra note 143. 
 532. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Community 
Reinvestment Act, Background and Purpose, http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/ (last visited 
May 12, 2008). 
The Community Reinvestment Act is intended to encourage depository institutions to 
help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound banking 
operations. It was enacted by the Congress in 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901) and is 
implemented by Regulations 12 CFR parts 25, 228, 345, and 563e. 
Id. 
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Ease of entry into the market is another mitigating factor.  In FTC v. 
Foster, the Commission revealed sufficient increases in market 
concentration and high market shares, “trigger[ing] the presumption” 
that the contested merger would likely result in anticompetitive 
effects.533  This presumption can be successfully rebutted, however, with 
a showing of minimal barriers to market entry, which would mitigate the 
anticompetitive effect.534  Competitive influence of credit unions and 
other nonbank market participants is another mitigating factor which the 
Federal Reserve can consider when analyzing the competitive effect of a 
proposed merger.535  Nonetheless, these factors do not go far enough, 
and the 2008 credit crunch and economic fallout reveals that relevant 
market factors have not yet been given due consideration in the bank 
merger review context. 
 
 533. Foster, 2007 WL 1793441, at *26; see also Brief of Petitioner, United States v. 
Sungard Data Sys., Inc., No. 01-2196, (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9439.htm. 
Once the United States establishes a presumptive violation of the Clayton Act, the 
defendants may introduce evidence to attempt to rebut that presumption.  However, 
the Supreme Court has directed that the presumption will not easily be overcome.  To 
rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that “show[s] that the 
market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the acquisitions’ probable 
effects on competition. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 534. See Foster, 2007 WL 1793441, at *26 (The DOJ’s “Merger Guidelines require 
that entry must be timely, likely, and sufficient.” (citation omitted)); see also United 
States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 320, 367-68 (1970).  The 
District Court in Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co stated: 
‘Ease of access to the market is also a factor that deserves consideration in evaluating 
the anticompetitive effects of a merger. It is not difficult for a small group of business 
men to raise sufficient capital to establish a new small bank when the banking needs 
of the community are sufficient to warrant approval of the charter.’  Appellees, 
however, made no attempt to show that a group of businessmen would move to start a 
new bank in Phillipsburg-Easton, should the proposed merger be approved. 
399 U.S. at 367-68 (citations omitted). 
 535. See First Citizens Banc Corp., 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C1, C2 (2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/legalq407.pdf. 
[T]he Board notes that one community credit union also exerts a competitive 
influence in the Logan County banking market.  This institution offers a wide range of 
consumer products, operates street-level branches, and has membership open to 
almost all the residents in the market. 
 
The Board previously has considered the competitiveness of certain active credit 
unions as a mitigating factor. 
Id. at C2 & n.12. 
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VIII.  SUBPRIME MELTDOWNS AND CREDIT MARKET BEATDOWNS BEGET 
BANK MERGER SHOWDOWNS 
Unprecedented lending practices of the last two decades and 
aggressive pooling, packaging and securitizing of real estate-based 
credit have led the United States toward an economic downturn that will 
likely be labeled a recession with the benefit of hindsight.  At least one 
critic has attributed the crisis to the “Fed’s monetary policy having 
created the housing bubble, characterized by a spectacular escalation of 
real estate values in every American city . . . .”536  The credit crunch of 
2008 spread like a contagion, and will likely shape public sentiment.  It 
may also whet the American appetite for fundamental change of our 
financial system, including the manner in which banks, and bank-like 
financial services firms combine operations through mergers and 
acquisitions.  The collapse of many former subprime “players” has 
already begun to lead to mergers by necessity and a host of distressed 
asset sales. 
In August 2007, America’s biggest bank,537 Bank of America made 
a $2 billion equity investment in Countrywide Financial Corp., but 
claimed that it had a merely passive investment stake in Countrywide.538  
However, Bank of America’s long desired market share dominance in 
 
 536. Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, LEWROCKWELL.COM, Sept. 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo125.html. 
 537. Valerie Bauerlein, Will BofA Laugh Last?—Bet on Countrywide Looks Funny 
To Some, But Patience May Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007 (“Bank of America, the 
biggest U.S. bank by market value, grew to its gargantuan size by gobbling up 
companies coast to coast. Often those banks were in major distress, and Bank of 
America seized that advantage.”); see also James R. Hagerty & Valerie Bauerlein, 
Countrywide, Bank of America Courted for Years, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2007. 
Bank of America reached its scale by scooping up banks, many of them in hardship. 
Predecessor NCNB kicked off the growth spree with the 1988 purchase of the 
remnants of FirstRepublic Bank of Dallas, what was once one of Texas’s largest 
banks, at the urging of federal regulators.  That deal gave it a backdoor to expansion 
in Texas and, thus, interstate banking. 
 
NCNB later made a $200 million strategic investment in MNC Financial Inc. of 
Baltimore and quickly bought the distressed bank, extending its reach up the East 
Coast. 
Id. 
 538. Bauerlein, supra note 537; see also Bank of America Takes Countrywide Stake, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/business/ 
apee-mortgage.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
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the mortgage business led to discussions between the two companies 
that the leading retail lender’s staff and technology539 would be inserted 
into Bank of America’s omnipresent branches.  Countrywide CEO 
Angelo Mozilo claimed there were no plans for the two companies to 
merge, but hinted about vague future mortgage business 
collaborations.540 
Despite Mozilo’s poker player bluster, Bank of America offered 
roughly $4 billion to acquire Countrywide in the second week of 2008 
and in effect, “doubl[ed] down on a previous investment in the troubled 
firm and catapult[ed] the buyer into the top spot among mortgage 
lenders and loan servicers in the U.S.”541  Bank of America now has 
more branches (and customers) than any other bank in the United 
States.542  According to one analyst, if Countrywide “were indeed to fail, 
the federal government would facilitate a sale to Bank of America, much 
as many believe that regulators encouraged Bank of America to take the 
stake in the first place.”543  Kenneth D. Lewis, Bank of America CEO, 
“flatly denied that his deal with Countrywide was at the behest of 
regulators.”544 
 
 539. “Countrywide’s computer technology also is considered a big plus in holding 
down loan-origination and servicing costs.” See Hagerty & Bauerlein, supra note 537. 
 540. Id. 
 541. Alistair Barr & Steve Goldstein, Bank of America to Buy Countrywide 
Financial, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 11, 2008, available at, http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
news/story/bank-america-buy-countrywide-financial/story.aspx?guid=39417545-5DC7-
4CD1-862D-5939F89D9667. 
 542. Hagerty & Bauerlein, supra note 537 (“Countrywide has roughly 61,000 
employees, nearly 1,000 branch offices for mortgage loans and a stock-market value of 
about $12.7 billion. Bank of America has nearly 200,000 employees, 5,700 branches 
and a market capitalization of $233.14 billion -- second only to Citigroup Inc. among 
banks.”). 
 543. Bauerlein, supra note 537 (quoting analyst Richard X. Bove of Punk Ziegel & 
Co.). 
In that respect, Mr. Bove compares a potential takeover to the legendary maneuver in 
1988 of FirstRepublic, then the largest bank in Texas. Bank of America got its 
foothold in Texas for a bargain, with huge tax benefits. 
 
Mr. Bove says that if Countrywide got in deeper trouble, regulators might also be 
willing to waive regulatory limits that bar any U.S. bank from an acquisition giving it 
more than 10 percent of total U.S. bank deposits. 
Id. 
 544. Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game In the Fed’s Cross Hairs: Exotic Game, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/23gr 
et.html. 
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As market pundits speculated about the veracity of Countrywide’s 
financials,545 and whether its bondholders would be confronted with 
default risks, Bank of America noted far less conspicuously in an 
amended registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission that the likelihood it would back Countrywide’s bond debt, 
which had been downgraded to “junk” just days earlier,546 was a rapidly 
diminishing prospect with “no assurance that any such debt would be 
redeemed, assumed or guaranteed.”547  Meanwhile, the senior Senator 
from New York, Charles Schumer, could barely couch his support for 
the mega-bank when he remarked that Bank of America should actually 
receive a deeper discounted purchase price due to the widening belief 
that Mozilo’s Countrywide crew cooked its books.548  
 
 545. See, e.g., Christopher Whalen, Are Countrywide Financial Bond Holders 
Bankruptcy Remote?, SEEKINGALPHA.COM, May 02, 2008, available at 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/75342-are-countrywide-financial-bond-holders-
bankruptcy-remote.  The columnist cited the opinion below for the premise that 
government assisted “bail out” deals ultimately increase systemic market risk over time: 
Ever since the government bailout of Chrysler in 1979-80, this country has been on a 
course of raising the safety net so that the market’s discipline, in a capitalistic 
economic system, has been truncated.  We have witnessed a growing level of 
decisions that are based upon expediency rather than sound long-term decision 
making.  Each time these expedient decisions are made, the level of risk within the 
U.S. economy has been increased.  The market’s discipline is not allowed to work for 
fear of the potential economic fallout. 
Id.; see also John Spence, B. of A. Should Exit Countrywide Deal: Analyst, 
MARKETWATCH, May 5, 2008 available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/an 
alyst-says-bank-america-should/story.aspx?guid=%7B479AEC2B-AEF7-477F-94DE-4 
AA90EC59156%7D&dist=msr_14; David Mildenberg & Eric Martin, Bank of America 
Should Skip Countrywide, Analyst Says (Update3), BLOOMBERG, May 5, 2008, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aQmo1eDHU 
.Ts&refer=home. 
 546. David Mildenberg, Countrywide Rating Cut to ‘Junk’ By Standard & Poor’s 
(Update4), BLOOMBERG, May 2, s2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aNssWctbuukA&refer=home. 
 547. David Mildenberg, Bank of America May Not Guarantee Countrywide’s Debt 
(Update6), BLOOMBERG, May 5, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ne 
ws?pid=20601087&sid=a0qQd39LDl7c&refer=home; see also, BofA Gives ‘No 
Assurance’ on Portion of Countrywide Debt, DALLAS BUS. J., May 2, 2008, available at 
http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2008/04/28/daily66.html; Bank of America 
Amended Registration Statement Form S-4/A,  available at http://www.sec.gov/Archiv 
es/edgar/data/70858/000095014408003445/g11537a2sv4za.htm (filed with the SEC 
Apr. 30, 2008). 
 548. Christopher S. Rugaber, Countrywide Financial Admits Loan Officers Made 
Errors, ASSOCIATED PRESS (via Yahoo!), May 6, 2008, available at 
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Bank of America was not the only mega-bank positioned to pick 
from the smoldering subprime rubble in 2008 and acquire big brand 
financial assets with government assistance and fire-sale prices.  
JPMorgan Chase Bank, the nation’s third-largest bank in terms of total 
assets, received far more than just matchmaking services and deal-
friendly legislator rhetoric.  According to the New York Times, the 
“Federal Reserve Bank of New York pushed Bear Stearns into the arms 
of JPMorgan Chase.”549  In fact, JPMorgan Chase was the beneficiary of 
a $29 billion Federal Reserve imprimatur that effectively insulated the 
bank from substantial risk in the acquisition of distressed subprime 
assets.550  The Fed’s backing facilitated the investment bank bailout 
buyout, the primary purpose of which, “according to regulators, was to 
forestall a toppling of financial dominoes on Wall Street, in the event 
that Bear Stearns skidded into bankruptcy and other firms began falling 
apart as well.”551  Central Bank Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly 
“helped broker the buyout, after liquidity evaporated at Bear.”552 
Sighs of relief were heard overseas, where at least one experienced 
market crisis manager, Bank of Israel governor Stanley Fischer, opined 
that the Fed’s willingness to back a Bear bailout “marked a “turning 
 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080506/ap_on_bi_ge/countrywide_hearing.  According 
to the AP account, the senior Senator from New York made the following rather ironic 
remarks during Senate Panel testimony regarding Bank of America’s planned purchase 
of Countrywide: 
Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., chairman of the panel, criticized what he called a 
broader ‘vulture mentality’ in the mortgage lending industry.  ‘Companies have 
repeatedly sought to foreclose on homes where owners were current on payments, 
sought attorneys fees in bankruptcy court for motions that they have lost, and failed to 
keep even the most basic records to justify their claims in bankruptcy court,’ he said.  
Schumer also said that Bank of America Corp., which agreed to buy Countrywide in 
January [2008] for approximately $4 billion, should reconsider the deal’s price tag.  If 
the purchase price for Countrywide was ‘based in part on profits from these bad 
practices, Bank of America should demand a lower price, because these practices will 
not be allowed to continue,’ he said. 
Id. 
 549. Morgenson, supra note 544; see also Jonathan Stempel, Buffett Says Fed 
Avoided Chaos in Bear Bailout, REUTERS, May 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0332203020080503. 
 550. Henry Blodget, Bear Stearns Bailout Paves Way For $1+ Trillion U.S. 
Homeowner Rescue Plan, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Mar.24, 2008, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henry-blodget/bear-stearns-bailout-pave_b_93052.html; 
see also Stempel, supra note 549. 
 551. Morgenson, supra note 544. 
 552. Stempel, supra note 549. 
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point” in the latest financial market turmoil,” although other economics 
experts were far less sanguine about the Fed’s maneuver.553  Anna 
Schwartz, a contemporary of Nobel Laureate economist Milton 
Friedman, called the Bear Stearns bailout a “rogue operation,” and that 
“the Fed had no business intervening there.”554  Timothy F. Geithner, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York president, has since called for “more 
stringent supervision over financial institutions and urged banks to put 
in place more fail-safes to prevent the liquidity problems that claimed 
Bear Stearns last month.”555  According to Minneapolis Fed president 
Gary Stern, there is simply “no way to put the genie back in the bottle,” 
while Harvard University professor, and former International Monetary 
Fund research director, Kenneth Rogoff quipped, “[I]t is very hard in the 
middle of a crisis to know where to draw lines.”556 
Former regulators have also spoken publicly about the political 
climate for change.557  Counted among them is former SEC Chairman 
 
 553. John Thornhill et al., Bear Stearns Rescue a ‘Turning Point,’ FIN. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3325b50a-03fb-11dd-b28b-
000077b07658,dwp_uuid=8cd8eda0-f1d7-11dc-9b45-0000779fd2ac.html; see also 
Janet Morissey, Nouriel Roubini – Superbear Says There’s More to Come, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080324/REG/767507756. 
It’s the beginning of a radical change in monetary policy.  It’s not just the $30 billion 
that the Fed confirmed to Bear Stearns via JPMorgan — there were two other major 
options that went in the same direction.  One was the decision [two weeks ago] to 
provide $200 billion so that all primary dealers, including non-bank financial 
institutions, would be able to swap their illiquid and toxic MBS [paper] for safe 
Treasuries.  The other was the Fed giving any primary dealer, including non-banks, 
access to the Fed discount window on the same terms as banking institutions.  This is 
a radical change; we haven’t seen anything like this since the Great Depression.  
These are financial institutions that are not regulated or supervised by the Fed.  The 
Fed has no idea of whether they are just illiquid or insolvent, which creates a massive 
moral hazard problem.  It’s a radical shift in the way the Fed operates — and a 
dangerous way, I would argue. 
Id. 
 554. Craig Torres, Fed ‘Rogue Operation’ Spurs Further Bailout Calls (Update 1), 
REUTERS, May 2, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601 
087&sid=a1ctn1Xfq5Do&refer=home. 
 555. Michael Grynbaum, Fed Officials Defend Rescue of Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/business/03cnd-fed.htm 
(Mr. Geinther’s “recommendations were vague and came at the close of an often-
gripping testimony [as he] recounted the weeklong process by which the Fed mediated 
the fire sale of Bear Stearns to its Wall Street rival, JPMorgan Chase.”). 
 556. Torres, supra note 554. 
 557. Brian Blackstone, Real Time Economics: Volcker Warns of Precedent Set by 
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William Donaldson, who announced his support for Senator Barack 
Obama’s candidacy, based in large part upon the issue of financial 
market regulatory reform, and noted that Sen. Obama “saw the ‘need to 
take a good hard look at how things are organized’ and ‘just exactly 
what went wrong in terms of the regulatory oversight that we have.’”558 
Formerly America’s fifth-largest investment bank, Bear Stearns 
was widely reputed for having among the largest appetites for subprime 
risk on Wall Street, and as two of its hedge funds imploded under the 
weight of excessive leverage,559 its stock slid from a peak of roughly 
$120 per share, to JPMorgan Chase’s initial bid of $2, later upped to $10 
per share.560  Bear Stearns shareholders have asserted a host of 
derivative claims, connected principally to the bank’s subprime collapse 
and subsequently proposed takeover, and as a class they seek, inter alia, 
injunctive relief to block the proposed merger.561  Meanwhile, Bear’s 
 
Fed Moves, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/ 
2008/05/14/volcker-warns-of-precedent-set-by-fed-moves/?mod=WSJBlog.  Former 
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker cautioned during prepared testimony to 
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that use of what he characterized as “long-
dormant” Fed powers may be seen subsequently as a precedent for future periods of 
economic stress: 
‘Whatever claims might be made about the uniqueness of current circumstances, it 
seems inevitable that the nature of the Fed’s response will be taken into account and 
be anticipated, by officials and market participants alike, in similar future 
circumstances,’ [ ] Volcker hinted at the Fed’s recent role facilitating the rescue and 
proposed takeover of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase.  The Fed, he said, ‘felt it 
necessary to extend that safety net’ to systemically important institutions by 
‘providing direct support for one important investment bank experiencing a 
devastating run, and then potentially extending such support to other investment banks 
that appeared vulnerable [to] speculative attack,’ Volcker said. 
 
‘Hence, the natural corollary is that systemically important investment banks should 
be regulated and supervised along at least the basic lines appropriate for commercial 
banks that they closely resemble in key respects,’ he said. 
Id. 
 558. Christopher Cooper et al., Obama to Receive Endorsement Of 3 Former SEC 
Chairmen, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121 
073227421390697.html. 
 559. Joe Bel Bruno, Hedge Fund Collapse at Bear Stearns Trickles Down to 
Pension Funds, Ordinary Investors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20070626-1135-bearstearns-fallout.ht 
ml. 
 560. Francesco Guerrera et al., JPMorgan Faces $9bn Charge for Bear Clean-Up, 
FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c44bc2d8-2113-
11dd-a0e6-000077b07658.html; see also Stempel, supra note 549. 
 561. See Second Amended Complaint, Cohen v. Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., No. 
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bailout was examined during House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee hearings.562 
JPMorgan Chase was not the only firm to benefit from the Federal 
Reserve’s historic largesse.  During a rare crisis avoidance move, the 
Fed opened its “discount window” to investment banks who were all too 
willing to scoop up “tens of billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve, 
rushing to get hard-to-sell mortgage bonds off their battered balance 
sheets.”563  One month later, “as Washington beg[an] to consider how to 
modernize a hodgepodge of banking regulations,” the Senate Banking 
Committee conducted post-mortem hearings aimed at “examin[ing] the 
collapse of Bear Stearns and its implications for taxpayers, regulators 
and future financial crises.”564  Senate Banking Committee Chairman, 
Sen. Christopher Dodd, has also expressed recent concerns about a 
“potential crisis in the student-loan market,” and House Financial 
Services Committee Chairman, Rep. Barney Frank, has noted that “new 
rules are needed to deal with a lack of regulation of risk.”565  The 
approach advocated here, solely with regard to the prospective financial 
services merger review process, favors neither business combinations 
nor opposition thereto, but instead promotes a “new baseline for 
fairness,”566 one which effectively equips those empowered to review 
proposed banking mergers with whatever tools are reasonably available 
to accurately evaluate relevant micro and macro market conditions as 
they relate to a prospective transaction. 
 
07 Civ. 10453 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 562. See James Politi, House Panel Questions Bear Rescue Plan, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4e041ddc-04f8-11dd-a2f0-000077b0765 
8,dwp_uuid=8cd8eda0-f1d7-11dc-9b45-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 563. Stephen Foley, Brokers Rush to Borrow Funds from the Fed, INDEPENDENT 
(UK), Mar. 21, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ 
brokers-rush-to-borrow-funds-from-the-fed-799127.html. 
 564. Grynbaum, supra note 555. 
 565. See Torres, supra note 554. 
 566. John Poirier, Fed Backs Credit Card Reforms, REUTERS, May 2, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT00892120080502. 
‘The proposed rules are intended to establish a new baseline for fairness in how credit 
card plans operate,’ Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke said at a meeting to approve the 
proposal. ‘Consumers relying on credit cards should be better able to predict how their 
decisions and actions will affect their costs.’ 
Id. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
The last half-century has been a period of incredible social, 
technological, and economic advancement for much of the world, as an 
electronic “information age” has brought unprecedented enlightenment 
to billions.  The benefits have also extended to financial services, as 
money now moves around the world daily with enhanced information 
processing and at the speed of light, allowing for efficient delivery of 
financial services in virtually every currency known and at every 
location on earth.  Formerly provincial economies now operate globally 
and trading partners cooperate from virtually all locales.  The domestic 
market for financial services is no exception, and has realized vast 
improvements in efficiencies, largely through the use of technology, but 
also through combinations of financial services firms with 
complimentary skills, markets, products and services.  Regrettably, 
much of the law that still governs the antitrust review process of bank 
mergers remains rooted in a doctrine that was developed years before 
humans first explored the surface of the moon. 
Financial services are no longer an exclusive domain of commercial 
banks.  In fact, market sectors for virtually every financial product and 
service, once associated with “insulated” traditional banks, are now 
filled with nonbank competitors of all sorts, including toll-free telephone 
mortgage originators, purely internet “banks,” credit card companies 
offering checking accounts, auto and home loan markets financed by 
hedge funds, check cashing and predatory “pay day advance” outfits that 
litter struggling urban neighborhoods, and firms like American Express 
dominate the small business lending market. 
There can be little debate that beyond the last classic bastion of the 
banking industry—the purely depository account—almost every other 
imaginable financial product or service has a competitive landscape that 
includes non-banks.  These advancements only increased during the last 
decade, as the Internet became commercialized and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act ushered in the era of combined banking, securities, and 
insurance businesses organized under one corporate umbrella.  Since the 
Citicorp and Travelers mega-merger, others have followed suit, and still 
hundreds, if not thousands, of other smaller transactions have resulted in 
combinations of traditional banks with a host of nonbank firms. 
The U.S. Supreme Court established once prudent and effective 
boundaries to govern the scope of regulatory reviews for proposed 
mergers involving businesses that were considered “unique”—banks.  
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Those boundaries were delineated mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, well 
before the most significant economic and technological changes served 
as catalysts for an evolving financial services industry.  Philadelphia 
National Bank was the common law progenitor of what was indeed 
sound policy for an era when a commercial bank was a clearly 
identifiable creature.  The Philadelphia National Bank Court labored to 
craft a workable rule that “was substantively strong and administrable,” 
and that would presumably stand the test of time.567 
Today, the entities that provide many of the bank-like functions are 
often, although not always, components of a bank holding company 
structure that include a variety of products and services that may have 
been unimaginable when the Supreme Court first fashioned those 
regulatory standards of review.  The Philadelphia National Bank 
approach remains quite relevant in some respects, but it is believed that 
the test created in 1963 should only be among the sharpest arrows in a 
bank regulator’s quiver, instead of its entire arsenal of review. 
The Department of Justice moved away from bank merger reviews 
dominated by the local market analysis that has been the hallmark of the 
Philadelphia National Bank legacy, and which has become an inflexible 
metric when employed exclusively.  Federal bank regulators have not 
yet been liberated from the constraints of an antiquated standard created 
almost a half century ago.  Local market analysis has indirectly 
engendered a trend of closure and divestiture, designed to secure merger 
approval, which in the abstract might seem to be innocuous, until one 
carefully considers the adverse secondary effects attendant to the 
elimination of long-standing relationships at the neighborhood and 
community level, in addition to frustration of the spirit and intent of the 
Community Reinvestment Act. 
Consolidation typically promises greater efficiencies and lower 
delivery costs, although it seems that all too often any realized savings 
quickly morph into one-time higher net profits, and consumers are 
 
 567. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS: 
LAW AND POLICY p. 58 n.296 (1986) (citing and quoting Richard Posner, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 105 (1976)). 
Philadelphia National Bank placed considerable weight upon devising a rule that was 
substantively strong and administrable.  Noting ‘the danger of subverting 
congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation,’ the Court said 
that ‘in any case in which it is possible . . . to simplify the test of illegality, the courts 
ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial administration.’ (citing 
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963)). 
Id. 
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rarely, if ever, the beneficiaries of any of the merger upside.  The 
downside can of course include higher fees, fewer choices, decreases in 
staff and customer service, and worse still, a market vacuum that all too 
often replaces depository institutions that were once community pillars 
with “pay-day” lenders, check-cashing stores and outfits of similar 
predatory ilk. 
With virtually 100% of all merger applications garnering approval 
during the last decade, approval has been a veritable “rubber stamp,” 
provided that overtly monopolistic market share did not result directly 
from a proposed transaction.  The DOJ has been consistently more 
pragmatic in its approach to bank merger analysis over the years, and 
continues to factor in market elements that federal bank regulators might 
ignore, due to what seems to be an overly devoted deference to 
Philadelphia National Bank precedent.  A DOJ review typically includes 
evaluation of any market participants that provide competing products or 
services, regardless of whether the potential competitor is a credit card 
issuer, or some other nonbank operation.  However, federal bank 
regulators do partially consider savings and loans and similar thrifts that 
are not considered part of the traditional commercial banking sector, or a 
component of the DOJ merger application analysis. 
The divergence between the DOJ and federal banking regulators 
creates inconsistency, contradiction, and increased regulatory 
uncertainty, save for the consistent fact that virtually every merger 
application has been approved during the last decade.  It also offers a 
skewed vision of the actual amount of anticompetitive activity present in 
various banking markets.  Perhaps an aspect of provincialism is at work 
that causes factions of the federal government to resist adopting 
standards developed in another portion of that same government.  
Nonetheless, the DOJ position, on balance, is more adaptable to the 
market realities of consolidation in today’s financial services sector. 
The Philadelphia National Bank standard endures to some degree, 
even if unspoken, and unquestionably deserves to hold a meaningful 
place amongst all of the tools available to the DOJ and banking 
regulators, as future proposed transactions are evaluated.  Yet, adherence 
to that standard has all too often been the totality of the analysis, in such 
devoted deference to stare decisis, that it seems misguided.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made the 
following observations some two decades ago: 
Whether, in view of the dynamic changes in the banking industry 
over the past decade, discrete and highly specialized banking 
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practices, such as those involved here, may realistically be included 
in a general commercial banking product market, however, is a 
difficult question which the time constraints of the decision making 
process in this case simply do not allow us to probe with the 
necessary care.568 
The U.S. Supreme Court has more than once wisely recognized that 
as times change, so too must legal standards adapt to evolving 
circumstances.569  This is almost certainly one of those occasions.  
During its last term, the Court eliminated a nearly century-old antitrust-
based ban on minimum retail pricing,570 in a direct acknowledgement 
that as markets evolve, U.S. laws must keep the pace.571  This is 
especially true as the domestic economy will eventually rebound from 
the recession in which it is eventually mired, and an upswing of M&A 
activity will be a likely occupant of the leading edge of that recovery.572  
 
 568. Irving Bank Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 845 F.2d 1035, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 569. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (Marshall, J. Blackmum, J., 
joining, dissenting).  The Supreme Court has also stated: 
[T]his Court has never departed from precedent without ‘special justification.’ [ ]. 
Such justifications include the advent of ‘subsequent changes or development in the 
law’ that undermine a decision’s rationale, [ ]; the need ‘to bring [a decision] into 
agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained,’ [ ]; and a showing that a 
particular precedent has become a ‘detriment to coherence and consistency in the 
law.’ [ ]. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 570. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., ___ U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 
2705 (2007).  Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, noted that long-standing 
precedent can evolve with time: 
Stare decisis, we conclude, does not compel our continued adherence to the per se 
rule against vertical price restraints. As discussed earlier, respected authorities in the 
economics literature suggest the per se rule is inappropriate, and there is now 
widespread agreement that resale price maintenance can have procompetitive effects. 
[ ] It is also significant that both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission-the antitrust enforcement agencies with the ability to assess the long-
term impacts of resale price maintenance-have recommended that this Court replace 
the per se rule with the traditional rule of reason. 
Id. at 2721. 
 571. Id.; see also Giang Nguyen, Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 
d/b/a Kay’s Kloset, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12, 2006, http://docket.medill.north 
western.edu/archives/004185.php. 
 572. Ben Steverman, M&A: The Big Thaw?, BUSINESSWEEK, May 15, 2008, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/may2008/pi2008 
0515_859749.htm.  It has been reported that: 
So far this year [2008], the total value of announced M&A deals is . . . down 39% in 
the U.S. and 34% worldwide from this time a year ago. . . . [but] [b]ankers and 
experts said the shrinking of available credit has acted as a brake on the M&A 
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The Court can, and should, take prudent steps to modify and modernize 
the governing standard of bank merger review and equip banking 
regulators with all the tools available to perform application scrutiny in a 
manner truly consistent with their regulatory charge. 
The Authors urge that whatever the future analytical framework for 
evaluating proposed bank mergers might be, the last thing it should be is 
dutiful devotion to stare decisis merely for the sake of not offending a 
half-century of doctrinal deference.  Regulatory reform trial balloons 
have been advanced throughout the year, including the dramatic release 
of the U.S. Treasury Department’s “blueprint,” which advocates for the 
adoption of a “less is more” approach, and urges for the consolidation 
and closure of federal financial regulators, with the Federal Reserve 
filling the void by utilizing substantially enhanced powers over the 
banking sector. 
The Fed recently advanced substantive reforms regarding consumer 
credit card issuer practices, including “a proposal that would limit 
interest rate hikes, abolish certain fees, and modify controversial billing 
practices—targeting what officials consider to be abuses,”573 and further 
suggesting receptiveness to systemic regulatory overhaul.  Considering 
that the Fed has arguably been the most devout adherent to the 
monolithic and now outdated Philadelphia National Bank standard, the 
Court is stridently urged to soon revisit the question of what might 
constitute an appropriate measure of bank merger scrutiny, and craft an 
adaptable new standard that is mindful of the path already traveled, but 
also responsive to the rate of change fast afoot on Wall and Main streets, 
and perhaps soon within the “Beltway” and also on Pennsylvania 
Avenue. 
 
market.  The credit crisis began last summer, but it really started to slow dealmaking 
in the fall.  The M&A market hit its roughest patch in February and March, when 
investment bank Bear Stearns [ ] collapsed. 
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